St. George's Ebenezer Primitive Methodist Church of Methuen v. Primitive Methodist Church of United States

• Decision Date: 27 December 1943
• Parties: ST. GEORGE'S EBENEZER PRIMITIVE METHODIST CHURCH OF METHUEN v. PRIMITIVE METHODIST CHURCH OF UNITED STATES, EASTERN CONFERENCE, et al.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

315 Mass. 202

52 N.E.2d 401

ST. GEORGE'S EBENEZER PRIMITIVE METHODIST CHURCH OF METHUEN

v.PRIMITIVE METHODIST CHURCH OF UNITED STATES, EASTERN CONFERENCE, et al.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Essex.

Dec. 27, 1943.

Proceeding by St. George's Ebenezer Primitive Methodist Church of Methuen against Primitive Methodist Church of the United States of America, Eastern Conference and others, for revocation of a land title certificate, issued to named respondent's trustees, and issuance of a new certificate to petitioner. Judgment for petitioner, and respondents appeal and bring exceptions.

Appeal dismissed, and exceptions sustained.Appeal and exceptions from Land Court, Essex County; C. C. Smith, judge.

Before FIELD, C. J., and DONAHUE, LUMMUS, QUA, and RONAN, JJ.

M. A. Cregg, of Lawrence, for petitioner.

J. C. Johnston and J. Friedberg, both of Boston, and S. Baker and D. A. Baker, both of Lowell, for respondents.

RONAN, Justice.

The petition, filed in the Land Court, seeks the revocation of a certificate of title to certain premises, which was issued on December 12, 1902, to the trustees of the Eastern Conference of the Primitive Methodist Church, and the issuance of a new certificate to the petitioner on the ground that one Searles, the owner of the locus, intended to convey it to the petitioner, but through the mistake of the scrivener conveyed it on October 20, 1902, to the said trustees. The demurrer of the respondents was overruled and their plea to the jurisdiction was overruled. The judge found in favor of the petitioner and ordered the issuance of a new certificate in the name of the petitioner. The case is here both on appeal and on exceptions.

The petitioner, a religious society incorporated in 1888 under the name of the ‘Ebenezer Primitive Methodist Church of Methuen’ (changed in 1906 to ‘St. George's Ebenezer Primitive Methodist Church of Methuen’), has since its organization maintained a place of public worship in Methuen. The respondent, the Primitive Methodist Church of the United States of America, ‘Eastern Conference,’ hereinafter called the conference, was incorporated by Special Act, St.1893, c. 175, for the purpose of maintaining public worship according to the faith, usages and discipline of that denomination. The membership of the conference comprises the churches of that denomination located in portions of Rhode Island and Massachusetts. There is a board of trustees who are elected annually and are authorized to receive and hold in trust for the benefit of the conference, donations, bequests and grants ‘made to the Primitive Methodist Church of the United States of America.’

We first consider the plea to the jurisdiction. The petition purports to be based upon G.L. (Ter.Ed.) c. 185, §§ 112, 114. The Land Court is empowered by section 112 to determine the validity of a claim adverse to the registered owner which arose after the original registration of the land. The petition, however, does not allege, and the bill of exceptions, which contains all the material evidence, does not show, that the petitioner ever filed any sworn statement of its claim as required by this section. We cannot accept as a fact the making and filing of such a statement by a mere general reference to such a statement in the petitioner's brief. Gorey v. Guarente, 303 Mass. 569, 22 N.E.2d 99;Davis & O'Connor Co. v. Shell Oil Co., Inc., 311 Mass. 401, 41 N.E.2d 287. Consequently, the petitioner shows no right to maintain the petition under this section. One who has neglected to take the necessary and essential steps provided by a statute creating a remedy has no right to the remedy. Brown v. Town of Winthrop, 275 Mass. 43, 175 N.E. 50;Old Colony R. Co. v. Board of Assessors of Quincy, 305 Mass. 509, 26 N.E.2d 313; City of Waltham v. City of Newton, 306 Mass. 59, 27 N.E.2d 965;Boston Five Cents Savings Bank v. Assessors of Boston, 311 Mass. 415, 41 N.E.2d 283.

A registered owner or other person in interest may file a petition under G.L. (Ter.Ed.) c. 185, § 114, for amendment of a certificate of title or the issuance of a new certificate upon proof of any of the specific grounds enumerated in this section ‘or upon any other reasonable ground,’ provided relief may be given without opening the original decree of registration and without impairing the title or interest of a purchaser holding a certificate for value and in good faith, unless such purchaser in writing consents thereto. The rights of no innocent purchaser for value have intervened since the issuance of the certificate of title to the trustees, and relief may be granted to the petitioner if entitled to relief, without disturbing the original decree of registration. Ward v. Prudential Ins. Co., 299 Mass. 559, 13 N.E.2d 411. The petitioner must show that it is a person in interest in order to maintain a petition under section 114. The word ‘interest’ has been said to be one of broad significance and ‘its meaning in any particular case depends upon the setting in which it is employed.’ Commonwealth v. Albert, 307 Mass. 239, 245, 29 N.E.2d 817. The Legislature in using a term capable of varying shades of meaning must be understoodto have adopted the particular meaning that best served its purpose and aim in enacting the statute. Sears v. Inhabitants of Nahant, 215 Mass. 234, 102 N.E. 491, Ann.Cas.1914C, 1296;City of Marlborough v. City of Lynn, 275 Mass. 394, 176 N.E. 214;City of Worcester v. Quinn, 304 Mass. 276, 23 N.E.2d 463, 125 A.L.R. 707. Here, we are dealing with a statute that is part of an elaborate legislative plan for the registration of titles to land, where, subject to certain exceptions, all rights of ownership and interests in the land are shown by certificates of title. We think a person in ‘interest’ must be one who has a proprietary, pecuniary or some other right or interest in the land itself, as distinguished from a claim of a personal nature against the owner of the land. We are confirmed in this view by the later use of this same word in this sense in other parts of this statute. It is a general rule of statutory construction that ordinarily a term appearing in different portions of a statute is to be given the same meaning. Bay State St. R. Co. v. City of Woburn, 232 Mass. 201, 122 N.E. 268;Hood Rubber Co. v. Commissioner of Corporations and Taxation, 268 Mass. 355, 167 N.E. 670, 70 A.L.R. 1;Animal Rescue League of Boston v. Assessors of Bourne, 310 Mass. 330, 37 N.E.2d 1019, 138 A.L.R. 110;Wellesley College v. Attorney General, 313 Mass. 722, 49 N.E.2d 220. Moreover, section 114 must be construed with section 1(k) of the same chapter, as amended by St.1934, c. 67, which conferred jurisdiction upon the Land Court of ‘All cases and matters of equity cognizable under the general principles of equity jurisprudence where any right, title or interest in land is involved, except suits in equity for specific performance of contracts,’ as parts of a single harmonious legislative system dealing with the registration of titles and interests in land. Hite v. Hite, 301 Mass. 294, 17 N.E.2d 176, 119 A.L.R. 517;Board of Assessors of Town of Brookline v. Prudential Ins. Co., 310 Mass. 300, 38 N.E.2d 145.

We think that one claiming an equitable interest in land has sufficient standing to maintain a petition under section 114. Indeed, it has been held that the Land Court may adjudicate the validity of a right to specific performance of a contract to convey land upon proceedings for the registration of title though it has no power to enforce the contract. Johnson v. Rosengard, 299 Mass. 375, 377, 12 N.E.2d 825. See Lamson v. Coulson, 234 Mass. 288, 125 N.E. 551. It follows that there was no error in overruling the plea to the jurisdiction.

We now pass to the material facts appearing in the decision of the trial judge. One Searles, a resident of Methuen, became interested some forty years ago in providing a new place of worship in Methuen ‘for a local group of Methodist people whose pastor at that time he seems to have esteemed highly.’ He executed a deed of registered land on October 20, 1902, to the ‘Trustees of the Eastern Conference of the Primitive Methodist Church’ upon condition that the premises would revert to him and his heirs and assigns if the church should cease to use the property for religious purposes, or if Methuen became...