State ex inf. Haley v. Missouri Pac. R. Co.

• Citation: 19 S.W.2d 879,323 Mo. 653
• Decision Date: 06 August 1929
• Docket Number: 28122
• Parties: The State ex inf. Sam S. Haley, Prosecuting Attorney, v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Company, Appellant
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

19 S.W.2d 879

323 Mo. 653

The State ex inf. Sam S. Haley, Prosecuting Attorney, v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Company, Appellant

No. 28122

Supreme Court of Missouri

August 6, 1929

Appeal from Cole Circuit Court; Hon. Henry J. Westhues Judge.

Reversed.

Montgomery Rucker & Hayes for appellant.

(1) This court will take judicial notice that the appellant, the Missouri Pacific Railroad Company, is a common carrier engaged in interstate commerce. State v. Railroad, 212 Mo. 658. (2) This court will take judicial notice of the constitutions of the United States and Missouri, with their amendments, and of the Federal and State statutes enacted thereunder. Wentz v. Railroad Co., 259 Mo. 450; Davis v. McCall, 179 Mo.App. 198. (3) Article I Section 8, of the Constitution of the United States gives to Congress the power to regulate commerce among the several states, etc., and by the Safety Appliance Act and the amendments thereto Congress entered the field to regulate the construction and equipment of cars used by railroads engaged in interstate commerce, and the states are prohibited from entering this legislative field. N. Pac. Railroad Co. v. Washington, 222 U.S. 370; Escanabi Co. v. Chicago, 107 U.S. 678; Morgan v. Bd. of Health, 118 U.S. 455; Nashville v. Alabama, 128 U.S. 96; Gladstone v. Minnesota, 166 U.S. 427; Lake Shore Railroad Co. v. Ohio, 173 U.S. 285; N. Y. Cen. Railroad Co. v. Winfield, 244 U.S. 147; So. Ry. Co. v. Com. of Indiana, 236 U.S. 439; Pa. Railroad Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm., 250 U.S. 566; State v. Railroad Co., 212 Mo. 658; L. & N. Railroad Co. v. Hughes, 210 F. 727; State v. Ry. Co., 181 S.W. 494; A. Coast Line Railroad Co. v. Napier, 2 F.2d 891. (4) Police regulations which incidentally affect but do not burden interstate commerce are effective in the absence of constitutional legislation on the same subject; but when Congress enacts legislation covering a particular subject-matter, all state laws covering the same subject-matter are superseded and set aside. This is true even where the requirements of the state laws are consistent with and supplemental to the Federal regulations. State v. Railroad Co., 212 Mo. 658; Sells v. Railroad Co., 266 Mo. 155; Lusk v. Atkinson, 268 Mo. 109; N. Pac. Railroad Co. v. Washington, 222 U.S. 370; So. Ry. Co. v. Reed, 222 U.S. 424; Chicago, etc., Co. v. Hardwick, 226 U.S. 426; Charleston Railroad Co. v. Barnville, 237 U.S. 597; Pacific Co. v. Pub. Serv., 250 U.S. 566; Farmers Grain Co. v. Langer, 273 F. 635; So. Ry. Co. v. Comm., 236 U.S. 439; Mo. Pac. v. Straub, 69 L.Ed. 439; N. Y. Cent. Railroad Co. v. Winfield, 244 S.W. 147; State v. Railroad Co., 154 N.E. 790; Staten Island Ry. Co. v. Pub. Ser. Com., 16 F.2d 313; So. Ry. Co. v. Railroad Com. of Indiana, 109 N.E. 759. (5) The above rule is not affected by the fact that the State law was enacted by virtue of the police power. The power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce takes precedence over the police power of the states and the states are powerless to enact regulations which in effect constitute a regulation of interstate commerce. Cases under Point 4; Real Silk Co. v. Portland, 268 U.S. 325; Schaeffer v. Farmers Grain Co., 268 U.S. 189; Sanitary District v. United States, 266 U.S. 405; Monongahela Bridge Co. v. United States, 216 U.S. 177; Federal Employers' Liability Cases, 223 U.S. 1. (6) The Safety Appliance Act of Congress, and amendments thereto, particularly the amendment of 1903, applies to all trains, locomotives, tenders, cars and similar vehicles used on any railroad engaged in interstate commerce, regardless of whether the particular car is at the time engaged in interstate commerce or intrastate commerce. United States v. So. Railway Co., 222 U.S. 20; So. Ry. Co. v. Indiana Comm., 236 U.S. 439; Brinkmeier v. Mo. Pac., 224 U.S. 268; Texas & Pacific Railroad Co. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33; L. & N. Railway Co. v. Layton, 243 U.S. 617; United States v. Railroad Co., 237 U.S. 407; United States v. Railroad Co., 237 U.S. 412; United States v. Great Northern, 145 F. 438; B. & O. Railroad Co. v. Hoover, 297 F. 919; State v. Ry. Co., 181 S.W. 494; State v. Railroad Co., 183 S.W. 120. (7) The fact that the Safety Appliance Act of Congress referred to the Interstate Commerce Commission the designation and promulgation of rules governing the construction and equipment of cars used on any railroad engaged in interstate commerce, makes the orders of the commission a part of the act. St. L. & Iron Mt. Railroad Co. v. Taylor, 210 U.S. 281; Union Bridge Co. v. United States, 204 U.S. 364. (8) A State statute so drawn as not to distinguish between interstate and intrastate commerce, there being at the time a Federal law covering the same ground of regulation and the two being in conflict, cannot be upheld as a regulation of intrastate commerce alone. State v. Railroad, 212 Mo. 659.

D. W. Peters for respondent.

(1) The statute in question is a reasonable exercise of the police power of the State and in no wise conflicts with Sections 21 or 30 of Article II of the Constitution of Missouri. (2) The act does not conflict with the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, nor does it in any wise conflict with Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, nor does it attempt to interfere with the power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce in accordance with the provisions of Section 8 of Article I of the Constitution of the United States. (3) The Federal Safety Appliance Act does not attempt to prescribe any rule or regulation for the equipment of caboose cars other than that they shall be equipped with secure sill steps, efficient hand brakes, and where ladders and running boards are used, the same are required to be constructed, together with handholds and grab irons, in such manner as to be safe for the use of employees. See Safety Appliance Act as amended, Sec. 2, 36 Statutes at Large, page 298.

Henwood, C. Davis and Cooley, CC., concur.

OPINION

HENWOOD

On February 19, 1926, an information was filed in the Circuit Court of Cole County, charging the defendant with the unlawful use and operation of a certain caboose car, and demanding that a penalty be assessed against the defendant under Sections 10079 and 10080, Laws 1923, p. 310. The State elected to proceed under the criminal code, as provided in Section 3708, Revised Statutes 1919, and upon a trial before the court, a jury being waived, the defendant was found guilty and its punishment assessed at a fine of $ 100. Judgment was rendered accordingly, and the defendant was granted an appeal to this court, constitutional questions being involved.

The information, omitting formal parts, is in the following form:

"Comes now Sam S. Haley, the duly elected, qualified and acting Prosecuting Attorney of Cole County, Missouri, and informs the court that this action is brought for and on behalf of the State of Missouri, and that on the 16th day of February, 1926, at the County of Cole and State aforesaid, the Missouri Pacific Railroad Company was a corporation duly organized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the State of Missouri, and was on said date engaged in operating a line of railroad from the city of St. Louis to Kansas City, through Cole County, in said State; that on said day, the defendant did, unlawfully and wrongfully, use and operate a certain caboose car No. 653 on its line of railway through Cole County, Missouri, which was not provided with end platforms equipped with guardrails, grab irons, steps for the safety of persons getting on and off of said car, and without riser and skirt boards at the sides and back thereof; all of which said equipment the defendant was required by law to have upon said caboose car, and that the operation of said caboose car without said equipment was in violation of the provisions of Section 10079, as amended, Laws of Missouri 1923 at pages 309, 310 and 311.

"Wherefore, informant, the Prosecuting Attorney of Cole County, says that a cause of action has accrued to the State of Missouri to have and demand of and from the defendant as a penalty for the neglect of the provisions of said law the sum of $ 500, to be paid to the State of Missouri, for which informant asks judgment." (Our italics.)

Sections 10079 and 10080 of the Act of 1923, upon which this proceeding or prosecution is based, read as follows:

"Sec 10079. -- From and after the first day of September, 1925, it shall be unlawful for any person, persons, partnership, or corporation, while operating within the State of Missouri any railroad or railway in whole or in part within said state, either as owner, lessee, or receiver, to require or permit the use of any caboose cars in any commerce, traffic, transportation or intercourse between two or more points or places wholly within this state, unless said caboose cars shall be at least twenty-eight (28) feet in length, exclusive of the platforms, and equipped with two four-wheeled trucks, and said caboose cars shall have steel under-frames on all trains where a pusher engine is used. And be of constructive strength equal to that of the 60,000-pound capacity freight car, and shall be provided with a door at each end thereof and an outside platform across each end of said car. Each platform shall be not less than thirty (30) inches in width, and shall be equipped with proper guardrails, grab irons and steps for the safety of persons getting on and off of said car. Said steps shall be equipped with a suitable tread, riser and skirt boards at the sides and back thereof, properly designed to prevent slipping from said steps. Said caboose cars shall have suitable cupolas, and necessary closets, toilet and windows. (Our italics.)

"Sec 10080. -- Any...