State ex rel. Daily Record Company v. Hartmann
Decision Date | 02 July 1923 |
Citation | 253 S.W. 991,299 Mo. 410 |
Parties | THE STATE ex rel. DAILY RECORD COMPANY v. MOSES HARTMANN et al., Judges of Circuit Court |
Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
Peremptory writ denied.
Frank X. Hiemenz and Wilfley, Williams, McIntyre, Hensley & Nelson for relator.
The second proviso of Section 10405, Revised Statutes 1919, is unconstitutional and void. (1) Said second proviso is in violation of subdivisions 32 and 33 of Section 53, Article IV, of the Constitution, in that it creates a classification without any reasonable basis therefor and enacts a special or local law where a general law could have been made applicable. State ex rel. Garesche v. Roach, 258 Mo 541, 561; State ex rel. v. Miller, 100 Mo. 439, 448; Murnane v. St. Louis, 123 Mo. 479, 491; State v Anslinger, 171 Mo. 600, 611; Henderson v Koenig, 168 Mo. 356, 376; 1 Lewis' Sutherland on Stat. Con. (2 Ed.) 388. (2) Said second proviso is in violation of said subdivisions 32 and 33 of Section 53, Article IV, of the Constitution, in that it is limited to cities having a population of more than 600,000 as shown by the United States census of 1910 (said census being the last United States census taken prior to the enactment of said proviso). State ex rel. v. Turner, 210 Mo. 83; State ex rel. v. Williams, 232 Mo. 56, 72; State ex rel. v. Messerly, 198 Mo. 354; State ex rel. v. County Court, 89 Mo. 237. (3) There is nothing in the Constitution which requires or authorizes the Legislature to pass a law providing that in St. Louis alone newspapers which carry legal publications must have a certain percentage of circulation, but there is a provision in the Constitution which says that a special law shall not be passed where a general law can be made applicable, and this provision of the Constitution denies to the Legislature the power to pass a law fixing a percentage of circulation in St. Louis alone. If a percentage of circulation of a newspaper authorized to receive legal publications is a good thing in St. Louis or in cities of over 600,000 or in cities of over 100,000, then it inevitably follows that it would also be a good thing in the remaining portions of the State. That such a law could be made general no one will dispute. It is a well-known fact that out in the numerous counties of the State legal notices are too frequently published in some little newspaper published in some small town remote from the county seat, and the persons interested in the legal publication and the interested public now has no protection against such abuse.
Buder & Buder and Shepard Barclay, amici curice.
(1) The "last United States census," intended by the proviso in Section 10,405, refers to the time when any award of the printing is to be made, and not alone to the last census "taken prior to the enactment of said proviso," as claimed by the learned brief for relator (p. 10). The figures of each "last census" are intended to apply to all future lettings of such printing. Dunne v. Railway, 131 Mo. 1; Beard v. Rowan, 1 McLean 135, 9 Pet. 317; State ex rel. Flanningham v. Board, 16 Nev. 92; Railroad v. Blackman, 63 Ill. 117; Town v. Jenkins, 40 Barb. 574; Stebbins v. Board, 2 McCrary, 196. (2) The second proviso is neither a special nor local law, but a general law, and will apply to all persons or things which now or in future may come within its terms. State v. Tolle, 71 Mo. 645; State v. Wofford, 121 Mo. 61; State ex rel. v. Higgins, 125 Mo. 364; Dunne v. Railway, 131 Mo. 1; Young v. City, 152 Mo. 661; Ex parte Loving, 178 Mo. 194; State v. Speed, 183 Mo. 186; State v. Keating, 202 Mo. 197. (3) If relator is right (as we deny) in supposing that the second proviso (which originated in Laws of 1893, p. 26) should be discarded as unconstitutional, the effect of its elimination would be to leave in force former laws (R. S. 1889, sec. 312, or R. S. 1899, sec. 4692) both of which required of the successful bidder a larger circulation than 3,000 copies. The relator has no such circulation; and hence it would have no standing to obtain the remedy sought, because the old law would be an obvious bar. State ex rel. v. Clark, 275 Mo. 95; Henderson v. Koenig, 168 Mo. 356. (4) The respondents have discretion to award the printing to the newspaper making the "lowest and best bid." In a large city they do not abuse that discretion by rejecting the bid of relator (with a circulation of less than 3000) and awarding the printing to another newspaper having a circulation such as the second proviso requires. The latter was assuredly a "better" bidder, and the board was right in making its award accordingly, but, if in error, their action, being discretionary, should not be controlled by another court by writ of mandamus. State ex rel. v. McGrath, 91 Mo. 386; State ex rel. v. Hawkins, 130 Mo.App. 41; State ex rel. v. Meier, 142 Mo.App. 309; Anderson v. Schools, 122 Mo. 61; State v. Hermann, 63 Ohio St. 440; People v. Kent, 160 Ill. 655; Trapp v. Newport, 115 Ky. 840; People ex rel. v. Council, 78 N.Y. 33; 2 Dillon, Munic. Corp. (5 Ed.) sec. 811.
OPINIONIn Banc
Mandamus.
-- The relator has made a fair outline of this case, and we adopt it, as follows:
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