DeYoung v. City of San Diego

• Decision Date: 14 September 1983
• Citation: 194 Cal.Rptr. 722,147 Cal.App.3d 11
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: Howard DeYOUNG, et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. CITY OF SAN DIEGO, et al., Defendants and Respondents. Civ. 28290.

Page 722

194 Cal.Rptr. 722

147 Cal.App.3d 11

Howard DeYOUNG, et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. CITY OF SAN DIEGO, et al., Defendants and Respondents.

Civ. 28290.

Court of Appeal, Fourth District, Division 1, California.

Sept. 14, 1983.

D. Dwight Worden, and W. Scott Williams, Solana Beach, for plaintiffs and appellants.

John W. Witt, City Atty., Ronald L. Johnson, Chief Deputy City Atty., Celeste Stahl Brady, Deputy City Atty., for defendants and respondents.

WORK, Associate Justice.

Howard DeYoung and the Citizens for Recreational Use of Pueblo Lands (Citizens) appeal an order refusing to enjoin the City of San Diego, its City Council and City Manager, from taking further action or expending money to lease a portion of City-owned Pueblo Lands near Torrey Pines Municipal Golf Course for more than 15 years. The sole question before us is whether City Charter section 219 regarding Pueblo Lands permits leasing such lands for periods in excess of 15 years upon City Council approval followed by voter ratification. Concluding section 219 allows long-term leasing by such method, we affirm the order.

Factual and Procedural Background

The San Diego electorate adopted a new City Charter in 1931, including section 219 entitled "Pueblo Lands." That section provides:

"No sale of Pueblo Lands owned by The City of San Diego which are situated North of the North line of the San Diego River shall ever be valid and binding upon said City unless such sale shall have been first authorized by an ordinance duly passed by the Council and thereafter ratified by the electors of The City of San Diego at any special or general municipal election. The City Manager shall have authority to lease Pueblo Lands, provided that any lease for a term exceeding one year shall not be valid unless first authorized by ordinance of the Council. No lease shall be valid for a period of time exceeding fifteen years."

Section 219 has never been amended. An attempt to do so in 1975 resulted in the electorate rejecting, by a vote of 85,938 to 52,275, a proposal to amend section 219 to allow leasing of Pueblo Lands for periods up to 55 years, thus repealing the 15-year limitation.

During the 1950's, the City developed a portion of the Pueblo Lands in Torrey Pines Mesa as a municipal golf course and proposed constructing golf club facilities, a hotel, restaurant and related activities. In 1956, the City Council enacted and the electorate ratified ordinance No. 6905 authorizing the leasing of certain portions of Pueblo lots 1330 and 1331 for a period exceeding 15 years for these purposes. In 1961, the City entered into a 50-year lease with a private party resulting in the construction of the Torrey Pines Inn. In 1963, ordinance No. 8879 (to authorize the sale or conveyance, trade or exchange of portions of certain Pueblo lots including Nos. 1326 and 1330) was enacted by the City Council, but rejected by the electorate. In 1964, ordinance No. 8983 was enacted by the City Council and apparently ratified by the electorate authorizing the lease or sale of portions of certain Pueblo lots including 1326 and 1330.

Authorized by City Council Resolution No. R-255145, the City Manager requested proposals (RFP) to develop and operate a hotel and related facilities on the Torrey Pines Mesa adjacent to the golf course. The land involved comprises portions of Pueblo lots 1326, 1330 and 1331, measuring approximately 15 acres. The proposed development contemplates the leasing of Pueblo Lands for a term greater than 15 years. After reviewing proposals by the Property Department, the Public Facilities and Recreation Committee and the City Council, the Council selected the Sheraton Corporation as the developer to exclusively negotiate with the City for potential lease and development.

DeYoung and Citizens ¹ promptly sued for injunctive and declaratory relief, alleging City's actions would illegally expend public funds and waste City property because the development contemplates a lease in excess of 15 years contrary to section 219. Plaintiffs also seek to enjoin further negotiation and execution of a lease agreement for more than 15 years. Plaintiffs also seek a declaration section 219 absolutely prohibits leasing City-owned Pueblo Lands for more than 15 years and ordinance No. 6905 does not authorize the City to lease the Pueblo Lands subject to this lawsuit for more than 15 years. The trial court denied the request for preliminary injunction, stating:

"In respect to the hearing held this date in which the plaintiff seeks a preliminary injunction to prohibit the City's leasing of Pueblo Lands for a term in excess of 15 years, and in which the contention of the parties centers upon the construction of Section 219 of the Charter, the Court's conclusion is the provision 'no lease shall be valid for a period of time exceeding 15 years' is to be construed according to the same standard and conditions set forth in this section applicable to the sale of Pueblo Lands and thus permits a lease of Pueblo Lands for a term in excess of 15 years if the lease is authorized by an ordinance of the Council and is thereafter ratified by the electors of the City of San Diego."

Plaintiffs contend the "plain meaning rule" when applied to the final sentence of section 219 mandates a judicial construction the City may not lease Pueblo Lands for a period in excess of fifteen years, even when approved by the voters. They urge the prohibitory "language of section 219, read literally and given its 'usual and ordinary import' makes plain, good sense and there is no room for judicial interpretation." Granted, when reading the last sentence of section 219 in isolation, it appears to clearly forbid all leases of Pueblo Lands in excess of fifteen years. However, sentences of a statutory provision must be read and construed in context. (Tripp v. Swoap, 17 Cal.3d 671, 679, 131 Cal.Rptr. 789, 552 P.2d 749, overruled on other grounds in Frink v. Prod, 31 Cal.3d 166, 180, 181 Cal.Rptr. 893, 643 P.2d 476.) Upon reading section 219 in its entirety, it becomes unclear whether it intends to forbid all leases over fifteen years or just such leases not ratified by the electorate. Accordingly, we construe the charter provision in light of the character of the document it is within and relevant settled rules of statutory construction.

APPLICABLE LAW REGARDING REVIEW AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION

The grant or denial of a preliminary injunction generally lies within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed on appeal absent a showing of a clear abuse of discretion. (City of Torrance v. Transitional Living Centers for Los Angeles, Inc., 30 Cal.3d 516, 519, 179 Cal.Rptr. 907, 638 P.2d 1304; Continental Banking Co. v. Katz, 68 Cal.2d 512, 527, 67 Cal.Rptr. 761, 439 P.2d 889.) Normally, plaintiffs must establish that pending trial on the merits, defendants should be restrained from exercising the right claimed by them, as the underlying purpose of the injunction is to preserve the status quo until a final determination is made upon the merits. Consequently, the court must determine whether defendants would suffer greater harm from issuance of the preliminary injunction than the plaintiffs would suffer from its refusal, considering the reasonable probability the plaintiffs would ultimately prevail on the merits. (People v. Pacific Land Research Co., 20 Cal.3d 10, 21, 141 Cal.Rptr. 20, 569 P.2d 125; Continental Banking Co. v. Katz, supra, 68 Cal.2d at p. 528, 67 Cal.Rptr. 761, 439 P.2d 889.) However, since the trial court based its denial of the preliminary injunction solely on its interpretation of Charter section 219, we review this matter as a question of law. (California Teachers Ass'n v. San Diego Community College Dist., 28 Cal.3d 692, 699, 170 Cal.Rptr. 817, 621 P.2d 856; Killian v. City and County of San Francisco, 77 Cal.App.3d 1, 7, 143 Cal.Rptr. 430.)

As a chartered city, San Diego "can make and enforce all ordinances and regulations regarding the municipal affairs subject only to the restrictions and limitations imposed by the city charter, as well as conflicting provisions in the United States and California Constitutions and preemptive state law." (Grimm v. City of San Diego, 94 Cal.App.3d 33, 37, 156 Cal.Rptr. 240.)

"The charter operates not as a grant of power, but as an instrument of limitation and restriction on the exercise of power over all municipal affairs which the city is assumed to possess; and the enumeration of powers does not constitute an exclusion or limitation. [Citations.] ... All rules of statutory construction as applied to charter provisions [citations] are subordinate to this controlling principle.... A construction in favor of the exercise of the power and against the existence of any limitation or restriction thereon which is not expressly stated in the charter is clearly indicated.... Thus in construing the city's charter a restriction on the exercise of municipal power may not be implied." (City of Grass Valley v. Walkinshaw, 34 Cal.2d 595, 598-599 ; Grimm v. City of San Diego, supra, 94 Cal.App.3d 33, 38 ; see Taylor v. Crane, 24 Cal.3d 442, 450-451 [155 Cal.Rptr. 695, 595 P.2d 129]; Oneto v. City of Fresno, 136 Cal.App.3d 460, 464 .)

The fundamental rules of statutory construction apply to interpret Charter provisions. (Oneto v. City of Fresno, supra, 136 Cal.App.3d 460, 465, 186 Cal.Rptr. 299; Castaneda v. Holcomb, 114 Cal.App.3d 939 942, 170 Cal.Rptr. 875; Squire v. City and County of San Francisco, 12 Cal.App.3d 974, 980, 91 Cal.Rptr. 347; Currieri v. City of Roseville, 4 Cal.App.3d 997, 1001, 84 Cal.Rptr. 615.) First, "the court should ascertain the intent of the Legislature so as to effectuate the purpose of the law." (Select Base Materials v. Board of Equal., 51 Cal.2d 640, 645, 335 P.2d 672; California Teachers Ass'n v. San Diego Community College Dist., supra, 28 Cal.3d 692, 698, 170 Cal.Rptr. 817, 621 P.2d 856; Moyer v....