Stamboulos v. McKee

• Decision Date: 17 June 1975
• Citation: 342 A.2d 529,134 N.J.Super. 567
• Parties: De Metrios STAMBOULOS et al., Plaintiffs-Respondents, v. Chrighton McKEE and Johanna McKee, Defendants-Appellants.
• Court: New Jersey Superior Court — Appellate Division

Page 567

134 N.J.Super. 567

342 A.2d 529

De Metrios STAMBOULOS et al., Plaintiffs-Respondents, v. Chrighton McKEE and Johanna McKee, Defendants-Appellants.

Superior Court of New Jersey Appellate Division.

Submitted June 10, 1975.

Decided June 17, 1975.

Fornabai & Zimmermann, Fort Lee, for defendants-appellants (James V. Zimmermann, Fort Lee, on the brief).

Gladstone, Hart, Mandis, Rathe & Shedd, Hackensack, for plaintiffs-respondents (Mitchell S. Camp, Hackensack, on the brief).

Before Judges CARTON, CRANE and KOLE.

The opinion of the court was delivered by

KOLE, J.A.D.

Defendants have been month-to-month tenants of an apartment in a four-family apartment building in Fort Lee for a substantial period of time. Plaintiffs acquired title to the building on May 31, 1974. On that day they served on defendants a notice to quit and demand for possession of the apartment as of June 30, 1974. One of the plaintiffs apparently desired to reside therein. After the notice was served it appeared that another apartment in the building would become vacant in July, but it had been promised to a friend of one of the plaintiffs.

Defendants held over beyond June 30. This dispossess action was thereafter instituted. The trial judge held that plaintiffs had complied with the 30-day notice required by law; that the right to possession of the apartment vested in the landlord when the notice was given on May 31, 1974, and that the newly enacted eviction statute, effective June 25, 1974, pertaining to residential property such as that here involved, L. 1974, C. 49, ¹ did not apply since the landlords' vested right to possession accrued prior to its effective date. He granted a judgment for possession to plaintiffs. This appeal followed.

There is adequate credible evidence to sustain the trial judge's determination that the required 30-day notice was served in time, as required by law. That finding, accordingly is affirmed. State v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 146, 199 A.2d 809 (1964).

We have concluded, however, that the judge erred in holding that plaintiffs' right to possession vested upon service of the notice to quit and demand for possession, rather than on June 30, 1974 when possession was to be surrendered. Hence, the new eviction statute, effective June 25, 1974, applied to this proceeding. Since good cause for eviction under that statute was not shown, the action should have been dismissed. See 25 Fairmount Ave., Inc. v. Stockton, 130 N.J.Super. 276, 326 A.2d 106 (Cty.D.Ct.1974).

We are in substantial agreement with the rationale of Stockton. As applied to a month-to-month tenancy, the right to possession in the landlord did not arise until the time specified in the 30-day notice for the termination of the tenancy--here, June 30, 1974. On that date the new statute was applicable and precluded, with respect to residential tenants such as defendants, the termination of the month-to-month tenancy, the vesting of a right to possession in the landlord, or the dispossession of the tenants until and unless one of the 'good cause' requirements specified in § 2 of the statute, N.J.S.A. 2A:18--61.1, was shown.

We do not agree with plaintiffs that N.J.S.A. 2A:18--56, requiring one month's notice to quit in order to terminate a month-to-month tenancy, indicates that the tenancy is terminated merely by the giving of the notice. That provision has been said to be intended to protect the tenant by giving him time to readjust his affairs before his tenancy is terminated on the date set forth in the notice. Gretkowski v. Wojciechowski, 26 N.J.Super. 245, 250, 97 A.2d 701 (App.Div.1953); Pa. R.R. Co. v. L. Albert & Son, Inc., 26 N.J.Super. 508, 511, 98 A.2d 323 (App.Div.1953), cert. den. 13 N.J. 361, 99 A.2d 675 (1953). See also, Bhar Realty Corp. v. Becker, 49 N.J.Super. 585, 140 A.2d 756 (App.Div.1958).

Moreover, a month-to-month tenancy is a continuing tenancy, which does not give rise to a new relationship for each month. Even under the law as it existed prior to this statute, a new tenancy was established only when the existing monthly tenancy was actually ended and the new one commenced. Thus, where the landlord gave a proper notice to quit and demand for possession at the end of the month, unless the tenant paid an increased rental commencing the beginning of the following month, the holding over of the tenant created a new tenancy at the increased rental. See Bhar Realty Corp. v. Becker, supra; Saracino v. Capital Properties Associates, Inc., 50 N.J.Super. 81, 87, 141 A.2d 71 (App.Div.1958); Hertzberg v. Siegel, 8 N.J.Super. 226, 73 A.2d 840 (App.Div.1952); Dector v. Phelps, 136 N.J.L. 53, 51 A.2d 548 (Sup.Ct.1947); Finkelstein v. Herson, 55 N.J.L. 217, 26 A. 688 (Sup.Ct.1893).

Additionally, the notice to quit under N.J.S.A. 2A:18--56 is one of the procedural requirements to effect a termination of the tenancy in order to give the county district court jurisdiction in a dispossess action. The mere giving of it does not create or affect substantive rights between a landlord and tenant. Stockton, supra 130 N.J.Super. at 286, 326 A.2d 106. Compare Bhar Realty Corp. v. Becker, supra, 49 N.J.Super., at 588--589, 140 A.2d 756.

Thus, the new statute, effective June 25, 1974, five days before the landlord's right to possession vested, will be given prospective effect in the present case. The problem of retroactive deprivation of vested rights, therefore, is not involved. Compare Engler v. Capital Management Corp., 112 N.J.Super. 445, 447, 271 A.2d 615 (Ch.Div.1970), where the lease had expired, giving rise to an immediate vested right of possession in the landlord, and the court refused to apply the later enacted retaliatory eviction act, N.J.S.A. 2A:42--10.10. See also, Rothman v. Rothman, 65 N.J. 219, 225--232, 330 A.2d 496 (1974); Nickell v. Gall, 49 N.J. 186, 229 A.2d 511 (1967); Troy Hills Village, Inc. v. Fischler, 122 N.J.Super. 572, 578--579, 301 A.2d 177 (Law Div.1971), aff'd o.b. 122 N.J.Super. 525, 301 A.2d 153 (App.Div.1973).

Plaintiffs contend that the denial of their right as landowners to terminate a month-to-month tenancy in order to occupy the premises themselves violates fundamental property rights and is unreasonable and arbitrary since it bears no rational relationship to the announced statutory objective.

The express purpose of the new statute here involved was stated by the Legislature as follows:

At present, there are no limitations imposed by statute upon the reasons a landlord may utilize to evict a tenant. As a result, residential tenants frequently have been unfairly and arbitrarily ousted from housing quarters in which they have been comfortable and where they have not caused any problems. This is a serious matter, particularly now that there is a critical shortage of rental housing space in New Jersey. This act shall limit the eviction of tenants by landlords to reasonable grounds and provide that suitable notice shall be given to tenants where an action for eviction is instituted by the landlord. (Statement attached to L. 1974, C. 49)

The statute was adopted in response to a legislative recognition of a problem facing tenants at a time when a critical housing shortage exists. Courts have also recognized the current rental housing shortage. See E.g., Inganamorte v. Fort Lee, 62 N.J. 521, 303 A.2d 298 (1973); Marini v. Ireland, 56 N.J. 130, 265 A.2d 526 (1970); Samuelson v. Quinones, 119 N.J.Super. 338, 291 A.2d 580 (App.Div.1972). The intent of this legislation is to limit the eviction of tenants by landlords to the statutory grounds with respect to premises not excluded from its coverage. Stockton, supra, 130 N.J.Super. at 287--288, 326 A.2d 106. See Bradley v. Rapp, 132 N.J.Super. 429, 334 A.2d 61 (App.Div.1975).

There is a presumption of constitutionality of a legislative enactment. The party contesting its validity has a heavy burden of proof. Private property rights are always subject to the reasonable exercise of the state's police power, where the protection of the health, safety and general welfare of the people are concerned. Rothman v. Rothman, supra; David v. Vesta Co., 45 N.J. 301, 212 A.2d 345 (1965); Fried v. Kervick, 34 N.J. 68, 167 A.2d 380 (1961); Jamauneau v. Harner, 16 N.J. 500, 109 A.2d 640 (1954), Cert. den. 349 U.S. 904, 75 S.Ct. 580, 99 L.Ed. 1241 (1955).

To support their contention with respect to the constitutional invalidity of the statute as applied to them, plaintiffs make the following arguments: (1) they are being deprived of living quarters in their own building by tenants who would have had no legal authority to do so under prior law; (2) earlier rent control legislation adopted during periods of housing shortages permitted evictions where the landlord in good faith desired the premises for his own or his family's use as a housing accommodation; (3) provisions for this kind of relief to the owner constitute a recognition that the present statute is unreasonable, arbitrary and discriminatory as applied to owners, such as plaintiffs, who desire the apartment for their own use; (4) to deprive plaintiffs of the right to occupy an apartment which they intended for their own use when they...