State, Dept. of Corrections v. Watts

• Citation: 177 P.3d 793,2008 WY 19
• Decision Date: 22 February 2008
• Docket Number: No. S-07-0050.,No. S-07-0095.,S-07-0050.,S-07-0095.
• Parties: STATE of Wyoming DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Wyoming State Penitentiary, Wyoming Honor Farm, Petitioners, v. Leonard (Lee) WATTS, Personal Representative of The Estate of Tammy Sue Watts, Respondent. The State of Wyoming Department of Corrections, Wyoming State Penitentiary, Wyoming Honor Farm, Appellants (Defendants), v. Leonard (Lee) Watts, Personal Representative of the Estate of Tammy Sue Watts, Appellee (Plaintiff).
• Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

177 P.3d 793

2008 WY 19

STATE of Wyoming DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Wyoming State Penitentiary, Wyoming Honor Farm, Petitioners, v. Leonard (Lee) WATTS, Personal Representative of The Estate of Tammy Sue Watts, Respondent.

The State of Wyoming Department of Corrections, Wyoming State Penitentiary, Wyoming Honor Farm, Appellants (Defendants), v. Leonard (Lee) Watts, Personal Representative of the Estate of Tammy Sue Watts, Appellee (Plaintiff).

No. S-07-0050.

No. S-07-0095.

Supreme Court of Wyoming.

February 22, 2008.

Representing Petitioners/Appellants: Patrick J. Crank, Wyoming Attorney General; John W. Renneisen, Deputy Attorney General; Misha Westby, Senior Assistant Attorney General; C. Levi Martin, Senior Assistant Attorney General. Argument by Ms. Westby.

Representing Respondent/Appellee: David B. Hooper and Tom A. Glassberg of Hooper Law Offices, P.C., Riverton, Wyoming. Argument by Mr. Hooper.

Before VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, JJ.

KITE, Justice.

[¶ 1] Leonard (Lee) Watts brought a wrongful death suit after his wife, Tammy Sue Watts, who was a contract nurse at the Wyoming Honor Farm, was murdered by an inmate. The Wyoming Department of Corrections, Wyoming State Penitentiary and Wyoming Honor Farm (hereinafter collectively referred to as "the State") moved for summary judgment, claiming they were immune from suit pursuant to the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act (WGCA). The district court denied their motion. In this combined appeal and writ of review, the State contests the district court's ruling. We conclude that Mr. Watts' claims are barred under the WGCA. Consequently, we reverse.

ISSUES

[¶ 2] The State phrases the issue as:

Do Appellee's claims fall within the "operation or maintenance of any building" exception to governmental immunity under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-39-106 (LexisNexis 2003)?

Mr. Watts states the following appellate issues:

1. Does the Court have jurisdiction to review the District Court's Order Denying the State's Motion for Summary Judgment?

2. Was the death of Tammy Watts a direct result of the manner in which the State of Wyoming operated the Honor Farm Administration Building thus permitting a claim to be made for wrongful death "caused by the negligence of public employees ... in the operation or maintenance of any building ..." Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-39-106 (LexisNexis 2003)?

FACTS

[¶ 3] Ms. Watts was a contract nurse who worked at the Wyoming Honor Farm. She usually arrived for work around 6:00 a.m. each day. Ms. Watts was typically alone in the medical offices until the other nurse arrived between 6:30 and 7:00 a.m. The medical offices were located in the basement of the administration building, and inmates could access them from the east door without being observed. Sometime before 7:00 a.m. on April 15, 2004, Floyd Grady, an inmate at the Honor Farm, murdered Ms. Watts in the medical offices.

[¶ 4] As personal representative of Ms. Watts' estate, Mr. Watts brought a wrongful death suit on behalf of her heirs. He claimed the State was negligent by:

• releasing Mr. Grady from the Wyoming State Penitentiary and transferring him to the Honor Farm;

• failing to provide for Ms. Watts' safety and security;

• failing to "provide the security and reasonably safe conditions necessary to protect contract workers" from persons known to be extremely dangerous such as Mr. Grady;

• failing to "imprison and guard" Mr. Grady and other dangerous inmates in a reasonable manner;

• failing to operate the administration building in a safe and secure manner;

• providing an insufficient number of detention officers at the Honor Farm;

• improperly training, supervising and managing the detention officers at the Honor Farm • failing to provide Ms. Watts with security from dangerous inmates;

• failing to prevent Mr. Grady from attacking and killing Ms. Watts.

[¶ 5] The State filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting it was immune from suit under the WGCA, Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 1-39-101, et seq. (LexisNexis 2003). Mr. Watts argued that § 1-39-106, which waives immunity for "the negligence of public employees while acting within the scope of their duties in the operation or maintenance of any building," applied to his claims. Mr. Watts argues that the "lack of sufficient guards, surveillance over the stairs and area where Tammy Watts traveled to the medical offices and locating and operating the medical offices in the Administration Building in a fashion that permitted the inmates direct, unobserved access to the medical offices between 6:00 and 6:30 a.m. when Tammy Watts was there by herself' fell within the waiver of immunity in § 1-39-106.

[¶ 6] The district court denied the State's motion for a summary judgment, stating:

1. The State asserts no exception of the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act (Wyo. Stat. §§ 1-39-101 through 1-39-117) that permits the estate of Tammy Watts to bring this lawsuit.

....

3. Plaintiff asserts that Defendants are liable pursuant to Wyo. Stat. § 1-39-106[,] i.e. Tammy Watts' death was caused by the negligence in Defendants' operation or maintenance of the Wyoming Honor Farm.

4. Genuine issues of material fact exist as to the negligence, if any, of Defendants in the operation and maintenance of the Wyoming State Honor Farm, including but not limited to the number of security officers on duty the morning of Tammy Watt's murder, the lack of security cameras in certain areas of the facility, Tammy Watts' duties as a nurse at the Honor Farm, and inherent risks, if any, of such employment.

[¶ 7] The State filed a notice of appeal or, in the alternative, a petition for writ of review, seeking appellate review of the district court's ruling on its claim it was immune from suit. We granted a writ of review.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

[¶ 8] Summary judgment motions are governed by W.R.C.P. 56(c):

The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.

We review a district court's summary judgment rulings de novo, using the same materials and following the same standards as the district court. The facts are reviewed from the vantage point most favorable to the party opposing the motion, and we give that party the benefit of all favorable inferences that may fairly be drawn from the record. Cook v. Shoshone First Bank, 2006 WY 13, ¶ 11, 126 P.3d 886, 889 (Wyo.2006); Garcia v. Lawson, 928 P.2d 1164, 1166 (Wyo.1996).

DISCUSSION

1. Jurisdiction

[¶ 9] Before we consider the merits, we will address whether we have jurisdiction over this appeal and the proper procedure for obtaining judicial review of a denial of a motion for summary judgment on the basis of immunity.¹ Generally, the denial of a motion for summary judgment is not an appealable final order. Gilstrap v. June Eisele Warren Trust, 2005 WY 21, ¶ 7, 106 P.3d 858, 861 (Wyo.2005); Wolter v. Equitable Resources Energy Co., 979 P.2d 948, 953 (Wyo. 1999). However, we have recognized an exception to the general rule when a district court refuses to dismiss a case on the basis of qualified immunity. Park County v. Cooney, 845 P.2d 346, 349 (Wyo.1992).

The United States Supreme Court has held ... that a federal district court's denial of a motion to dismiss based on qualified immunity was "an appealable `final decision' * * * notwithstanding the absence of a final judgment." Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 530, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 2817, 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985). The Court reasoned that qualified immunity provides "an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability, and like an absolute immunity, it is effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial." Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 526, 105 S.Ct. at 2815 (emphasis in original). In other words, unless the order denying dismissal can be reviewed before trial, it can never be effectively reviewed at all, because the defendant will have already suffered an irreparable loss to his immunity from suit.

....

State courts are divided on whether interlocutory appeal is available under these circumstances. We believe the state decisions which allow appeal, for the reasons detailed in Mitchell as cited above, are better reasoned; and we therefore hold that an order denying dismissal of a claim based on qualified immunity is an order appealable to this court. See Henke v. Superior Court, 161 Ariz. 96, 775 P.2d 1160, 1162-64 (Ariz.[App.]1989).

Id.

[¶ 10] We have, in the past, granted a writ of review for the purpose of examining a denial of a governmental entity's motion for summary judgment on the basis of immunity under the WGCA. See, e.g., City of Cheyenne v. Huitt, 844 P.2d 1102 (Wyo.1993). However, the same policies which favor an exception to the general rule in qualified immunity cases that summary judgment denials are not appealable apply to claims of governmental immunity. We conclude, therefore, an order denying a summary judgment on a claim of governmental immunity is appealable and it is not necessary to grant discretionary review in such circumstances. Because we have jurisdiction to consider the State's appeal of the district court's order denying its motion for summary judgment on the immunity issue, the writ of review is superfluous and we, therefore, dismiss it as unnecessarily granted.

2. Section 1-39-106

[¶ 11] Section 1-39-104(a) states:

(a) A governmental entity and its public employees while acting within the scope of duties are granted immunity from liability for any tort except as provided by W.S. 1-39-105 through 1-39-112 and limited by W.S. 1-39-121.

[¶ 12] Mr. Watts argued, and the district court apparently agreed, his claims fell within the waiver of immunity in § 1-39-106. Section 1-39-106 states:

A governmental entity is liable for damages...