State ex rel. Kansas City v. School Dist. of Kansas City

• Citation: 62 S.W.2d 813,333 Mo. 288
• Decision Date: 31 July 1933
• Docket Number: 31730
• Parties: State of Missouri at the relation of Kansas City, a Municipal Corporation, Relator, v. School District of Kansas City et al
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Missouri

62 S.W.2d 813

333 Mo. 288

State of Missouri at the relation of Kansas City, a Municipal Corporation, Relator, v. School District of Kansas City et al

No. 31730

Supreme Court of Missouri

July 31, 1933

Peremptory writ denied.

George Kingsley, Joshua Barbee and J. C. Petherbridge for relator.

(1) Under the Charter of Kansas City (1925), the relator herein has specified power and authority to judicially assess the lands of the school district, "in the same manner as though the same were the property of a private person," for local street improvements, and such assessment "shall be paid by the School District;" the school lands so assessed cannot be sold under execution to enforce such judicial assessment, but the judgment so rendered thereon may be enforced by a judgment against the owners of the land so assessed, which relator is seeking by this proceeding. Pars. 1, 3, sec. 1, Art. I, Kansas City Charter; Secs. 128, 129, 151, Art. VI, Kansas City Charter; Sec. 319 Art. VIII, Kansas City Charter; St. Louis Public Schools v. St. Louis, 26 Mo. 468; Lockwood v. St Louis, 24 Mo. 20; Barber Asphalt Co. v. St Joe, 183 Mo. 451. (2) The provisions of the Kansas City Charter adopted by the people of the city for its own local self-government has all the force and effect of a legislative enactment, when not in conflict with the Constitution and the general laws of this State. McGhee v. Walsh, 249 Mo. 266; Mullins v. Kansas City, 188 S.W. 195; Kansas City v. Field, 270 Mo. 514. (3) Where there is a right to recover there is always and necessarily must be a remedy even though it may not be specifically provided for by statute or charter provisions. Drainage District v. Bates County, 269 Mo. 78. (4) Mandamus is the proper remedy against a school district and the officers and directors thereof, to compel payment of a judgment against it; the proceedings are ancillary to the main judgment and take the place of an execution, because the school property cannot be sold under an execution to satisfy a judgment against the district. State ex rel. Edwards v. Wilcox, 21 S.W.2d 930; State ex rel. Hentschel v. Cook, 201 S.W. 361; State ex rel. Pyle v. University City, 320 Mo. 451; State ex rel. Pool v. Willow Springs, 183 S.W. 594. (5) It is wholly unnecessary for the city to bring another suit on the judgment already obtained and secure another judgment thereon against the school district prior to in stituting this suit. This proceeding is a simple, direct and positive method to reach the end desired. All legal questions can be fully presented and determined in this proceedings. Schwab v. St. Louis, 310 Mo. 137. (6) By the stipulation filed herein, respondents have requested and thereby consented that this court take jurisdiction of this matter. The points raised by respondents in their return that Kansas City should have first secured a personal judgment against the school district before filing this proceeding, is, in effect, waived by them in such stipulation. (7) School lands are not public property, so the courts of this State hold. If they are not public property then they must be treated as private property. They are private property as used in the Kansas City Charter and subject to be assessed the same as other private property. Thogmartin v. School District, 189 Mo.App. 14; Sec. 319, Kansas City Charter. (8) The Council of Kansas City had the right to fix the benefit district, and include therein the lands of the school district. Such power to so fix the district does not involve the power of eminent domain; on the contrary, special assessments for public improvements are referable to the taxing power, and are legislative in character, and the Legislature of the city has the power to create special taxing districts and to charge the cost of such improvements upon the property therein, including school lands, according to its valuation, area, frontage or special benefits, as the case may be. Sec. 129, Kansas City Charter; Mudd v. Wehmeyer, 323 Mo. 704.

Henry L. McCune and McCune, Caldwell & Downing for respondents.

(1) Respondent School District of Kansas City, Missouri is a public corporation performing a public or governmental function. Its moneys and property are strictly public property and cannot be held liable for local improvement assessments until the Legislature of Missouri or the Charter of Kansas City provides for such liability. Edina v. School District, 305 Mo. 452; St. Louis v. Brown, 155 Mo. 545; Clinton v. Henry County, 115 Mo. 557; Thogmartin v. School District, 189 Mo.App. 10. (2) The proceeding brought by relator to widen Fifteenth Street, inaugurated by the passage of city ordinance No. 55188 and resulting in the judgment rendered by the Circuit Court of Jackson County in cause No. 267956, was authorized solely by the provisions of Article VI of the Charter of Kansas City, which said article is entitled "Condemning and Damaging Private Property." Section 129 of said Article VI, provides that when any private property is damaged or the use thereof restricted for any public use, the council shall "by ordinance prescribe the limits within which private property shall be deemed to be benefited by the proposed improvement and be assessed and charged to pay compensation therefor." Said Article VI contains no provision authorizing the city to assess benefits in condemnation proceedings against school or other public property. The property of a school district used for school purposes is public property and not private property. Edina v. School District, 305 Mo. 464; St. Louis v. Brown, 155 Mo. 545; Clinton v. Henry County, 115 Mo. 557. (3) As no personal judgment has been or can be rendered against respondent school district in said condemnation proceedings, there is no foundation for a mandamus suit to compel the payment of a judgment against the lands of the school district assessed with special benefits. State ex rel. Jeffries, Admr. of Kennedy, v. Trustees of Town of Pacific, 61 Mo. 155. (4) School funds are collected from the public to be held in trust by boards of education for the purpose of education. Cochran v. Wilson, 287 Mo. 224. To use school funds for any other purpose would be in violation of the provisions of Section 6 of Article XI, and Section 11 of Article X of the Constitution of Missouri. Section 9552, Revised Statutes 1929, provides that the board of directors of respondent school district is authorized to make an estimate of the amount of money necessary for school purposes and an estimate of a levy of tax for those purposes.

John C. Meredith and Meredith & Harwood, amicus curiae.

(1) It has been the policy of the State of Missouri for many years that school district property is assessable with special benefits for local improvements, in like manner as the property of the individual. Lockwood v. St. Louis, 24 Mo. 20; St. Louis Public Schools v. City of St Louis, 26 Mo. 468; Clinton v. Henry County, 115 Mo. 557. (2) In the matter of the assessment of special benefits for local improvements, property of the school district has been classed with and as private property. Sec. 319, Art. VIII, of Kansas City Charter. (3) School district property is not exempt as to special assessments for local improvements under the constitutional provision exempting property used for school purposes from taxation. Sheehan v. Hospital, 50 Mo. 155; Clinton v. Henry County, 115 Mo. 557; Corrigan v. Kansas City, 211 Mo. 608. (4) The determination of the limits of a benefited district in condemnation proceedings is a legislative matter and is conclusive and final as to all parties in interest and the determination as to whether or not any special piece of property is benefited and to what amount is the province of the jury and their verdict is final and conclusive as to all parties in interest. Kansas City Grading Co. v. Holden, 107 Mo. 305; Schwab v. St. Louis, 274 S.W. 1058. (5) Under our Constitution, the taxing power of the State and the amount of the tax to be assessed as a benefit is vested in the Legislature and/or the legislative body of a municipality in regard to special assessments for local improvements, and the school board has no right to determine whether or not the school district property shall be taxed or is benefited. Mudd v. Wehmeyer, 323 Mo. 704; Schwab v. St. Louis, 274 S.W. 1058. (6) The fixing of the amount of the special benefit received by any tract or parcel of land in the benefited district in a condemnation case, is the exercise of the taxing power by a municipality and no notice to any of the parties in the benefited district is necessary unless prescribed by the charter of the city, and when the charter requirements have been complied with, the lien and the amount of the benefit is final and conclusive. Mudd v. Wehmeyer, 323 Mo. 704. (7) Where a right is created by statute or municipal charter and no remedy is provided or an inadequate or inappropriate remedy given in the statute or charter, the party is entitled to resort to any common-law action which will afford him an appropriate and adequate redress. Drainage District v. Bates County, 269 Mo. 78; Construction Co. v. Railroad, 206 Mo. 172. (8) It being against the public policy of the State that property used by a school district for schools shall be subject to a writ of execution and sale thereunder, the lien on the property of the school district of the amount of the benefit having been conclusively determined and the duty of the school board to pay having been expressly imposed by statute or charter, on the refusal of the school board to pay, a writ of mandamus is the appropriate remedy, and it is not necessary to put the claim in judgment against the school district. State ex rel. Hentschel v. Cook, 201 S.W. 361. (9) A school district can sue and...