State v. Buchmann
| Decision Date | 06 May 2013 |
| Docket Number | A12-1518 |
| Parties | State of Minnesota by Commissioner of Human Services, Intervenor, County of Swift ex rel. Sarah J. Bouta n/k/a Sarah J. Ashburn, Appellant, v. Bruce H. Buchmann, Respondent. |
| Court | Minnesota Court of Appeals |
Reversed
Swift County District Court
Robin W. Finke, Swift County Attorney, Benson, Minnesota (for appellant)
Tara J. Ulmaniec, Ulmaniec Law Office P.L.L.C., Benson, Minnesota (for respondent)
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, Cynthia B. Jahnke, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota (for intervenor Minnesota Commissioner of Human Services)
Considered and decided by Larkin, Presiding Judge; Halbrooks, Judge; and Rodenberg, Judge.
1. Application of Minn. Stat. § 171.30, subd. 1(j) (2012), which prohibits issuing limited commercial driver's licenses to child support obligors whose driver's licenses have been suspended because they are significantly in arrears and not in compliance with a payment agreement, does not violate a rural obligor's constitutionalright to substantive due process even though that obligor was formerly employed as a commercial truck driver.
2. Application of Minn. Stat. § 171.186, subd. 1 (2012), which permits suspension of a child support obligor's driver's license when that obligor is significantly in arrears and not in compliance with a payment agreement, does not violate an obligor's constitutional right to equal protection even though that obligor lives isolated in rural Minnesota.
Appellant Swift County and intervenor Minnesota Commissioner of Human Services (commissioner) challenge the district court's order declaring unconstitutional as applied to respondent Bruce Buchmann Minnesota's statutes allowing driver's license suspensions for failure to pay child support. See generally Minn. Stat. §§ 171.186, subd. 1, .30, subd. 1(j). We reverse.
Respondent and Sarah Ashburn are the parents of R.D.B., born May 10, 1997, and D.M.B., born December 27, 1999. Respondent has two other children. Respondent rents a house in rural western Minnesota.1 The nearest town, Danvers, has a population of 97 and is located nine miles from respondent's home. Respondent has worked in the past as a commercial truck driver. He is now unemployed.
In December 2001, respondent was ordered to pay $200 per month in child support for R.D.B and D.M.B. At that time, respondent was self-employed, preparing and selling firewood. Since that time, respondent has repeatedly failed to pay his child support obligation. This failure has resulted in significant arrearages and has prompted judicial and administrative actions, including repeated suspension of respondent's driver's and commercial driver's licenses. Over the years, respondent has entered into payment agreements with the county and had his licenses reinstated. Each time his driving privileges have been reinstated, he has again failed to make payments as agreed, resulting in those privileges again being suspended
Respondent's long history of failure to pay his child support has prompted the district court to hold him in contempt. In April 2005, the district court found him in constructive civil contempt for nonpayment of support. Respondent's driver's license had been suspended for nonpayment of child support. The district court noted that respondent lost his job as a truck driver after he abandoned a truck for hire and its load in California when he was faced with an unloading delay caused by a longshoreman's strike. It also noted that, although respondent was unemployed, he had never moved for a reduction of his monthly child support obligation. The district court found respondent's unemployment to be "due to deliberate irresponsibility on his part."
In February 2006, respondent entered into a payment agreement with the Swift County child support office and his driving privileges were reinstated. In April 2008, respondent entered into a second payment agreement with Swift County, and his license, which had been suspended for nonpayment, was again reinstated. However, respondentmade no payments pursuant to this agreement and his license was again suspended in June 2009. Respondent entered into a third payment agreement with Swift County in October 2009. He made the last child support payment he has ever made on November 2, 2009, which payment was made by income withholding. In 2010, respondent's driving privileges were again suspended and have remained so.
As a result of respondent's chronic unemployment, his home no longer has running water, telephone service, or electricity because of unpaid bills. He has an outdated eyeglasses prescription, and cannot afford the copay for replacement glasses. He formerly relied on friends for transportation, but he claims that this is no longer an option. Respondent owns no vehicle. His driver's and commercial driver's licenses have now expired.
In February and September 2011, the county sought again to have respondent held in contempt of court for nonpayment of child support. Respondent was then over $25,700 in arrears. Respondent moved to dismiss the contempt proceeding and to reinstate his licenses, arguing that the driver's-license-suspension statutes are unconstitutional.
The district court held the contempt hearing before the constitutional issues were briefed and argued. At the hearing, a county child support officer testified that a number of jobs were available in the area that did not require a driver's license. Respondent testified that his lack of transportation made it impossible for him to find a job either because the job required a driver's license or because he would not be able to get to and from work. In an order filed March 8, 2012, the district court declined to hold respondentin contempt, noting that "[r]egardless of Respondent's level of responsibility in creating this dilemma, Minnesota Statutes are preventing Respondent from being able to turn his life around and resume making child support payments."
In an order filed July 3, 2012, the district court declared that the statute prohibiting the issuance of a limited commercial driver's license violated respondent's constitutional right of substantive due process. The district court identified the right to pursue employment as a protected interest and concluded that, while there is a rational basis for the statutes allowing for suspension of a driver's license for nonpayment of support, the prohibition against issuing a limited commercial driver's license to those nonpaying obligors whose driver's licenses had been suspended was "wholly irrational." The district court reasoned that prohibiting an obligor like respondent who is a commercial truck driver from obtaining a limited commercial driver's license prevents him from making a living and continuing to make child support payments, and that "[r]egardless of whether the obligor will make the payments, the obligor must have an opportunity to do so."
The district court also declared that the statute allowing for suspension of driver's licenses for nonpayment of child support violated respondent's constitutional right to equal protection. The district court reasoned that "the effect of the laws on people in rural Minnesota is considerably more harmful than for those in urban areas," and "the availability of employment is considerably lower" than in urban areas because there are fewer employers. The district court also emphasized that public transportation is rarely available in rural Minnesota, resulting in a "significantly greater" burden on ruralMinnesotans whose driver's licenses are suspended. The district court concluded that it is "wholly irrational" to expect rural residents to walk or bike multiple miles or to move to find and maintain employment and that, without a driver's license, respondent cannot move his life forward or continue to make his child support payments. Swift County appealed. The commissioner intervened.
I. Did the district court err in determining that Minn. Stat. § 171.30, subd. 1(j) violates respondent's substantive due process right to earn a living?
II. Did the district court err in determining that Minn. Stat. § 171.186, subd. 1, violates respondent's right to equal protection of the laws?
We review as-applied challenges to the constitutionality of statutes de novo. Schatz v. Interfaith Care Ctr., 811 N.W.2d 643, 653 (Minn. 2012). Minnesota statutes are presumed constitutional and reviewing courts declare statutes unconstitutional only when "absolutely necessary." Id. at 653-54; see also Minn. Stat. § 645.17(3) (2012) (). A court's power to declare a statute unconstitutional should be "exercised with extreme caution." Associated Builders & Contractors v. Ventura, 610 N.W.2d 293, 299 (Minn. 2000). The party challenging a statute's constitutionality must therefore demonstrate the unconstitutionality beyond a reasonable doubt. Schatz, 811 N.W.2d at 654.
Whether Minnesota's driver's license suspension statutes are unconstitutional is a matter of first impression. Minnesota, however, is not the only state to have adopted this type of statutory scheme to incentivize obligors to pay their child support.2 As such, this is not the first time the constitutionality of these statutes has been challenged on either a due process or equal protection basis. See, e.g., Thompson v. Ellenbecker, 935 F. Supp. 1037, 1040-41 (D.S.D. 1995); Amunrud v. Bd. of Appeals, 143 P.3d 571, 574 (Wash. 2006); State v. Beans, 965 P.2d 725, 727-29 (Alaska 1998).
Child support enforcement in Minnesota is governed by Minn. Stat. §§ 518A.26-.78 (2012) and related provisions at sections 171.186 () and 171.30 (prohibiting the commissioner of...
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