State v. Alarcon

• Decision Date: 21 August 2019
• Docket Number: A17-1325
• Parties: STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Jose ALARCON, Jr., Appellant.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

932 N.W.2d 641

STATE of Minnesota, Respondent,

v.Jose ALARCON, Jr., Appellant.

A17-1325

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

Filed: August 21, 2019

OPINION

CHUTICH, Justice.

In this case we consider what it means to "leave[ ] a primary address" under Minnesota’s predatory-offender registration statute, which makes an offender’s knowing failure to register a felony offense. Minn. Stat. § 243.166, subds. 3a(a), 5(a) (2018). A jury found appellant Jose Alarcon, Jr. ("Alarcon") guilty of knowingly failing to register as a predatory offender when he did not register with local law enforcement authorities within 24 hours of leaving his registered primary address, a motel room in Albert Lea.

Alarcon appealed, and the court of appeals affirmed, concluding that sufficient evidence sustained his conviction. We hold that to convict a defendant of knowingly failing to register when a predatory offender "leaves a primary address and does not have a new primary address," Minn. Stat. § 243.166, subd. 3a(a) (2018), the State must prove not only that the defendant’s living arrangement at the primary address had ended, but also that the defendant knew that this living arrangement had ended. We further hold that the evidence at trial was insufficient to support Alarcon’s conviction. The State attempted to prove by circumstantial evidence that Alarcon knew that his living arrangement at the motel had ended. The circumstances proved, however, were consistent with a reasonable inference to the contrary. We therefore reverse the decision of the court of appeals.

FACTS

Respondent the State of Minnesota charged Alarcon with knowingly failing to register as a predatory offender under Minnesota Statutes section 243.166, subdivision 5(a). The probable cause portion of the criminal complaint alleged that Alarcon "did not report to the arresting officer, his probation officer, or other law enforcement officer his change of primary address despite the statutory requirement to do so within 24 hours of the loss of primary address on April 3rd, [2015]." At a jury trial, the following evidence was presented.

Alarcon was required to comply with the predatory-offender registration requirements because in August 2014, he was convicted of soliciting a child to engage in sexual conduct. See Minn. Stat. § 243.166, subd. 1b(a)(2) (2018). Upon his conviction, Alarcon signed a "duty to register" form. On the form, Alarcon acknowledged that "if I do not have a primary address I must report to the law enforcement authority with jurisdiction in the area where I will be staying within 24 hours of leaving my former primary address."

About 4 months later, on December 15, 2014, Alarcon moved to a motel in Albert Lea. He registered the motel’s address as his "primary address." Two weeks later, he updated his information to specify the room number in which he was living, and he signed another "duty to register" form. Alarcon’s living arrangement with the motel was not governed by a written lease agreement. Rather, he orally agreed to pay the motel in advance for his stay—first, on a monthly basis, but then on a weekly basis and sometimes on a daily basis. At the time of the alleged offense, Alarcon was paying in advance on a weekly basis.

Alarcon paid his rent using a credit card from a relative for nearly 4 months without incident. But on April 3, 2015, when the motel attempted to charge Alarcon for the upcoming week, the credit charge was declined. Alarcon was not at the motel that day but his personal belongings were in his room, unpacked. Because of the declined charge, the motel manager placed a "boot" on the doorknob that prevented Alarcon from re-entering the room and a note on the door about the lapsed payment. According to the manager’s trial testimony, the note read, "Mr. Alarcon, your rental [sic] is due today at 11 a.m. It was not paid due to a declined credit card. We have secured your room, and to gain access to the room and your property, payment must be made." The manager did not have any other contact information for Alarcon, so was unable to reach him. After waiting 24 hours, the manager instructed his staff to pack Alarcon’s belongings and place them in storage so that the room could be rented to another customer.

Three days later, on April 6, 2015, Alarcon was arrested in Albert Lea during a traffic stop on unrelated charges. Apparently, the police discovered that Alarcon was a registered predatory offender upon his booking into jail. The next morning, the jail updated his registered primary address to reflect that he was "currently housed at the Freeborn County jail as of April 7, 2015."

Alarcon’s probation officer testified that Alarcon did not notify her that he had left his primary address at the motel on April 3, 2015, did not discuss any plans to change his primary address, and did not contact her at all during the 3-day period between April 3 and April 6, 2015. The motel manager also testified that Alarcon did not contact him during that 3-day period. The manager testified that "at some point" after April 6, 2015, Alarcon called to arrange to pick up his belongings from the motel, estimating that Alarcon retrieved his belongings a couple weeks later.

A jury found Alarcon guilty of knowingly failing to register as a predatory offender. He was sentenced to 18 months in prison.¹ On appeal Alarcon challenged the sufficiency of the evidence at trial. The court of appeals affirmed Alarcon’s conviction, concluding that the evidence was sufficient to show that he knew of his registration requirements and that he "had no arrangement to continue living [at the motel] once his payment was declined[.]" State v. Alarcon , No. A17-1325, 2018 WL 3520538, at *4 (Minn. App. July 23, 2018).

We granted Alarcon’s petition for further review in part, agreeing to consider whether the State’s evidence was sufficient to support his failure-to-register conviction.

ANALYSIS

Under Minnesota’s predatory-offender registration statute, an offender must "register" with an assigned corrections officer or, in certain circumstances, a local law enforcement authority.² Minn. Stat. § 243.166, subd. 3(a) (2018). Registering requires the offender to provide, among other information, a "primary address."³

Id. , subd. 4a(a)(1). A "primary address" is "the mailing address of a person’s dwelling." Id. , subd. 1a(g). A "dwelling" is "the building where the person lives under a formal or informal agreement to do so." Id. , subd. 1a(c).⁴

The specific registration requirement at issue involves an offender who leaves a primary address. When an offender "leaves a primary address and does not have a new primary address," the offender must "register with the law enforcement authority that has jurisdiction in the area where the person is staying within 24 hours of the time the person no longer has a primary address." Id. , subd. 3a(a).

An offender who "knowingly violates any of [the] provisions" of the predatory-offender registration statute is guilty of a felony. Id. , subd. 5(a). The "knowingly" mens rea element requires the State to prove that the offender "know[s] that he is violating the statute when the violation occurs." State v. Mikulak , 903 N.W.2d 600, 603 (Minn. 2017).

Alarcon was convicted of knowingly violating Minnesota Statutes section 234.166, subdivision 3a(a), by failing to report, within 24 hours, that he left his primary address at the motel on April 3, 2015, without having a new primary address. He argues that the State did not prove that his duty to register was triggered because it failed to prove that he actually left his primary address at the motel or that he knew that his living arrangement was terminated by the motel for lack of payment. According to Alarcon, his conviction must be reversed because the State’s evidence was circumstantial and open to reasonable inferences inconsistent with guilt. See State v. Al-Naseer , 788 N.W.2d 469, 473–74 (Minn. 2010) (setting forth the sufficiency-of-the-evidence standard of review when an element of a conviction is proven with circumstantial evidence).

When the sufficiency of the State’s evidence is challenged on appeal, we ask whether the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the conviction, was sufficient to permit a finder of fact to conclude that the defendant was guilty of the charged offense. State v. Olhausen , 681 N.W.2d 21, 25 (Minn. 2004). Alarcon’s sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim turns on the meaning of the statute, however, which presents "a question of statutory interpretation that we review de novo." State v. Henderson , 907 N.W.2d 623, 625 (Minn. 2018). Accordingly, to determine if the State’s circumstantial evidence was sufficient to support Alarcon’s conviction, we must first determine what it means to "leave[ ] a primary address" under subdivision 3a(a).

I.

When interpreting the meaning of the phrase "leaves a primary address" in Minnesota Statutes section 243.166, subdivision 3a(a), we seek to "ascertain and effectuate" the Legislature’s intent. Minn. Stat. § 645.16 (2018). If the Legislature’s intent is clear from the statute’s plain language, "then we interpret the statute according to its plain meaning without resorting to the canons of statutory construction." State v. Struzyk , 869 N.W.2d 280, 284–85 (Minn. 2015). The threshold inquiry is therefore "whether the statute’s language, on its face, is ambiguous." Christianson v. Henke , 831 N.W.2d 532, 536 (Minn. 2013) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). If it is, we proceed to the second step and resort to the canons of statutory construction to resolve the ambiguity. State v. Thonesavanh , 904 N.W.2d 432, 435 (Minn. 2017).

A statute is ambiguous when it is "subject to more than one reasonable interpretation." State v. Fleck , 810 N.W.2d 303, 307 (Minn. 2012). In considering whether a statute is ambiguous, the "statute must be construed as a whole and the words and sentences therein ‘are to be understood ... in light of their...