State Management Ass'n of Connecticut, Inc. v. O'Neill

• Decision Date: 20 May 1986
• Docket Number: No. 267363,267363
• Citation: 512 A.2d 240,40 Conn.Supp. 381
• Court: Connecticut Superior Court
• Parties: STATE MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATION OF CONNECTICUT, INC., et al. v. William A. O'NEILL et al. -New Britain, at Hartford

Page 240

512 A.2d 240

40 Conn.Supp. 381

STATE MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATION OF CONNECTICUT, INC., et al. v. William A. O'NEILL et al.

No. 267363.

Superior Court of Connecticut,

Judicial District of Hartford-New Britain,

at Hartford.

May 20, 1986.

Eugene N. Sosnoff, New Haven, for plaintiffs.

Charles A. Overend, Asst. Atty. Gen., for defendants.

SATTER, Judge.

The plaintiffs are state employees, who appear individually and as members and on behalf of members and officers of the State Management Association of Connecticut, Inc. (SMAC), a union of management level employees, to challenge the constitutionality of § 5-270(g) of the General Statutes. The section defines a "managerial employee" by his principal functions. ¹ Pursuant to § 5-270(b), such managerial employees are not "employees" within the meaning of the Collective Bargaining for State Employees Act (CBSEA); General Statutes § 5-270 et seq.; and thus are denied the rights afforded to "employees" by § 5-271, under that act.

By way of background, that act, without reference to managerial employees, was enacted in 1975, giving state employees for the first time the right to bargain collectively. Immediately a number of unions While subsection (g) of § 5-270, when read with subsection (b), deprives managerial employees of a whole gamut of rights under CBSEA, including the right to form and to join a union, the only rights the plaintiffs in this suit have proven that the state has denied them are the right to have SMAC recognized as their bargaining agent and the right to engage in collective bargaining.

                active in the field of public employment petitioned the state labor relations board (board) to be certified as majority representatives for specified units of state employees.   The board eventually established, by regulation, eleven bargaining[40 Conn.Supp. 383]  units.   The state insisted that certain employees were managers and should be excluded from the units.   The unions, desirous of being certified as quickly as possible as bargaining representatives, did not oppose the state.   Four years later those managers were still not represented nor allowed to participate in the collective bargaining process.   They formed SMAC and petitioned the board for recognition.   Over the opposition of the state, the board ruled that managerial employees were entitled, under the then existing statute, to be represented by a union and to bargain collectively.   An election by managerial employees was held;  SMAC won and on May 14, 1981, the board certified SMAC as the collective bargaining representative.   Less than two months later the General Assembly passed Public Acts 1981, No. 81-457, which included § 12, now codified as § 5-270(g)
                

The plaintiffs point out that while they are denied those rights, "supervisory employees," defined by § 5-270(f), are not, and that there is no rational way to distinguish the two classes of employees.

Thus, the plaintiffs contend that subsection (g) of § 5-270, and subsection (b), to the extent it incorporates subsection (g): (1) deprive the plaintiffs and members of their union of equal protection of the law in violation of article first, §§ 1 and 20, of the state constitution and in violation of the fourteenth amendment to the United States constitution; (2) are vague and ambiguous in violation of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United States constitution; and (3) violate the federal civil rights statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, by reason of abridging rights guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment.

The plaintiffs seek a judgment declaring subsection (g) of § 5-270 and subsection (b), to the extent it incorporates subsection (g), unconstitutional, an order nullifying actions of the state, its officials and agencies taken pursuant to those statutes, and an injunction restraining the state, its officials and agencies from taking any action which is based on authority of those statutes.

PRELIMINARY

The court has a "judicial duty" to decide the constitutionality of the statute here challenged. Horton v. Meskill, 172 Conn. 615, 625, 376 A.2d 359 (1977). Moreover, the plaintiffs' action for a declaratory judgment and for a prospective injunction against constitutional violations is well adapted to the judicial determination of controversies concerning constitutional rights and the constitutionality of state laws. Sentner v. Board of Trustees, 184 Conn. 339, 344-45, 439 A.2d 1033 (1981); Horton v. Meskill, supra, 172 Conn. 626, 376 A.2d 359.

The defendants urge this court not to decide the plaintiffs' claim for a declaratory judgment because the plaintiffs have not exhausted their administrative remedy by first seeking a declaratory ruling from the board under § 4-176 of the Uniform Administrative Procedure Act. Recognized exceptions to the exhaustion doctrine include, however, claims raising the constitutional propriety of an agency ruling; Harwinton Drilling & Engineering Co. v. Public Utilities Control Authority, 188 Conn. 90, 94, 448 A.2d 210 (1982); or the constitutionality of a statute governing agency action. Friedson v. Westport, 181 Conn. 230, 233, 435 A.2d 17 (1980). Here the plaintiffs challenge not the application by the board of § 5-270(g)

                and (b), but the constitutionality[40 Conn.Supp. 385]  of this statute on its face.   In  Caldor, Inc. v. Thornton, 191 Conn. 336, 344, 464 A.2d 785 (1983), aff'd sub nom.   Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., --- U.S. ----, 105 S.Ct. 2914, 86 L.Ed.2d 557 (1985), the Supreme Court noted that "[w]hether a statute is in conflict with the state constitution is the duty of the judiciary to determine....  The legislature cannot confer upon an administrative agency the power to adjudicate facial unconstitutionality without doing violence to the separation of powers doctrine."   Thus, the defendants' argument of the exhaustion of administrative remedies is without merit in this case
                

EQUAL PROTECTION ISSUE

Although our courts are not required to interpret similar clauses in the state and federal constitutions the same way; see Fasulo v. Arafeh, 173 Conn. 473, 475, 378 A.2d 553 (1977); Berdon, "Protecting Liberty and Property under the Connecticut and Federal Constitutions: The Due Process Clauses," 15 Conn.L.Rev. 41 (1982); there is no reason in this case for not giving the equal protection clauses in article first, § 20, of the Connecticut constitution and in the fourteenth amendment to the United States constitution like meanings and for not imposing similar constitutional limitations. Frazier v. Manson, 176 Conn. 638, 645, 410 A.2d 475 (1979); Kellems v. Brown, 163 Conn. 478, 485, 313 A.2d 53 (1972), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 1099, 93 S.Ct. 911, 34 L.Ed.2d 678 (1973).

The analysis of the constitutional doctrine of equal protection must start with a determination of whether a legislative classification is inherently suspect, or whether the legislation impinges upon a fundamental right. Where the legislation creates a suspect classification or impinges upon a fundamental right, it is subject to strict scrutiny and must be struck down unless justified by a compelling state interest. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 335, 92 S.Ct. 995, 31 L.Ed.2d 274 (1972); Laden v. Warden, 169 Conn. 540, 542, 363 A.2d 1063 (1975). Where a statute does not involve suspect classifications or fundamental rights, it will survive constitutional challenge if the distinction created is founded on a rational basis. McGinnis v. Royster, 410 U.S. 263, 270, 93 S.Ct. 1055, 35 L.Ed.2d 282 (1973); Laden v. Warden, supra.

Among classifications which have been identified as inherently suspect are those based on alienage, national origin, race and sex. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 688, 93 S.Ct. 1764, 36 L.Ed.2d 583 (1973). A classification based on employment relationship, as in this case, is clearly distinguishable. Cardo v. Lakeland Central School District, 592 F.Supp. 765, 771 (S.D.N.Y.1984).

The plaintiffs do, however, assert that the right to bargain collectively is a fundamental right, relying as authority upon NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation, 301 U.S. 1, 33, 57 S.Ct. 615, 622, 81 L.Ed. 893 (1937). In that case the United States Supreme Court was referring to a "fundamental right" created by the National Labor Relations Act and not by the United States constitution.

The key to determining whether a right is fundamental for purposes of equal protection analysis is whether that right is explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the constitution. San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33-34, 93 S.Ct. 1278, 1296-97, 36 L.Ed.2d 16, reh. denied, 411 U.S. 959, 93 S.Ct. 1919, 36 L.Ed.2d 418 (1973). Among such rights are the rights to vote, travel, procreate and speak freely. Frazier v. Manson, supra, 646. They do not include the right to bargain collectively and to be protected by, and receive the benefits of, a collective bargaining agreement.

In Cardo v. Lakeland Central School District, supra, a per diem teacher brought suit against the school district and the teachers union, on the ground that he was denied his constitutional right of equal protection by being excluded from protection Nor does this court find that the statute here being challenged involves rights that are significant, though not fundamental, or classifications that are sensitive, though not suspect, so that they demand some intermediate standard of review. Keogh v. Bridgeport, 187 Conn. 53, 67, 444 A.2d 225 (1982); Eielson v. Parker, 179 Conn. 552, 564, 427 A.2d 814 (1980).

                under a collective bargaining agreement.   In holding that the plaintiff had not claimed a fundamental right, the court said:  "The right to collectively bargain and to receive the benefits of collective bargaining are not among the rights afforded explicit protection under our federal constitution.   Nor is there any basis for finding that they are implicitly so protected or necessary to protect all other rights."

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