State ex rel. Linn v. Superior Court for King County

• Decision Date: 01 March 1944
• Docket Number: 29301.
• Citation: 146 P.2d 543,20 Wn.2d 138
• Parties: STATE ex rel. LINN v. SUPERIOR COURT FOR KING COUNTY et al.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

146 P.2d 543

20 Wn.2d 138

STATE ex rel. LINN v. SUPERIOR COURT FOR KING COUNTY et al.

No. 29301.

Supreme Court of Washington, En Banc.

March 1, 1944

As Corrected on Denial of Rehearing April 10, 1944.

Original certiorari proceeding by the State of Washington, on the relation of G. D. Linn, against Superior Court for King County, Robert M. Jones, Judge, to review action of respondent judge dismissing a petition seeking a writ of mandamus requiring the mayor of the City of Seattle and members of the City Council to take proper steps looking toward the submission of a proposed charter amendment to the electors of the City of Seattle.

Judgment of respondent judge affirmed.

GRADY BLAKE, and ROBINSON, JJ., dissenting.

Frank L. Walters and A. A. Booth, both of Seattle, for relator.

Smith Troy, Atty. Gen., and Jess N. Rosenberg, of Olympia, amici curiae.

A. C Van Soelen and J. Ambler Newton, both of Seattle, for respondents.

BEALS Justice.

January 27, 1944, G. D. Linn, relator herein, on his own behalf and on behalf of his co-signers, filed with the clerk of the city council of Seattle a petition which he and 9,149 other persons had signed, each of whom by signing the petition asserted that he was a qualified voter of the city of Seattle. By the petition, the signers demanded that the city council submit to the voters of Seattle a proposed amendment to subdivision 14, § 18, article IV, of the charter of the city of Seattle, the proposed amendment being set forth in the petition. The petitioners asked that the proposed amendment be submitted at the approaching municipal clection to be held March 14, 1944. January 31st following relator filed with the clerk his affidavit concerning the alleged genuineness of the signatures borne by the petition, which affidavit was by the clerk attached to the petition. This affidavit relator filed in purported compliance with Rem.Rev.Stat. § 8964. On the same day, the petition, together with relator's affidavit, came Before the city council at a regular meeting, whereupon the council rejected the petition, in so far as the March 14th election was concerned, as not having been filed within the time required by law, directing, however, that the petition be placed on file.

February 3rd, relator commenced an action Before the superior court of the state of Washington for King county, whereby he, as relator, asked for a writ of mandamus requiring the mayor of the city of Seattle and the members of the city council, all of whom were named as respondents to the proceeding, to grant the petitions to the proceeding, to grant proper steps looking toward the submission of the proposed charter amendment to the electors of the city of Seattle at the municipal election above referred to. An alternative writ of mandate having been issued, issue was joined thereon, and the action came on to be heard on its merits Before the Honorable Robert M. Jones, one of the judges of the superior court.

A hearing was had, evidence was introduced, and after argument, February 10, 1944, an order was entered denying the writ and dismissing the proceeding. Thereafter, upon application to this court, certiorari was granted, and the record regularly filed herein by respondent. The matter was argued to department two of this court February 18th, and to the court sitting en banc February 21, 1944, and was submitted to the court for final decision upon the record made herein, briefs filed, and the argument of counsel. At the hearing Before the court en banc, a brief was filed by the attorney general as amicus curiae.

By the brief last referred to, attention of the court was called to § 10, article XI, of the constitution of Washington, which reads in part as follows:

'Corporations for municipal purposes shall not be created by special laws; but the legislature, by general laws, shall provide for the incorporation, organization, and classification, in proportion to population, of cities and towns, which laws may be altered, amended, or repealed. * * * Any city containing a population of twenty thousand inhabitants or more shall be permitted to frame a charter for its own government consistent with and subject to the constitution and laws of this state, and for such purpose the legislative authority of such city may cause an election to be had, at which election there shall be chosen by the qualified electors of said city fifteen freeholders thereof, who shall have been residents of said city for a period of at least two years preceding their election, and qualified electors, whose duty it shall be to convene within ten days after their election, and prepare and propose a charter for such city. Such proposed charter shall be submitted to the qualified electors of said city, and if a majority of such qualified electors voting thereon ratify the same, it shall become the charter of said city, and shall become the organic law thereof, and supersede any existing charter, including amendments thereto, and all special laws inconsistent with such charter. Said proposed charter shall be published in two daily newspapers published in said city for at least thirty days prior to the day of submitting the same to the electors for their approval, as above provided. * * * Such charter may be amended by proposals therefor submitted by the legislative authority of such city to the electors thereof at any general election, after notice of said submission published as above specified, and ratified by a majority of the qualified electors voting thereon.'

It appears that this constitutional provision was not called to the attention of the superior court at the time of the argument, nor was it referred to by the parties at the argument Before the department of this court.

In the court below, relator contended that the proceeding was governed by portions of chapter 186, Laws of 1903, Rem.Rev.Stat., §§ 8963-8965, while respondents below contended that the statute referred to had been superseded by Laws of 1921, chapter 61, as amended by Laws of 1923, chapter 53. As above stated, the trial court ruled in favor of the respondents below, and dismissed the action.

Relator here contends that the trial court erred in holding that the act of 1921, as amended by the act of 1923, above cited, in so far as pertinent to the facts of this proceeding, superseded that act of 1903.

Briefly stated, the difference between the acts, in so far as the proceeding Before the superior court was concerned, is that by the act of 1903 the petition was timely filed, as under the act of 1903, the subject matter of such a petition as that here in question should be 'submitted to the voters at the next regular municipal election occurring thirty days or more after said petition is filed.' By the 1921 act, as amended by Laws of 1923, chapter 5o, § 6, Rem.Rev.Stat. § 5148-2, it was provided that the governing board of any city, etc., '* * * shall not less than forty-five (45) days Before the date of any election to be held under the provisions of this act, certify to the election board a list of the offices to be filled at such election, and any such governing board, desiring to submit to the voters of such city, town, or district any proposition for their approval and adoption, or rejection, at any election to be held under the provisions of this act, shall require the clerk or secretary of such governing board to certify to the election board at least forty-five (45) days Before the date of such election * * *.'

In our opinion, the question presented in the case at bar is at this date controlled by the section of our state constitution above quoted, and for this reason, consideration of the statutes above cited is unnecessary. We accordingly leave any question which may arise under those statutes for determination when presented.

Of course the question presents itself as to whether or not the words 'legislative authority,' as used in the section of the state constitution above quoted, should be held to include the people acting in accordance with their right to initiate legislation pursuant to existing laws, so as to make the requirement of thirty days notice applicable to legislation by way of charter amendments initiated by the people, as well as to that sponsored by a city council or other legislative body.

Constitutional provisions should be construed so as to give effect to the manifest purpose for which they were adopted.

Section 1, article I, of the constitution of Washington, reads as follows:

'All political power is inherent in the people, and governments derive their just powers from the consent of the governed, and are established to protect and maintain individual rights.'

'The fundamental purpose in construing a constitutional provision is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the framers and of the people who adopted it. The court, therefore, should constantly keep in mind the object sought to be accomplished by its adoption, and the evils, if any, sought to be prevented or remedied. Effect should be given to the purpose indicated by a fair interpretation of the language used.' 16 C.J.S., Constitutional Law, pp. 51-54, § 16.

'The object of construction, as applied to a written constitution, is to give effect to the intent of the people in adopting it. In the case of all written laws, it is the intent of the lawgiver that is to be enforced. But this intent is to be found in the instrument itself. It is to be presumed that language has been employed with sufficient precision to convey it, and unless examination demonstrates that the presumption does not hold good in the particular case, nothing will remain except to enforce it.' 1 Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 8th Ed., pp. 124, 125.

Considering the purpose of the...