State ex rel. Rea v. Kinmore
| Decision Date | 30 June 1893 |
| Citation | 55 N.W. 830,54 Minn. 135 |
| Parties | State ex rel. Clyde W. Rea v. Sanford Kinmore et al |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Argued by appellants, submitted on brief by respondent May 25, 1893.
Appeal by Sanford Kinmore and Ida Kinmore his wife, from a decision of the District Court of Lyon County, B. F. Webber, J., given and entered June 21, 1892, discharging the child Jessie Rea from their custody.
On February 26, 1892, two of the county commissioners of Lyon County presented a petition to the Probate Court of that county asking that Jessie Rea, a female child, be sent to the State Public School at Owatonna. The mother of the child consented that the application be granted. On March 1, 1892 that court made an order reciting that the child Jessie Rea was born August 28, 1888; that it was sound in mind and body that Clyde W. Rea, its father, a printer by trade, resided in Chicago, Ill.; that its mother, Lena Rea, resided at Tracy and consents, and that the child belonged to one of the classes described in the statute as admissible to that school, and ordered that it be taken to that school and admitted therein. On April 28, 1892, the Board of Control of that school, by G. A. Merrill, agent, made a contract with Sanford Kinmore and Ida Kinmore, his wife, of Tracy, placing the child with them until eighteen years of age, pursuant to Laws 1885, ch. 146, Laws 1889, ch. 167, and Laws 1891, ch. 124.
On May 9, 1892, the father, Clyde W. Rea, appeared before the District Court and obtained a writ of habeas corpus returnable May 13, 1892, at the chambers of the Judge in New Ulm, requiring Kinmore and wife to produce the child together with the time and cause of its detention before that court, to do and receive what should then and there be considered. It was served and they made return, stating the proceedings above mentioned. They attached copies of the entire record and papers.
At the hearing evidence was produced by the relator and by the respondents, and an adjournment to May 25, 1892, was granted at which time the court held that the Probate Court of Lyon County did not acquire jurisdiction or have authority to make the order committing the child to the State Public School; that this order, and the agreement made by the Board of Control with Kinmore and wife, were each null and void, and that the relator was entitled to the custody of his child. Formal judgment to this effect was entered. Kinmore and wife appeal from the decision to this court. A case was made, settled, signed and filed. Notice of appeal was served on the attorney for the relator and on the clerk of the District Court for Lyon County, and he made a return, consisting of a certified copy of the record in his office and all the papers on file. In this court the appeal was noticed for argument and placed on the calendar. The papers were printed, errors assigned and briefs served as in ordinary cases.
Nothing more need be said in order to sustain the judgment appealed from, which is affirmed.
Wheelock & Sperry, for appellants.
The writ cannot be used to review or correct orders and judgments which are erroneous merely. Nothing will be investigated on habeas corpus except jurisdictional defects. Petition of Crandall, 34 Wis. 177; Petition of Semler, 41 Wis. 517; State v. Sheriff of Hennepin Co., 24 Minn. 87; Matter of Underwood, 30 Mich. 502.
The District Court erred in considering questions which might have been raised at the hearing before the Probate Judge, and in considering questions upon which the Probate Court ruled, however erroneous such rulings may have been. People ex rel. v. Durston, 119 N.Y. 569; In re Rafferty, 1 Wash. St. 382; In re Bion, 59 Conn. 372.
The return to the writ shows that Jessie Rea is held under the final judgment of the Probate Court of Lyon County, a court of competent jurisdiction. Jacobs v. Fouse, 23 Minn. 51; Davis v. Hudson, 29 Minn. 27.
The statute 1878 G. S. ch. 80, § 22, seems to prohibit a review of the judgment of the Probate Court by means of this writ. People v. Gray, 4 Park. C. 616; In re Lybarger, 2 Wash. St. 131; Ex parte Watkins, 3 Pet. 193; Ex parte Bergman, 3 Wy. 396; Ex parte Keil, 85 Cal. 309; Ex parte Miller, 82 Cal. 454; Murray's Case, 43 Cal. 455.
Laws 1885, ch. 146, § 17, Laws 1889, ch. 167, § 11, provides that the proceedings under such petition shall not be deemed invalid by reason of any failure to serve such citation or by any informality or irregularity in such petition or service. It was for the Probate Judge to decide upon the sufficiency, regularity and validity of the petition. He did decide, and it does not matter how erroneous his decision was. It cannot be inquired into in this habeas corpus proceeding. McLaughlin v. Etchison, 127 Ind. 474; Ex parte Keil, 85 Cal. 309; In re Hause, 32 Minn. 155; Farnham v. Pierce, 141 Mass. 203.
This is not a proceeding between father and mother to determine which is entitled to the custody of the child, but is a proceeding wherein it is sought by the writ of habeas corpus to reverse the final judgment of a court of general jurisdiction, committing the child to the guardianship of the State School for Indigent Children.
Chas. W. Main and Geo. W. Somerville, for respondent.
The District Court on habeas corpus can inquire whether the Probate Court obtained jurisdiction to commit Jessie Rea to the State Public School. State ex rel. v. Bechdel, 37 Minn. 360; People ex rel. v. Liscomb, 60 N.Y. 559; State v. Sheriff of Hennepin Co., 24 Minn. 87.
Where a father who is the natural guardian of his minor child sues out a writ of habeas corpus to obtain its custody, he who would prevent, must show not only a valid law by which the child is detained, but that the law has been strictly complied with. Wales v. Willard, 2 Mass. 120; Sumner v. Parker, 7 Mass. 78; Smith v. Rice, 11 Mass. 507; Blodgett v. Hitt, 29 Wis. 169; Mohr v. Tulip, 40 Wis. 66; Frederick v. Pacquette, 19 Wis. 541; Chase v. Ross, 36 Wis. 267; Stizman v. Pacquette, 13 Wis. 291.
Laws 1889, ch. 167, § 11, provides that before the Probate Court shall commit any child to the school, an application in writing shall be made and signed by at least two County Commissioners, setting forth certain facts. It is this petition that gives the Probate Court jurisdiction; without it that court has no authority to try and determine any fact, and if it assumes to act without such petition, showing the child to be a fit subject for the school, it has no jurisdiction and can acquire none. The petition in this case does not state any facts but mere conclusions, and does not comply with the statute in form or substance. The law expressly provides that in said petition the commissioners shall certify that in their opinion the child named in said petition is dependent on the public for support, or is in a state of habitual vagrancy, or mendicity, or is ill treated and in peril of life, health or morality, by continued cruel personal injury or by the habitual intemperance or gross misconduct of the parent or guardian. This petition does not allege nor does the Probate Court find the existence of any one of these facts, authorizing that court to commit the child to the State Public School. A commitment to the school without such allegations and findings is not an informality or irregularity. It is unauthorized and void. In re White, 43 Minn. 250; People v. New York Catholic Protectory, 106 N.Y. 604.
The father had no notice of the proceedings before the Judge of Probate and did not appear. He is not bound by its decision. He alone is the proper party to have the custody of the child, and no court should seek to deprive him of it. Farnham v. Pierce, 141 Mass. 203; People v. New York Catholic Protectory, 106 N.Y. 604; People v. New York Catholic Protectory, 101 N.Y. 195; Goodchild v. Foster, 51 Mich. 599; Wells, Jur., §§ 33, 35, 36.
The petition is insufficient. Shipman v. Butterfield, 47 Mich. 487; Whelan v. County Com'rs of Sibley Co., 28 Minn. 80; In re Brown, 45 Mich. 326; People v. Baker, 3 N.Y.S. 536; Milwaukee Industrial School v. Milwaukee County, 40 Wis. 328.
This is a habeas corpus proceeding, brought before us on appeal by respondent from a judgment entered in District Court awarding the custody of the child in question to the relator, its father. From the return made to the writ of habeas corpus, and from the record of the proceedings had in the...
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