Stafne v. Snohomish Cnty.
| Decision Date | 08 March 2012 |
| Docket Number | No. 84894–7.,84894–7. |
| Citation | 271 P.3d 868 |
| Parties | Scott E. STAFNE, a single man, Respondent and Cross Petitioner, v. SNOHOMISH COUNTY and Snohomish County Planning Department and Troy Holbrook, in his position as a Snohomish County Planner, Petitioners and Cross Respondents. |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Bree Urban, John Roberts Moffat, Snohomish County Prosecutor's Office, Everett, WA, for Petitioners and Cross–Respondents.
Scott Erik Stafne, Stafne Law Firm, Arlington, WA, Michael Barr King, Carney Badley Spellman, PS, Seattle, WA, for Respondent and Cross–Petitioner.
Darren E. Carnell, Jennifer M. Stacy, King County Prosecutor's Office, Seattle, WA, amicus counsel for Washington Association of Prosecuting Attorneys.Timothy J. Donaldson, J. Preston Frederickson, Walla Walla City Attorney's Office, Walla Walla, WA, amicus counsel for Washington State Association of Municipal Attorneys.
¶ 1 This case involves whether a landowner seeking review of a county's decision not to adopt a proposed comprehensive plan amendment must appeal to the growth management hearings board (growth board) before seeking a remedy in superior court. This case also involves whether a party is entitled to a constitutional writ of certiorari or declaratory relief under the circumstances of this case.
¶ 2 The superior court granted Snohomish County's motion to dismiss Scott Stafne's land use petition and complaint. The Court of Appeals held that based on its conclusion that appeal to the growth board would be futile, the complaint was properly filed in superior court under the Land Use Petition Act (LUPA), chapter 36.70C of the Revised Code of Washington (RCW) but affirmed the dismissal on other grounds. Both parties were granted review. We affirm, but hold that decisions related to amendment of comprehensive plans must be appealed to the growth board under the procedures provided for in the Growth Management Act (GMA), chapter 36.70A RCW, and failure to do so precludes superior court review. We also hold that a constitutional writ and declaratory relief are unavailable under the circumstances of this case.
¶ 3 Scott Stafne, the petitioner and attorney acting pro se throughout most of these proceedings, owns a 20–acre lot in Twin Falls Estates, an area currently designated under Snohomish County's comprehensive plan as low density rural residential. Stafne bought a section of land adjacent to his property from the Department of Natural Resources (DNR) that was designated under the plan as commercial forest land (CFL) and forest transition area (FTA), which is at issue in this case.
¶ 4 Stafne sought and had been granted a boundary line adjustment allowing him to incorporate the newly acquired land onto his existing lot, though the acquired land retained its CFL and FTA status. In October 2007, Stafne submitted a docket proposal to the Snohomish County Council (Council) requesting the Council legislatively amend the County's comprehensive plan to redesignate the CFL and FTA portions of his property to low density rural residential. Stafne has generally maintained that his acquired land should be redesignated because the land, which is characterized by streams, wetlands, and very steep slopes, could not be considered “forest land” under the GMA. 1 Snohomish County considers such docket proposals annually. Snohomish County Code (SCC) 30.74.015; RCW 36.70A.130(2)(a).
¶ 5 Stafne addressed the Council at the June 9, 2008, public hearing, arguing that under the statute, his acquired land should not be designated forest land and requested that the comprehensive plan be amended. He pointed out that the land had been acquired from DNR because DNR had determined the land was not appropriate for commercial logging. Stafne also argued the County's planning department, which conducts the initial review and evaluation of docket proposals pursuant to SCC 30.74.030, erroneously relied on a previous definition of “forest land” when evaluating his proposal. On June 16, the Council adopted “Amended Motion No. 08–238,” approving the final list of proposals it decided to consider. The Council decided not to place Stafne's proposal on the final docket. Stafne did not appeal the Council's decision not to adopt his proposed amendment to the growth board.
¶ 6 Instead, on July 18, 2008, Stafne filed a complaint and a land use petition in superior court. He later amended his complaint to include requests for a statutory writ of review, writ of mandamus, writ of prohibition, or a constitutional writ of certiorari. He also sought a declaratory judgment that the land he acquired from DNR did not meet the definition of “forest land” under the GMA, and thus, could not be designated CFL as a matter of law.
¶ 7 The County moved to dismiss Stafne's lawsuit (1) under Civil Rule (CR) 12(b)(6), arguing that the decision to amend a comprehensive plan is a legislative act and the courts have no power to grant legislative relief, and (2) under CR 12(b)(1), arguing that petitions alleging GMA noncompliance must be appealed to the growth board before the superior court can have subject matter jurisdiction. Stafne filed a cross motion for partial summary judgment on his declaratory judgment action. The superior court granted the County's motion to dismiss and denied Stafne's motion.
¶ 8 Stafne appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed but held that Stafne was not required to exhaust administrative remedies by seeking review at the growth board because such review would be futile, and as a result, LUPA was his exclusive means to obtain review in superior court. Nevertheless, the court held that Stafne's land use petition was untimely and affirmed the trial court. Further, the court held that the trial court did not err in denying Stafne's request for writ of mandamus or prohibition and that Stafne was not entitled to declaratory judgment on summary judgment because LUPA was an adequate alternative remedy. Stafne v. Snohomish County, 156 Wash.App. 667, 234 P.3d 225 (2010).
¶ 9 Both parties sought this court's review. Both petitions were granted under limited review. Stafne v. Snohomish County, 171 Wash.2d 1008, 249 P.3d 183 (2011).
1. Whether a jurisdiction's decision related to a comprehensive plan amendment must be appealed to the growth board under the GMA or whether relief can be sought in superior court under LUPA.
2. Whether a superior court has jurisdiction to review such decisions under its constitutional writ authority.
3. Whether Stafne is entitled to declaratory judgment as to the legal consequences of the County's boundary line adjustment, specifically the CFL and FTA designation of the incorporated land.
¶ 10 As mentioned, we granted both parties' petitions for review. We begin our analysis with the issues raised by the County, because if we agree with the County, Stafne's arguments will necessarily fail. Though the County agrees with the result the Court of Appeals ultimately reached, it generally disagrees with two sections of the court's analysis. First, the County disagrees with the court's conclusion that a legislative decision not to adopt a proposed comprehensive plan amendment can qualify as a “land use decision” appealable under LUPA. The County contends that this conclusion disregards the express statutory provisions and conflicts with the Court of Appeals, Division Three's decision in Coffey v. City of Walla Walla, 145 Wash.App. 435, 187 P.3d 272 (2008), which held that a superior court has no jurisdiction to review comprehensive plan decisions under LUPA. Second, the County disagrees with the court's discussion of the growth board's jurisdiction and conclusion that Stafne was excused from appealing to the growth board because review there would have been futile.2 The County argues that this conclusion is in tension with our decision in Torrance v. King County, 136 Wash.2d 783, 966 P.2d 891 (1998), where we held that decisions related to comprehensive plans must be appealed to the growth board first pursuant to the procedures in the GMA.
¶ 11 At the outset, it is crucial to recognize that the GMA and LUPA are separate and distinct statutory schemes, with each containing expressly different review procedures. Generally, under the GMA, counties and cities required or choosing to plan under the act must each maintain a comprehensive plan, a generalized coordinated land use policy statement. RCW 36.70A.030(4). The comprehensive plan must include maps and “descriptive text covering objectives, principles, and standards used to develop the comprehensive plan.” RCW 36.70A.070. These maps can include a future land use map depicting how property is designated in the jurisdiction; the designations guide how property may thereafter be zoned by the jurisdiction.
¶ 12 Comprehensive plans are subject to continuing review and evaluation. Plans are amended by legislative action according to the schedules provided in RCW 36.70A.130. As part of this review process, counties and cities are required to establish procedures for the public to annually suggest updates, proposed amendments, and revisions to the jurisdiction's comprehensive plan. RCW 36.70A.470(2). To comply, Snohomish County adopted the procedure codified in chapter 30.74 of the SCC. The participation program is known as “docketing.” To ensure the cumulative effect of all the docket proposals is ascertained, the Council must consider all proposed amendments in a single public hearing. RCW 36.70A.130(2)(b). Following the hearing, the Council determines which proposals, if any, will be added to the final docket for comprehensive plan amendments. Amendments are adopted by resolution or ordinance. RCW 36.70A.130(1)(b). This case involves the Council's decision not to adopt Stafne's proposed amendment.
¶ 13 The legislature established in the GMA an administrative appeal process to resolve GMA noncompliance allegations, including that a...
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