Stanton v. Griffin

• Decision Date: 21 September 2021
• Docket Number: A21A0845, A21A0846
• Citation: 863 S.E.2d 548,361 Ga.App. 205
• Parties: STANTON v. GRIFFIN; and vice versa.
• Court: Georgia Court of Appeals

361 Ga.App. 205

863 S.E.2d 548

STANTON

v.GRIFFIN; and vice versa.

A21A0845, A21A0846

Court of Appeals of Georgia.

September 21, 2021

Jeremy Emanuel Citron, for Appellant in A21A0845.

Jeffrey Albright Brown, Columbus, Brooke Robyn Sexton, for Appellee in A21A0845.

Jeffrey Albright Brown, Columbus, Brooke Robyn Sexton, for Appellant in A21A0846.

Jeremy Emanuel Citron, for Appellee in A21A0846.

Phipps, Senior Appellate Judge.

Victoria Stanton injured her foot when she fell from a zipline on property owned by Martha Griffin. Stanton sued Griffin for damages on the theory of premises liability, and the trial court granted Griffin's motion for summary judgment. In Case No. A21A0845, Stanton appeals from this order, contending the trial court erred by finding that (1) Stanton was a licensee rather than an invitee at the time of her injury; (2) Griffin did not violate the applicable standard of care to Stanton; (3) Stanton's premises liability case was not converted to an ordinary negligence case by "active negligence" on the part of Griffin; and (4) Stanton assumed the risk of injury. In Case No. A21A0846, Griffin appeals from the trial court's order denying her motion to dismiss Stanton's appeal on the ground that Stanton failed to timely file the transcript of the summary judgment hearing or pay the costs of preparing the record for appeal. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the grant of summary judgment to Griffin and we dismiss as moot Griffin's appeal from the order denying her motion to dismiss Stanton's appeal from the summary judgment ruling.

Case No. A21A0845

"To prevail at summary judgment under OCGA § 9-11-56, the moving party must demonstrate that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the undisputed facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, warrant judgment as a matter of law." Peterson v. Peterson , 303 Ga. 211, 213 (1), 811 S.E.2d 309 (2018) (citations and punctuation omitted). "On appeal from an order granting or denying summary judgment, we conduct a de novo review, construing the evidence and all reasonable conclusions and inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmovant." State Automobile Mut. Ins. Co. v. Todd , 309 Ga. App. 213, 213-214 (1), 709 S.E.2d 565 (2011) (citation and punctuation omitted).

So viewed, the evidence shows that on the day she was injured, Stanton accompanied her then-future¹ mother-in-law to a family reunion hosted by Griffin and her husband on property owned by Griffin. Griffin's husband is Stanton's mother-in-law's brother. Stanton's mother-in-law testified in a deposition that no one is charged to attend the family reunion, but family members chip in to help with the cost of hosting it. According to Stanton's mother-in-law, she donated what she believed was enough to cover herself, her children, and Stanton.

At some point after arriving at the reunion, Stanton walked over to an area near a zipline that had been installed by Griffin's husband. Prior to riding the zipline, Stanton watched as others rode. Stanton testified in a deposition that she saw two people successfully ride the zipline, although one of them had to swing his body back and forth to keep his momentum going. While Stanton was standing nearby, another person riding the zipline stalled part way across and had to drop to the ground. When Stanton rode the zipline, she also came to a stop about halfway across. She then let go of the zipline handle and dropped to the ground, injuring her foot.

Stanton sued Griffin for damages on the theory of premises liability. Griffin filed a motion for summary judgment, which the trial court granted. This appeal followed.

1. Stanton argues that the trial court erred by finding that she was a licensee, rather than an invitee, on Griffin's property. This is important because, as discussed below in Division 2, the duty owed to an invitee generally is greater than that owed to a licensee. We conclude that the trial court properly found that Stanton was a licensee at the time of her injury.

An invitee is someone whom a landowner, by express or implied invitation, induces or leads to come upon his premises for any lawful purpose. A licensee, on the other hand, is a person who is neither a customer, a servant, nor a trespasser, who does not stand in any contractual relation with the landowner, and who is permitted to go on the premises merely for her own interests, convenience, or gratification.

Howard v. Gram Corp. , 268 Ga. App. 466, 467, 602 S.E.2d 241 (2004) ; see OCGA §§ 51-3-1 and 51-3-2 (a).

The general test as to whether a person is an invitee or a licensee is whether the injured person at the time of the injury had present business relations with the owner of the premises which would render his presence of mutual aid to both, or whether his presence on the premises was for his own convenience, or on business with others than the owner of the premises. In the absence of some relation which inures to the benefit of the two, or to that of the owner, no invitation may be implied, and the injured person must be regarded as a licensee.

Robinson v. Turner , 164 Ga. App. 515, 516, 297 S.E.2d 522 (1982) (citation and punctuation omitted). "The test of ‘mutuality of interest’ under [ OCGA § 51-3-2 ] is generally used in reference to a business in which the occupant is engaged or which he permits to be carried on there; it has no application in regard to a mere social guest. " Id. (citation and punctuation omitted). Rather, Georgia has consistently adopted the rule that "a social guest is not an invitee but is a licensee." Moon v. Homeowners' Assn. of Sibley Forest , 202 Ga. App. 821, 822 (2), 415 S.E.2d 654 (1992) (citation and punctuation omitted); see also Cham v. ECI Mgmt. Corp. , 353 Ga. App. 162, 165 (1) (a), 836 S.E.2d 555 (2019) ; Brown v. Dickerson , 350 Ga. App. 137, 138, 828 S.E.2d 376 (2019) ; Thompson v. Oursler , 318 Ga. App. 377, 378, 733 S.E.2d 359 (2012).

Thus, whether a person is an invitee or a licensee depends upon the nature of his relation or contact with the owner (or tenant) of the premises. If the relation solely benefits the person injured, he is at most a licensee. If, on the other hand, the relation was of mutual interest to the parties, he is an invitee. While the mutuality of interest required to render a person an invitee does not necessarily contemplate mutual economic or monetary advantage, the legal status of a mere social guest is, nevertheless, that of a licensee. And the fact that incidental services are performed by the guest during the course of his visit does not make him an invitee. But if the primary purpose of the visit is to perform services for the host or services mutually beneficial to host and guest, the legal status of the visitor is that of an invitee.

Chatham v. Larkins , 134 Ga. App. 856, 857-858 (2), 216 S.E.2d 677 (1975) (citations omitted).

Here, it is undisputed that Stanton was on Griffin's property to attend a family reunion. Stanton testified that she was a social guest, and she concedes that a "social guest" is a licensee. She argues, however, that a social guest can have her status changed from licensee to invitee based on the existence of mutuality of interest between the parties and that the trial court erred in applying a common meaning to the term "social guest" to determine her status.

In that regard, Stanton contends that there is evidence in the record that would authorize a jury to find mutuality of interest between her and Griffin and change her status from licensee to invitee. While Stanton does not argue that she provided any services to Griffin, she maintains that a jury could find mutuality of interest because (1) her mother-in-law contributed money to cover Stanton's attendance at the event, (2) other attendees also contributed to the cost of the event, and (3) the event smoothed a strained relationship between her mother-in-law and Griffin's husband, thereby "attaining ... broader organizational goals."

Stanton argues that her case is on point with the facts in Frankel v. Antman , 157 Ga. App. 26, 276 S.E.2d 87 (1981). In Frankel , the primary issue was the legal status of a volunteer member of a charitable organization attending a meeting of the organization in a private home. 157 Ga. App. at 26, 276 S.E.2d 87. The meeting was being held to plan the organization's annual fundraising event. Id. We found that the volunteer and the homeowner "shared a ‘common interest’ – the planning of the ... fundraiser – and [the volunteer] was present in the ... home solely for this purpose." Id. at 27, 276 S.E.2d 87. Consequently, we held that "the jury could have found that [the volunteer] was more than a mere social guest because sufficient ‘mutuality of interest’ existed between her and the [homeowners]." Id. at 28, 276 S.E.2d 87. Stanton's reliance on Frankel is misplaced, because the visitor in that case was present solely for the purpose of attending the meeting of the charitable organization. Stanton, on the other hand, was on Griffin's property to attend a social event. While Stanton contends that "there are significant facts that bear upon the mutuality of interest" here and "commonalities" between the parties, she does not identify any "common interest" that she and Griffin shared or point to any evidence that she was on Griffin's property to promote any such interest. Consequently, Frankel does not support Stanton's argument that she was an invitee. See Riley v. Brasunas , 210 Ga. App. 865, 866 (1), 438 S.E.2d 113 (1993) (concluding that "[t]he fact that a joint family social trip for their mutual personal benefit was being planned while appellants were guests in appellees’ private residence would not elevate their status from that of licensee to an invitee," and distinguishing Frankel on that basis). Accordingly, the trial court did not err by finding that Stanton, as a social guest, was a licensee.

2. Stanton argues that questions of material fact...