State Ex Inf. Thompson v. Bright

Decision Date09 April 1923
Citation250 S.W. 599,298 Mo. 335
PartiesTHE STATE ex inf. DAVID A. THOMPSON, Prosecuting Attorney, ex rel. THOMAS PUGH et al. Appellants, v. ARCH BRIGHT et al
CourtMissouri Supreme Court

Appeal from Ray Circuit Court. -- Hon. Ralph Hughes, Judge.

Affirmed.

Clark Milligan & Garner, M. M. Milligan, and Jacobs & Henderson for appellant.

(1) The court erred in not finding the issues for the relators because the greater weight of the evidence is in favor of the relators and against the respondents. (2) The judgment is against the weight of the evidence, because the relators have shown, conclusively, that the election was invalid, not held according to law, and the irregularities were such as to cause the result of the election to be uncertain, and that the result would have been different if the election had been held according to law. State ex rel. v. Siebert, 116 Mo. 415; Hall v. Schoenacka, 128 Mo. 661. (a) Because the plats and notices were not legal and proper and did not show the boundaries of the consolidated district, and were not intelligible so that the owners of property within the proposed district could ascertain whether or not their lands were within the proposed district. State ex rel. v Court-right, 205 S.W. 248; State ex rel. v. Wright, 194 S.W. 35. (b) Because the plats so filed were not authenticated and bore no official character so that the voters of said district could know the plat was of an official character and posted by authority of some public official. State ex rel. v. Courtright, 205 S.W. 248. (c) Because the plat was not presented to the voters at said meeting, in compliance with the law. (d) Because the polls in said district were not held open a reasonable length of time so as to give the voters in said district a reasonable length of time in which to vote. (e) Because a qualified voter presented himself at said school meeting fifteen minutes after the meeting was called to order, and desired to vote, but was precluded therefrom by the chairman; and if said voter had voted the results of the election would have been different. (f) Because there were three illegal votes cast at said meeting by men who resided outside of the boundary lines of the proposed district. (g) Because some of the illegal voters who voted, signed the petition asking that said matter be voted upon, about thirty days prior to voting at said election, which would be indicative of the fact that they voted for consolidation. (h) Because relators proved by a preponderance of evidence that said election was illegally held; that the voters did not pass to the front to cast their ballot; that they did not put on slips of paper "For Organization" or "Against Organization," or "For Consolidation" or "Against Consolidation," but in some instances put only the words "For" or "Against." That their ballots were taken up by tellers around the room, and there is no way of knowing what the true vote or the true sentiment of the people was at said meeting. O'Laughlin v. City of Kirkwood, 107 Mo.App. 302; State ex rel. Marbut v. Potter, 191 S.W. 57; State ex rel. v. McCann, 88 Mo. 386. (3) There was no proper certificate of the meeting to the county super-intendent of the respective counties or to the county clerk of the respective counties. (4) The board held its meeting outside the district, which was illegal, and all acts of said board outside said district were illegal and void. The board met at Hardin, and organized, which was outside the district, and directed that their names be typewritten to a proper certificate of the results of said election and the meeting of said voters at said time and place, which matters and things were typewritten by a stenographer in the bank, outside of the district, and the names thereto typewritten by said stenographer mailed to the county clerks of the different counties, and there was no certificate on file in the office of the superintendent of schools of Carroll County, Missouri, although the statutes prescribe that the chairman or secretary must certify to the superintendent of schools at Carroll County the meeting and results thereof. State ex rel. v. Courtright, 205 S.W. 248. (5) That the court erred in finding that the election was legally held, thereby showing that the sentiment of the people was for the consolidated school district, when in truth and fact, the election held three months thereafter indicated by a great majority, that they were not for the school district as proposed. (6) The court erred in holding as immaterial the results of the election held three months after the election for consolidation.

Lozier & Morris and Lavelock & Kirkpatrick for respondents.

(1) This is an action at law. It was submitted to the court without a jury; no declarations of law were given or requested, neither did appellants request a finding as to the facts. Under such circumstances, this court is precluded from reviewing the evidence, and the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed. Union Trust Co. v. Hill, 283 Mo. 278, 282; Wiley v. Harlow, 274 Mo. 170, 175; St. Louis v. Railroad, 248 Mo. 10, 25; Nickey v. Leader, 235 Mo. 30, 43; Bond & Stock Co. v. Houck, 213 Mo. 416, 426; Jordan v. Davis, 172 Mo. 599, 608; Hanenkratt v. Broughham, 164 Mo.App. 108; State ex rel. Fox v. Alt, 26 Mo.App. 674; State ex inf. v. Hall, 228 S.W. 1057; Cahill-Swift Mfg. Co. v. Goodnow Realty & Inv. Co., 204 S.W. 816. (2) This is a proceeding by quo warranto, and not a suit in equity. In view of the fact that there were no instructions, the findings of the trial court, which were supported by substantial evidence, are binding on this court. State ex rel. v. Wright, 270 Mo. 376, 387; State ex rel. v. People's Ice Co., 246 Mo. 168, 200; Guaranty & Surety Co. v. Drennon, 181 Mo.App. 198, 202; State ex rel. v. Alt, 26 Mo.App. 674; State ex inf. v. Hall, 228 S.W. 1057. (3) A writ of quo warranto is not a writ of correction or a writ of review. The petition of the forty-seven resident, tax-paying, qualified voters of proposed consolidated school district, with the action of the county superintendent thereon, gave the qualified voters at the special meeting jurisdiction to act in the premises, and the action of the voters then and there assembled, is final, and cannot be reviewed by quo warranto. State ex rel. v. Job, 205 Mo. 32; State ex inf. v. Fleming, 158 Mo. 562; School District v. Chappel, 155 Mo.App. 510; State ex rel. v. Sexton, 151 Mo.App. 517, 523; State ex rel. v. Gibson, 78 Mo.App. 170; State ex inf. v. Albany Drainage District, 234 S.W. 343. (4) This being an action by quo warranto, neither the legality of votes cast, nor the qualifications of voters at said special meeting, can be here inquired into, and even though this could be done, relators would have been compelled to notify respondents of their intention so to do, and furnish them with a list of the voters whose qualifications they purposed to call in question. State ex inf. v. Heffernan, 243 Mo. 442; State ex rel. Attorney-General v. Mason, 77 Mo. 189, 191; State ex rel. v. Townsley, 56 Mo. 107, 112. (5) Neither a strict nor a technical construction should be placed upon statutes authorizing the formation, organization or incorporation of consolidated school districts. A substantial compliance with such statutes is all the law requires. State ex inf. v. Smith, 271 Mo. 168, 177; State ex inf. v. Clardy, 267 Mo. 371, 384; State ex inf. v. Jones, 266 Mo. 191, 201; State ex rel. v. Sims, 201 S.W. 910, 911; School Dist. v. Chappel, 155 Mo.App. 498, 510. (6) Public Schools are largely controlled by individuals unversed in the law, and not accustomed to legal technicalities, and for this reason, the courts, in applying and interpreting statutes pertaining to schools and school districts, never resort to or indulge in strict or technical requirements, but construe such statutes liberally, always upholding them, where it can be done without violating legal requirements. State ex inf. v. Morgan, 268 Mo. 279; State ex inf. v. Jones, 266 Mo. 191, 201; State ex rel. v. Andrae, 216 Mo. 617, 637; State ex rel. v. Job, 205 Mo. 1, 34; School District v. School District, 181 Mo.App. 583, 589. (7) The school law governing elections in the formation of consolidated school districts, requires certain things to be done at a particular time and in a particular manner, but the statute does not say that compliance therewith is necessary to the validity of the election, therefore such statute is directory, and even though there might have been some irregularities in the proceedings of said special meeting, such irregularities did not affect the merits of the election or render the same invalid. Breuninger v. Hill, 277 Mo. 239, 252; State ex rel. v. Gordon, 242 Mo. 624; State ex rel. v. Hackman, 273 Mo. 670, 700; Ex parte Harvey Leach, 149 Mo.App. 317, 329; Horsefall v. School District, 143 Mo.App. 541; State ex rel. v. Cloud, 192 Mo.App. 322; Sanders v. Lacks, 142 Mo. 255, 263; State v. Swearingen, 128 Mo.App. 605, 613. (8) Irregularities or neglect of duty by officers in charge of an election, over whose conduct the voters have no control, do not, in the absence of a statute making such acts fatally defective, render such election void or illegal. Nance v. Kearbey, 251 Mo. 374, 383; Gass v. Evans, 244 Mo. 329, 353; Hehl v. Guion, 155 Mo. 76, 82; Sanders v. Lacks, 142 Mo. 255, 262; Hope v. Flentge, 140 Mo. 405; Bowers v. Smith, 111 Mo. 61. (9) The courts have, in some instances, held that neglect of election officers would render the election invalid, but this is true only in cases where the statute expressly so declared. West v. Ross, 23 Mo. 350; Ledbetter v. Hall, 62 Mo. 422; Gumm v. Hubbard, 97 Mo. 311; Hehl v. Guion, 155 Mo. 76, 85. (10) The evidence of respondents was...

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