St. Johns County v. Owings

• Decision Date: 16 November 1989
• Docket Number: No. 89-557,89-557
• Citation: 14 Fla. L. Weekly 2663,554 So.2d 535
• Parties: 14 Fla. L. Weekly 2663 ST. JOHNS COUNTY, Florida, etc. and David Bruner, Petitioners, v. W. Conway OWINGS, Respondent.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

Page 535

554 So.2d 535

14 Fla. L. Weekly 2663

ST. JOHNS COUNTY, Florida, etc. and David Bruner, Petitioners, v. W. Conway OWINGS, Respondent.

No. 89-557.

District Court of Appeal of Florida,

Fifth District.

Nov. 16, 1989.

James G. Sisco, St. Augustine, for petitioner, St. Johns County.

Geoffrey B. Dobson, St. Augustine, for petitioner, David Bruner.

George M. McClure, of McClure and Whiteman, St. Augustine, for respondent.

DANIEL, Chief Judge.

Petitioners, St. Johns County and David Bruner, seek review by petition for writ of certiorari of a circuit court order quashing the county's denial of a rezoning request of respondent land owner, W. Conway Owings and remanding the action to the county for rezoning to an appropriate commercial classification. Because of the limited scope of review in such matters, we are constrained to deny the petition for writ of certiorari.

Since 1973, the property in question has been zoned for multi-family residential use. The property is bounded on the north, west and east by commercially zoned property. South of the property is single family residential zoning. In 1985, the present owner's agent applied to have the property rezoned to a Planned Special Development to allow the building of a seventy-seven unit hotel-condominium and a shopping arcade. That request was denied in 1986, and no appeal was taken. Subsequently, in 1987, the owner filed a second rezoning application to have the property zoned for commercial general use or such other commercial classification as would be appropriate. The planning and zoning board recommended denial of the request because it determined that residential zoning was consistent with the Comprehensive Plan and compatible with the prevailing land uses. The plan provides for continuation of the status quo in the area, with development to continue along the same lines as on record--a somewhat ambiguous direction. Under the plan, commercial facilities are to be arranged to maximize accessibility, compliment traffic circulation and insure compatibility with adjacent property. The plan also states that commercial activity is to be restricted to the Poplar Avenue area. Poplar Avenue is the street one block north of the property in question. After considering all the evidence presented, the County Commission adopted the board's recommendation and denied the application for rezoning.

The circuit court, sitting in its appellate capacity, reviewed the County Commission's decision and found that the rezoning application was not barred by administrative res judicata because of the 1985 request and that the Comprehensive Plan could reasonably be interpreted to allow for commercial zoning in the area in question. Finally, the court concluded that denial of the rezoning application, where the property was surrounded by commercial zoning on all but one side, was not reasonable, holding that the issue was not fairly debatable and the record was devoid of competent substantial evidence to support the denial.

As recently emphasized by the Florida Supreme Court in Education Development Center, Inc. v. City of West Palm Beach Zoning Board of Appeals, 541 So.2d 106 (Fla.1989), a district court of appeal plays a very limited role in reviewing a circuit court's action in a zoning dispute such as this. Only the circuit court can review whether the judgment of the zoning authority is supported by competent substantial evidence. The district court of appeal merely determines whether the circuit court afforded due process and applied the correct law. See also City of Deerfield Beach v. Vaillant, 419 So.2d 624 (Fla.1982). As the court in Education Development Center noted, a district court of appeal may not quash a circuit court's decision because it disagrees with the circuit court's evaluation of the evidence.

In this case, the circuit court applied the correct law in determining that administrative res judicata did not bar the owner's second rezoning application. See Thomson v. Department of Environmental Regulation, 511 So.2d 989 (Fla.1987) (res judicata bars a second administrative application only if it is not supported by new facts, changed conditions, or additional submissions); City of Miami Beach v. Prevatt, 97 So.2d 473 (Fla.1957) (res judicata should be applied cautiously in zoning matters); Coral Reef Nurseries, Inc. v. Babcock, 410 So.2d 648 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1982) (doctrine of res judicata should be liberally construed in favor of applicant for zoning change). In fact, res judicata was not listed as a reason for the denial of the application by the county.

The circuit court also applied the correct law where it determined that the zoning change must comply with the Florida Local Government Comprehensive Planning and Land Regulation Act ¹ which requires that all development be consistent with the applicable comprehensive plan. The court weighed the opinion of the planning and zoning board that the small tract in question could not be zoned commercial without violating the plan, against the fact that the surrounding property on three sides was zoned for commercial use without violating the plan, as well as the opinion of an expert planner that the change would be consistent with the plan, and determined that the plan would not be violated by allowing the requested change. Again, this court cannot reweigh the evidence or substitute its judgment for that of the circuit court.

Finally, in applying the fairly debatable standard to determine whether the county commission's decision was reasonable, the circuit court utilized the correct standard of law. See, e.g., Palm Beach County v. Tinnerman, 517 So.2d 699 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987), rev. denied, 528 So.2d 1183 (Fla.1988) (fairly debatable standard applies in reviewing denial of rezoning). Again, the circuit court's weighing of the evidence is not subject to review by this court, as long as the correct standard of law has been applied. Regardless of whether this court would have decided the issues before the circuit court differently, a full de novo review of the county's decision by this court is not authorized, as Education Development Center and City of Deerfield Beach v. Vaillant make clear. Although as Justice McDonald suggested in his dissent to Education Development Center, the narrow scope of review allowed the district court of appeal may clothe the trial judge with "the powers of absolute czar in zoning matters", 541 So.2d at 109, another full review would render meaningless the circuit court's action.

Accordingly, as the circuit court applied the correct law in this case, the petition for writ of certiorari is DENIED.

DAUKSCH, J., concurs.

SHARP, J., dissents with opinion.

SHARP, Judge, dissenting.

NOTE: OPINION CONTAINS TABLE OR OTHER DATA THAT IS NOT VIEWABLE

The circuit court reviewed by writ of certiorari a decision of the Board of County Commissioners of St. Johns County which denied the landowner's (Owings') application to change the zoning on undeveloped land in Vilano Beach from RG-2(B) (multifamily) to CG-B (commercial general) or another appropriate commercial zoning category. The circuit court ruled that the Commission must grant Owings' application for "an appropriate commercial zoning classification" for three reasons:

(1) Owings' prior application to rezone the same property in 1985 to commercial P.S.D. (Planned Special District), which was denied and not appealed, should be given no res judicata effect in this proceeding;

(2) The requested CG-B zoning is consistent with St. Johns' comprehensive plan; and

(3) The denial of the requested zoning was not fairly debatable because the record before the Commission was "devoid of substantial, competent evidence to support the Commission's decision."

I would quash the lower court's ruling on all three grounds, although I recognize that the third ground may be unreviewable by us at the district court level, in light of Education Development Center, Inc. v City of West Palm Beach Zoning Board of Appeals, 541 So.2d 106 (Fla.1989).

The property involved in this case consists of approximately two and one-half acres. (See Map.) It is a long, skinny, triangular piece of land, sometimes referred to as the Point on Vilano Beach. One of its long sides fronts on Vilano Road, and at least nine of its two-tiered fifty platted lots face A1A at the ninety degree turn where A1A goes north after the bridge. Across Vilano Road, north of the property, all of the one-tier of lots are zoned commercial from the bridge to the ocean. Similarly, except for the Point, the lots on the south side of Vilano Road are also zoned commercial from the bridge to the ocean, as well as a few properties on Anamha Drive, which runs south from the Point, parallel with the ocean.

However, immediately to the south of the Point property is an extensive single-family residential. One row of homes on Ferrol Street would be directly adjacent to any commercial development on the Point's southernmost tier of lots, and other single-family lots would directly face it across Ferrol Street. Owings' application for commercial zoning included no conditions or provisions to buffer the single-family district from future commercial development on the Point.

Owings purchased the Point property in 1977. It was then zoned multifamily residential at the prior owner's request when zoning was first adopted in Vilano Beach, in the early 1970's. The other properties facing Vilano Road were zoned commercial at the inception of the zoning ordinances, or have since been changed to commercial. Most of the businesses are small. The property immediately to the west of the Point is zoned multifamily and one commercial piece is used downstairs as a shop and upstairs as a residence. Very little has changed in the neighborhood in the last five years, except that families are beginning to build larger, single-family homes in the vicinity.

In 1985, a contract buyer for the Point, with Owings' consent,...