State ex rel. J.R. v. Jones
| Decision Date | 21 December 2022 |
| Docket Number | 111819 |
| Citation | 2022 Ohio 4642 |
| Parties | STATE EX REL., J.R., Relator, v. THE HONORABLE TONYA R. JONES, ET AL., Respondents. |
| Court | Ohio Court of Appeals |
Writs of Prohibition Motion No. 557995 Order No. 558672
Zashin & Rich Co., L.P.A., Jennifer M. Hanes and Jenna C. Sholk for relator.
Michael C. O'Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Nora E. Poore, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney for respondents.
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
{¶ 1} Relator, J.R., seeks a writ of prohibition to prevent respondents, Judge Tonya R. Jones and Magistrate Judy Jackson-Winston, from ordering or conducting a predetermination parenting evaluation for purposes of ruling on a motion to modify a divorce decree filed by a nonparty to this action, S.R., in an underlying divorce case. J.R. further seeks a writ of prohibition to reverse a decision by respondents, Judge Leslie A. Celebrezze and Magistrate Yosef Hochheiser, that modified a domestic violence protection order. For the reasons that follow, we grant a writ as to respondents Celebrezze and Hochheiser and dismiss the complaint as to respondents Jones and Jackson-Winston, finding well-taken the motion to dismiss as to them.
{¶ 2} According to the complaint for writs of prohibition, J.R. and S.R. finalized their divorce on July 15, 2020, in J.R. v. S.R., Cuyahoga D.R. No. DR-19-379662. That case was assigned to respondent Jones. S.R. failed to answer or otherwise appear. As a result, a divorce decree was issued naming J.R. sole residential parent. The decree did not provide S.R. with any parental rights, right to visitation or custody of two minor children. However, the decree did state that "[S.R.] is free to file a motion with the court allocating him parental rights and responsibilities, including parenting time, at any time."
{¶ 3} On May 18, 2022, J.R. sought, and received, an ex parte domestic violence protection order in J.R. v. S.R., Cuyahoga D.R. No. DV-22-389958. This case was assigned to Judge Celebrezze whose magistrate is Hochheiser. A consent agreement to a civil protection order was entered into on June 2, 2022. The protection order named J.R. and three others, including the two minor children of J.R. and S.R., as protected persons. The order prohibited S.R. from having contact with or being within 500 feet of them. The order also contained the following reservation of rights:
[S.R.] reserves the right to file a petition for parental rights and responsibilities in Cuyahoga County Domestic Relations Court. Cuyahoga County Domestic Relations Court should conduct an independent evaluation regarding parental rights and responsibilities and should not use this protection order as the sole means of denying [S.R.] parental rights and responsibilities.
The order indicated that the parties were required to follow all decrees in their divorce case.
{¶ 4} In a separate section of the protection order, the consent agreement civil protection order form used by the court and signed by S.R. and J.R. had the following language added to item 18(B):
The protection order form does have a box for this section in item 18(B) that was not checked. Instead, the box above it, for 18(A), indicating that S.R.'s parenting time rights were suspended, was checked.
{¶ 5} On June 2, 2022, S.R. filed a motion to modify the divorce decree to allow him parenting time. Pursuant to R.C. 3109.04(C) and the court's local rules, an order was issued for the parties to cooperate in a custody evaluation to be conducted by the domestic relations court's Family Evaluation Services Department. This order was signed by respondents Jones and Jackson-Winston. J.R. sought to oppose the order or seek clarification by filing several motions, citing among other things, that the protection order prohibited contact between S.R. and the children. J.R. also filed an emergency motion for an attorney conference in the protection order case on July 21, 2022, in which she asserted that a staff member of the Family Evaluation Services Department informed her or her attorney that a request had been made to the magistrate in the protection order case to amend the protection order to allow the evaluation to go forward. In the motion, J.R. argued that the court could not modify the terms of the protection order without a motion before it. On August 3, 2022, an entry was journalized amending the consent agreement civil protection order. The entry stated:
This order was signed by respondents Celebrezze and Hochheiser. The order further denied J.R.'s emergency motion for an attorney conference.
{¶ 6} On August 9, 2022, after this court was closed for the day, J.R. filed the instant complaint for writs of prohibition in an effort to stop the custody evaluation that was to take place the next morning at 9:30 a.m. This court issued an order setting an abbreviated briefing schedule on August 10, 2022, but did not otherwise issue an order to stop the evaluation from going forward. Following that order, J.R. filed a motion for alternative writ, which we denied on August 16, 2022. Respondents filed a combined motion to dismiss the complaint on August 24, 2022. J.R. filed a brief in opposition on August 31, 2022. Respondents then filed a reply brief on September 6, 2022, arguing against claims that were made by J.R. for the first time in her opposition brief. On September 12, 2022, J.R. sought to strike the reply brief or, in the alternative, for leave to file a sur-reply brief. This court denied the motion to strike but granted J.R. leave to file a sur-reply brief, which she did on September 26, 2022.
{¶ 7} A writ of prohibition may issue when a relator establishes that an official is about to exercise judicial or quasi-judicial power, that the exercise of that power is unauthorized by law and that the relator lacks an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. State ex rel. Bell v. Pfeiffer, 131 Ohio St.3d 114, 2012-Ohio-54, 961 N.E.2d 181, ¶ 18. With limited exception, "a writ of prohibition 'tests and determines "solely and only" the subject matter jurisdiction' of the lower court." State ex rel. Jones v. Suster, 84 Ohio St.3d 70, 73, 701 N.E.2d 1002 (1998), quoting State ex rel. Eaton Corp. v. Lancaster, 40 Ohio St.3d 404, 409, 534 N.E.2d 46 (1988), quoting State ex rel. Staton v. Franklin Cty. Common Pleas Court, 5 Ohio St.2d 17, 21, 213 N.E.2d 164 (1965). "'[A]bsent a patent and unambiguous lack of jurisdiction, "a court having general subject-matter jurisdiction can determine its own jurisdiction, and a party challenging that jurisdiction has an adequate remedy by appeal."'" State ex rel. Mason v. Burnside, 117 Ohio St.3d 1, 2007-Ohio-6754, 881 N.E.2d 224, ¶ 10, quoting State ex rel. Powell v. Markus, 115 Ohio St.3d 219, 2007-Ohio-4793, 874 N.E.2d 775, ¶ 8, quoting State ex rel. Shimko v. McMonagle, 92 Ohio St.3d 426, 428-429, 751 N.E.2d 472 (2001). "A court will typically 'deny relief in prohibition when a respondent judge has general subject-matter jurisdiction and will deem any error by the judge to be an error in the exercise of that jurisdiction.'" Santomauro v. McLaughlin, Slip Opinion No. 2022-Ohio-2441, ¶ 14, quoting State ex rel. Sponaugle v. Hein, 153 Ohio St.3d 560, 2018-Ohio-3155, 108 N.E.3d 1089, ¶ 24. However, where a court patently and unambiguously lacks jurisdiction, prohibition may issue regardless of whether the relator possesses other adequate remedies, such as an appeal. State ex rel. Elder v. Camplese, 144 Ohio St.3d 89, 2015-Ohio-3628, 40 N.E.3d 1138, ¶ 13, citing Chesapeake Exploration, L.L.C. v. Oil & Gas Comm., 135 Ohio St.3d 204, 2013-Ohio-224, 985 N.E.2d 480, ¶ 11.
{¶ 8} This matter is before this court on respondents' motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Civ.R. 12(B)(6), dismissal for failure to state a claim, allows for the expedient adjudication of claims where "it appears beyond doubt, after presuming the truth of all material factual allegations in the complaint and making all reasonable inferences in [relator's] favor, that [relator] is not entitled to...
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