State v. Anonymous
| Decision Date | 03 April 1995 |
| Docket Number | No. 13108,13108 |
| Citation | 37 Conn.App. 62,654 A.2d 1241 |
| Court | Connecticut Court of Appeals |
| Parties | STATE of Connecticut v. ANONYMOUS. |
Jon L. Schoenhorn, Hartford, for appellant (defendant).
Elliot B. Spector, West Hartford, with whom, on the brief, was Christopher G. Arciero, Simsbury, for appellee (town of Farmington).
Before DUPONT, C.J., and FOTI and LAVERY, JJ.
This is an appeal by the defendant from the judgment of the trial court vacating the order granting his motion to destroy statutorily erased criminal records and allowing the town of Farmington to use his records for purposes of defending an action brought by the defendant against the town for false arrest.
On March 31, 1993, the defendant was arrested and charged with attempted larceny in the first degree by extortion in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-49, 53a-119(5)(E) and 53a-121. The defendant filed a motion to dismiss the charges against him, which the trial court granted. Thereafter, on July 8, 1993, the defendant sent notice, pursuant to General Statutes § 7-465, 1 to the town regarding his intention to bring a civil action against it for false arrest.
Relying on General Statutes § 54-142a(e), 2 the defendant requested that the Farmington police department physically destroy his police records. The police department, however, refused to comply, arguing that § 54-142a(e) applies only to court records. Thereafter, the defendant filed a motion with the trial court seeking an order compelling the town to destroy the records physically and the court granted the motion. The town then filed a motion asking the court to vacate the order granting the defendant's motion to destroy all records and to grant the town disclosure of the records pursuant to General Statutes § 54-142a(f). 3 The trial court granted the motion "for the purposes of legal defense of [the] civil action only." Thereafter, the defendant filed a motion to reconsider, which the trial court denied. The defendant filed this appeal following the trial court's denial of his motion to reconsider.
The defendant raises two issues on appeal: (1) did the town have standing to intervene in the underlying criminal action when it was not a party, made no action to intervene and was not aggrieved; and (2) did the court abuse its discretion in considering the defendant's notice under § 7-465 of his intention to institute a lawsuit and to claim monetary damages against the town for false arrest as a basis to order disclosure of erased records pursuant to General Statutes § 54-142(f)? We find that the town had standing and we agree with the defendant that he has a right to have his records destroyed. We reverse the trial court's judgment.
The defendant's first claim is that the town was not a party and made no action to intervene. Though normally a nonparty has no standing, here the parties themselves and the trial court treated the town as though it had made and been granted a motion to intervene. This court will consider the defendant's failure to file appropriate motions as a waiver of this issue since the trial court heard the matter on the merits. See Tedesco v. Stamford, 215 Conn. 450, 457, 576 A.2d 1273 (1990), remanded, 24 Conn.App. 377, 588 A.2d 656 (1991), rev'd, 222 Conn. 233, 610 A.2d 574 (1992).
The town was aggrieved by the court's order granting the defendant's motion to destroy the records. Aggrievement and standing are not technical rules intended to keep suitable parties out of court, nor are they tests of substantive rights. Rather, standing and aggrievement are "practical concept[s] designed to ensure that courts and parties are not vexed by suits brought to vindicate nonjusticiable interests and that judicial decisions which may affect the rights of others are forged on hot controversy, with each view fairly and vigorously represented." Light Rigging Co. v. Dept. of Public Utility Control, 219 Conn. 168, 172, 592 A.2d 386 (1991). To determine standing, it must be decided whether the town is a proper party to request an adjudication of the issue or has a legally protected interest that has been invaded. Mystic Marinelife Aquarium, Inc. v. Gill, 175 Conn. 483, 492, 400 A.2d 726 (1978).
Because the defendant had sent notice to the town regarding his intention to bring a civil action against it, the town had a legally protected interest. The town had a right to be heard concerning the destruction of records relating to its defense in the impending civil action, and, therefore, had standing because it was adversely affected.
When the defendant gave notice to the town concerning his intention to bring a civil action for false arrest, the town moved for disclosure of the records. The town claimed a right to disclosure of the records under General Statutes § 54-142a(f), which provides for an exception to General Statutes § 54-142a. Because Farmington did not qualify for the § 54-142a(f) exception, the trial court should not have granted the disclosure of the records to the town.
Section 54-142a(f) provides: "Upon motion properly brought, the court or a judge thereof, if such court is not in session, may order disclosure of such records (1) to a defendant in an action for false arrest arising out of the proceedings so erased...." This section is a narrowly tailored exception to § 54-142a(a), (b), (c) and (d), which provide for automatic erasure of criminal records in four situations. "[T]he four situations under which erasure would occur are if first there was a nolle, second if there is a case dismissed, third if a not guilty judgment was found in a court, and fourth if there was a full pardon after sentencing." 17 S.Proc., Pt. 6, 1974 Spec.Sess., p. 2781, remarks of Senator David Odegard. In any of these four situations, "Section 54-142a provides for the sealing, erasure and, in certain cases, destruction of police, court, and prosecutorial records insofar as they pertain to criminal charges that do not result in conviction...." State v. West, 192 Conn. 488, 492, 472 A.2d 775 (1984). " '[T]he obvious purpose of the statute [§ 54-142a] is to protect [an innocent person] from the harmful consequences of a criminal charge....' " Id., at 496, 472 A.2d 775. So as not to contravene this most important purpose, "the statutorily created exceptions to a general rule [of § 54-142a] must be strictly construed and the language not extended beyond its evident intent." State v. Anonymous (1983-1), 38 Conn.Sup. 661, 664, 460 A.2d 494 (1983); see also, Pintavalle v. Valkanos, 216 Conn. 412, 581 A.2d 1050 (1990) (); State v. Fiasconaro, 25 Conn.App. 643, 595 A.2d 945 (1991) ().
A strict reading of the statutorily created exception, § 54-142a(f)(1) allows disclosure to "a defendant in an action for false arrest...." At the time the town filed its motion requesting disclosure, however, it was not "a defendant in an action for false arrest." The town had received only a notice, pursuant to § 7-465, of the defendant's intent to bring an action for false arrest. Section 7-465 requires that notice be given regarding a party's intent to commence an action. The language of the statute seems clearly to state that notice must be given as a condition precedent to any action. See Fraser v. Henninger, 173 Conn. 52, 376 A.2d 406 (1977); Derfall v. West Hartford, 25 Conn.Sup. 302, 203 A.2d 152 (1964); MacLeod v. Milford, 25 Conn.Sup. 70, 196 A.2d 604 (1963); Wolfe v. Branford, 22 Conn.Sup. 239, 167 A.2d 924 (1960). The giving of notice, therefore, does not equal an action or even the commencement of an action. Furthermore, it is well settled that an action is brought on the date on which the writ is served on the defendant. See, e.g., Hillman v. Greenwich, 217 Conn. 520, 587 A.2d 99 (1991); Howard v. Robertson, 27 Conn.App. 621, 608 A.2d 711 (1992). Because service had not been made on the town at the time it filed its motion to vacate the order granting the motion to destroy the records, there was no action pending, and the town was not a defendant in an action for false arrest, as contemplated by § 54-142a(f). An action as defined by the Connecticut Supreme Court is " 'the lawful demand of one's right in a court of justice ... for the purpose of obtaining whatever redress the law provides.' " Dayco Corp. v. Fred T. Roberts & Co., 192 Conn. 497, 502, 472 A.2d 780 (1984), quoting Waterbury Blank Book Mfg. Co. v. Hurlburt, 73 Conn. 715, 717, 49 A. 198 (1901); In re Investigation of the Grand Juror, 188 Conn. 601, 606, 452 A.2d 935 (1982). An action is an action that is currently pending; to state that is to "state the obvious." Oneglia v. Oneglia, 14 Conn.App. 267, 269 n. 2, 540 A.2d 713 (1988). The defendant, therefore, had not yet made a lawful demand for his rights in a court of justice by filing an action for false arrest against the town; he had only put the town on notice that he might file an action.
Even if the defendant had already begun an action against the town, the town's right to a § 54-142a(f) exception is by no means an absolute right. Section 54-142a(f) provides "Such disclosure of such records is subject also to any records destruction program pursuant to which the records may have been destroyed." If an action for false arrest is brought and the records have previously been destroyed, the defendant would have no meaningful right to the exception because the right to the exception would be moot.
The town does not qualify for the § 54-142a(f) exception as it is not "a defendant in an action for false arrest." For this court to find that the records should be disclosed to the town would frustrate the purpose of the erasure statute, § 54-142a(e), which allows individuals who were arrested, but whose charges were...
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