State ex rel. Ferguson-Wellston Bus Co. v. Public Service Com'n of State of Mo.

• Decision Date: 03 March 1933
• Docket Number: 32273
• Parties: State ex rel. Ferguson-Wellston Bus Company, Appellant, v. Public Service Commission
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

58 S.W.2d 312

332 Mo. 283

State ex rel. Ferguson-Wellston Bus Company, Appellant, v. Public Service Commission

No. 32273

Supreme Court of Missouri

March 3, 1933

Appeal from Cole Circuit Court.

Reversed and remanded (with directions).

Glen Mohler for relator.

(1) The Public Service Commission laws are remedial statutes referable to the police power of the State. Hence their provisions must receive a liberal construction with a view to suppressing mischiefs and advancing the remedy. State ex rel. Sedalia v. Comm., 204 S.W. 497; Sec. 5251, R. S 1929; State ex rel. Laundry v. Comm., 34 S.W.2d 37. (2) An exception or proviso in a statute must be strictly construed. Subsection (e) of Section 5264 of the Motorbus Act should not be construed as a total withdrawal of power from the Commission as to suburban busses if any other reasonable construction can be found. 25 R. C. L. p. 985; State v Breckinridge, 282 S.W. 149; State v. Pub. Serv Comm., 34 S.W.2d 486. (3) The provision (subsection [e] of Section 5264) refers to subsection (b) relating to "urban" busses only, and qualifies that provision by defining suburban territory. The Legislature never intended to promote confusion and hardship to the public by leaving "interurban" busses without the supervision of the Commission. State ex rel. v. Comm., 34 S.W.2d 486.

D. D. McDonald and G. C. Murrell for respondent.

(1) The classification or exemption, as set out in subsections (b) and (e), Section 5264 of the Missouri Bus and Truck Law, 1931, simplifies the problems of administration and presents an opportunity for a more intimate knowledge of operation and regulation by municipal authorities. It is within the power of the Legislature to make such exceptions. State v. Kozer, 116 Ore. 381, 242 P. 621; Clark v. Maxwell, 179 N.C. 604, affirmed 282 U.S. 811. (2) The propriety of the exemption or classification predicated upon the difficulty of administration and accounting was clearly recognized by the Legislature. Railway Co. v. United States, 284 U.S. 95. (3) Statutes should receive a sensible construction, such as will effectuate the legislative intention, and so as to avoid an unjust or absurd conclusion. Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457; Henderson v. Mayor of New York, 92 U.S. 259; Gates v. Natl. Bank, 100 U.S. 239; Lau Ow Bew v. United States, 144 U.S. 47. (4) The acts of the Legislature should be so construced, if practicable, that one section will not defeat or destroy another, but explain and support it. Bernier v. Bernier, 147 U.S. 242.

Westhues, C. Cooley and Fitzsimmons, CC., concur.

OPINION

WESTHUES

Respondent in this case adopted the statement of facts made by relator. It is short and to the point and we therefore, adopt it as the statement of the case. It reads:

"This appeal is from the judgment of the Circuit Court affirming an order of the Public Service Commission, in which the majority of the Commissioners denied an application of appellant for a certificate of convenience and necessity to operate as a motor carrier of passengers between the municipalities of Ferguson and Florissant (St. Ferdinand), in St. Louis County, Missouri. Two of the Commissioners dissented from the order and filed a dissenting opinion.

"The opinion of the majority was based solely upon the view that the Commission is without jurisdiction to grant the certificate under the provisions of an act of the Legislature, approved May 5, 1931, and appearing in the Laws of 1931, at page 304, particularly subdivisions (b) and (e) of Section 5264 of that act.

"The evidence discloses that the municipalities of Ferguson and Florissant are respectively 5.5 and 8 miles from the corporate limits of the city of St. Louis and within the area defined as the 'suburban territory' of St. Louis by subsection (e). The evidence further shows that the proposed operation does not fall within the proviso of subsection (b), since appellant would not be operating within a municipality, nor would not operate thereunder a transportation system within a municipality, and that the major portion of such operation, i.e., two and five-tenths (2.5) miles out of the entire proposed route of 3.8 miles would be outside the limits of any municipality.

"The majority opinion concedes these facts and the resulting conclusion that the jurisdiction of the Commission over the operation is not withdrawn or excepted by subsection (b) of Section 5264. It is said, however, to be denied by subsection (e).

"Appellant, for a number of years prior to the hearing, had been operating under a permit of the Commission and under its supervision from Wellston to Ferguson, and the purpose of the application was for an additional permit to extend its lines to Florissant."

Article 8 of Chapter 33, Revised Statutes of Missouri 1929, pertaining to the regulation of the transportation of passengers by motor vehicles for hire, was repealed by the Legislature of 1931 and a new article enacted in lieu thereof. The new article regulates the transportation of both property and persons by motor vehicles for hire. [See Laws 1931, pp. 304 to 316, inclusive.] As noted by the statement the controversy in this case arose over the meaning of subdivisions (b) and (e) of Section 5264, page 304, Laws 1931. The subdivisions read as follows:

"(b) The term 'motor carrier,' when used in this act, means any person, firm, partnership, association, joint-stock company, corporation, lessee, trustee, or receiver appointed by any court whatsoever, operating any motor vehicle with or without trailer or trailers attached, upon any public highway for the transportation of persons or property or both or of providing or furnishing such transportation service, for hire as a common carrier. Provided, however, this act shall not be so construed as to apply to motor vehicles used in the transportation of passengers or property for hire, operating over and along regular routes within any municipal corporation or a municipal corporation and the suburban territory adjacent thereto, forming a part of transportation system within such municipal corporation or such municipal corporation and adjacent suburban territory, where the major part of such system is within the limits of such municipal corporation."

"(e) The term 'suburban territory,' when used in this act, means that territory extending one mile beyond the corporate limits of any municipality in this State and one mile additional for each 50,000 population or portion thereof. Provided that when more than one municipality is contained within the limits of any such territory so described, motor carriers operating in and out of any such municipalities within said territory shall be permitted to operate anywhere within the limits of the larger territory so described."

In order to correctly interpret a statute it is most important to ascertain the purpose for which the law was enacted. [59 C. J. 958, sec. 570.] Referring to the title of Article 8, Laws 1931, page 304, and considering the provisions of the entire article we find that it was the intention of the Legislature to confer upon the Public Service Commission the jurisdiction and authority to license, regulate and supervise the transportation of persons and property over the public highways of this State by motor vehicles for hire.

Subdivision (c) of Section 5267, page 307, Laws 1931, reads as follows:

(c) All laws relating to the powers, duties, authority and jurisdiction of the public service commission over common carriers are hereby made applicable to all such motor carriers, except as herein otherwise specifically provided."

There is no doubt that the Legislature intended that all motor carriers for hire of persons and property should be under the jurisdiction of the Public Service Commission unless expressly exempted therefrom in the act. It will be noted that in subdivision (b) of Section 5264, a transportation system operating within any city and suburban territory where the major part of such system is within the limits of such city, is exempted from the provisions of the act. This proviso was made for the evident purpose of leaving to the municipalities the...