State, Dept. of Revenue, Child Support Enforcement Div. v. Beans

• Decision Date: 04 September 1998
• Docket Number: No. S-8322,S-8322
• Citation: 965 P.2d 725
• Parties: STATE of Alaska, DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT DIVISION, Appellant, v. Paul BEANS, Appellee.
• Court: Alaska Supreme Court

Page 725

965 P.2d 725

STATE of Alaska, DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT DIVISION, Appellant, v. Paul BEANS, Appellee.

No. S-8322.

Supreme Court of Alaska.

Sept. 4, 1998.

Diane L. Wendlandt, Assistant Attorney General, Anchorage, and Bruce M. Botelho, Attorney General, Juneau, for Appellant.

Jim Kentch, Anchorage, for Appellee.

Before MATTHEWS, C.J., and COMPTON, EASTAUGH, FABE and BRYNER, JJ.

OPINION

COMPTON, Justice.

I. INTRODUCTION

The Child Support Enforcement Division (CSED) appeals the superior court's determination that AS 25.27.246, which provides for the suspension of delinquent child support obligors' driver's licenses, is unconstitutional. We affirm in part and reverse and remand in part.

II. FACTS & PROCEEDINGS

Paul Beans is the father of Nathaniel Kokrine, born in May 1991. In 1993 CSED ordered Beans to pay $845 per month in child support and established an arrearage of $15,377.

In January 1996 CSED sent Beans a "Notice of Intent to Suspend or Deny the Issuance or Renewal of Driver's License." Beans asked to enter a payment agreement with CSED. CSED sent Beans a proposed agreement, to which he did not respond. In March 1997 CSED issued a default decision finding Beans not in substantial compliance with the support order. In April Beans moved the superior court to review CSED's decision. In May the superior court held a hearing at which the court expressed concerns about the constitutionality of AS 25.27.246. The superior court appointed counsel to represent Beans pro bono and ordered counsel to brief the constitutional issues potentially raised by AS 25.27.246. The court stayed further licensing action pending resolution of the constitutional issues.

In June Beans moved for summary judgment, arguing that AS 25.27.246 violated his rights to substantive due process, procedural due process, and equal protection of law. The superior court granted this motion. It held that (1) the statute violated Beans's substantive due process rights because it was not rational; (2) the statute violated Beans's procedural due process rights because it denied him a jury trial; and (3) the statute violated Beans's equal protection rights because it did not contain a "best efforts" defense like that in a similar statute dealing with occupational licenses. This appeal followed. ¹

III. STATUTORY BACKGROUND

Alaska Statute 25.27.246 permits CSED to take adverse action against a delinquent child support obligor's driver's license. It requires CSED to maintain a list of obligors who are not in substantial compliance with support orders and to whom CSED has sent a notice of arrearages at least sixty days before it places them on the list. See AS 25.27.246(a). CSED must notify each person on the list that their driver's license will be suspended in 150 days and will not be reissued unless they obtain a release from CSED. See AS 25.27.246(b).

Licensees may request review of their inclusion on the list. See AS 25.27.246(e)-(f). CSED must release a licensee from the list if any of the following conditions is met: (1) the licensee is found to be in substantial compliance with the support order; (2) the licensee is in substantial compliance with a payment agreement negotiated with CSED; (3) the licensee obtains a judicial finding of substantial compliance; or (4) CSED or judicial review is not completed within the 150-day period before the licensee's license is suspended, through no fault of the licensee. See AS 25.27.246(f).

Following administrative review, a licensee may request judicial relief from CSED's decision. See AS 25.27.246(i). Alaska Statute 25.27.246(i) limits the court's review to three questions: "(1) whether there is a support order or a payment schedule on arrearages; (2) whether the petitioner is the obligor covered by the support order; and (3) whether the obligor is in substantial compliance with the support order or payment schedule."

IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review questions of constitutional law de novo. See, e.g., Lantz v. Lantz, 845 P.2d 429, 431 n. 1 (Alaska 1993). We will "adopt the rule of law that is most persuasive in light of precedent, reason, and policy." Wright v. Black, 856 P.2d 477, 479 (Alaska 1993).

V. DISCUSSION

A. Alaska Statute 25.27.246 Does Not Violate Beans's Right to Substantive Due Process.

Article I, section seven of the Alaska Constitution provides that "[n]o person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." Substantive due process, we have explained,

is denied when a legislative enactment has no reasonable relationship to a legitimate governmental purpose. It is not a court's role to decide whether a particular statute or ordinance is a wise one.... The constitutional guarantee of substantive due process assures only that a legislative body's decision is not arbitrary but instead based on some rational policy.

... The party claiming a denial of substantive due process has the burden of demonstrating that no rational basis for the challenged legislation exists. This burden is a heavy one, for if any conceivable legitimate public policy for the enactment is apparent on its face or is offered by those defending the enactment, the opponents of the measure must disprove the factual basis for such a justification.

Concerned Citizens of South Kenai Peninsula v. Kenai Peninsula Borough, 527 P.2d 447, 452 (Alaska 1974) (footnote omitted).

CSED clearly articulates a legitimate public policy for targeting the driver's licenses of delinquent obligors: the State needs to collect child support from all obligors, whether they are subject to income withholding or not. The threat of driver's license suspension is a particularly effective enforcement tool against those obligors who resist income withholding. Beans has not disproved this contention, as required by Concerned Citizens of South Kenai Peninsula.

Beans first argues that license revocation makes it more difficult for an obligor to earn the money to pay child support. Because this effect is contradictory to the State's asserted desire to collect child support, argues Beans, the statute is arbitrary. But Beans misses the point of the statute: an obligor who is willing to pay child support will not lose his or her license. As soon as an obligor enters into and begins to comply with a payment agreement negotiated under AS 25.27.246(f)(1) then, under subsection (f), CSED must release the obligor's license.

Beans next suggests that the lack of relationship between the sanction (forfeiting a driver's license) and Beans's underlying conduct makes AS 25.27.246 arbitrary. This argument focuses on the wrong relationship entirely. Whether there is a direct relationship between Beans's underlying conduct and the potential sanction has little or nothing to do with whether the sanction is particularly effective against a certain class of delinquent obligors. It is this particular effectiveness that makes the sanction of losing a driver's license rational.

Beans argues that, because CSED only pursues licensing action against delinquent obligors whose former spouses have used CSED's collection services, the authorizing statute has no rational basis. Beans provides no authority for the proposition that this method of selection renders a statute unconstitutional. CSED responds that "[a] statute is not arbitrary ... merely because the enforcement tool provided by that statute is used only in those cases in which the state's enforcement mechanism has been triggered." CSED's position is more persuasive. It is not irrational to limit CSED's enforcement efforts to cases in which CSED is already implicated or in which its aid is requested.

Finally, Beans argues that the statute does not distinguish between obligors who are avoiding payment and obligors who simply cannot pay. It is true that the statute does not explicitly draw that distinction, and we agree that such a distinction is necessary for the statute to satisfy the requirements of substantive due process. The statute, however, provides CSED with the flexibility to draw a distinction between obligors who are unwilling to pay and obligors who are unable to pay, as follows: CSED must release an obligor's license if the obligor is in substantial compliance with a payment schedule negotiated with CSED under subsection (f)(1). The statute does not circumscribe CSED's authority to negotiate such a payment schedule. In order to comport with the requirements of due process, CSED is simply required to exercise that authority to negotiate a payment schedule on arrearages that is within an obligor's ability to pay. ²

This court has explained that "[a] statute may be unconstitutional either on its face or as applied. A statute is facially unconstitutional if 'no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid.' " Javed v. State, Dep't of Public Safety, 921 P.2d 620, 625 (Alaska 1996) (quoting United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745, 107 S.Ct. 2095, 95 L.Ed.2d 697 (1987) and citing Gilmore v. Alaska Workers' Comp. Bd., 882 P.2d 922, 929 n. 17 (Alaska 1994)). Furthermore, AS 01.10.030 requires that any statute that does not contain a severability clause (which AS 25.27.246 does not appear to contain) be construed as though it contained the following language:

If any provision of this Act, or the application thereof to any person or circumstance is held invalid, the remainder of this Act and the application to other persons or circumstances shall not be affected thereby.

If AS 25.27.246 were applied so as to take away the license of an obligor who was unable to pay child support, it would be unconstitutional as applied in that case. At that point there would be no rational connection between the deprivation of the license and the State's goal of collecting child support. CSED's flexibility in negotiating payment plans, however, ensures that the statute need not be applied in such a manner; it is not unconstitutional on...