State v. Bengsch

• Decision Date: 12 November 1902
• Citation: 70 S.W. 710,170 Mo. 81
• Parties: THE STATE, Appellant, v. BENGSCH
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

70 S.W. 710

170 Mo. 81

THE STATE, Appellant, v. BENGSCH

Supreme Court of Missouri

November 12, 1902

[Copyrighted Material Omitted] [Copyrighted Material Omitted]

Appeal from Bates Circuit Court. -- Hon. W. W. Graves, Judge.

Affirmed.

Edward C. Crow, Attorney-General, and Sam B. Jeffries, Assistant Attorney-General, for the State.

(1) The act contains but one subject and it is clearly expressed in its title. Section 28, article 4 of the Constitution must be given a reasonable construction. Hannibal v. Marion Co., 69 Mo. 572; State ex rel. v. Ransone, 73 Mo. 78; State ex rel. v. Shepherd, 74 Mo. 310; State ex rel. v. County Court, 102 Mo. 537; Alleghany County Homes Cases, 77 Pa. St. 77; State v Matthews, 44 Mo. 523; State ex rel. v. Laflin, 75 Mo. 358; State v. Brassfield, 81 Mo. 151; Ewing v. Hoblitzelle, 85 Mo. 64; St. Louis v Teifel, 42 Mo. 578; DeBoth v. Coal Company, 141 Mo. 497; State ex inf. v. Ins. Co., 152 Mo. 1. Details of legislation fairly germane to the general subject of the act need not be specifically mentioned in the title. State ex rel. v. County Court, supra; State ex rel. v. Ransone, 73 Mo. 88; State v. Matthews, 44 Mo. 526; State ex rel. v. Blackstone, 115 Mo. 427; State v. Bennett, 102 Mo. 364; Lynch v. Murphy, 119 Mo. 169; State ex rel. v. Bronson, 115 Mo. 276; State ex rel. v. Slover, 134 Mo. 16; State v. Bixman, 162 Mo. 1. The requirements of the Constitution in this respect do not call for a table of contents in the title or the caption of a statute. State ex rel. v. County Court, 128 Mo. 441; Cooley on Constitutional Limitations, p. 172. The generality of a title is therefore no objection to it so long as it is not made a cover of legislation incongruous in itself and which by no fair intendment can be looked upon as having necessary and proper connection. Ewing v. Hoblitzelle, supra; Daubman v. Smith, 120 U.S. 517; Jonesboro v. Railroad, 110 U.S. 192; Kurtz v. The People, 33 Mich. 279; Donnersburger v. Prendergrast, 128 Ill. 229; Fuller v. People, 92 Ill. 182; Benz v. Weber, 81 Ill. 288. If the act contains but one subject and that is fairly expressed in its title, it will be broad enough to embrace everything having a natural connection with it. DeBoth v. Coal Co., supra. The act is a police measure designed as a means of limiting, restricting and restraining a traffic which is dangerous to the best interests of the State. It can not, therefore, be said to be an exercise of the property-taxing powers under the State Constitution. Black on Intoxicating Liquors, sec. 65. (2) The tax imposed by the act is not a property tax. When the entire act is taken into consideration there can be no question but that it is a license tax looking toward the regulation of the liquor traffic for the purpose of protecting the health, morals and good order of the people of the State. Such laws are valid and do not conflict with the restrictions of the State Constitution regarding the exercise of the taxing power. State ex rel. v. Hudson, 78 Mo. 302; State v. Hipp, 38 Ohio St. 225; Tiedemann on Police Powers, pp. 275, 279. That the liquor traffic can be controlled, regulated and in fact, prohibited by the police power of the State, can not be denied. State v. Austin, 10 Mo. 591; State v. Lemp, 16 Mo. 389; State v. Searcy, 20 Mo. 489; Burch v. Mayor, 42 Ga. 598; State v. Brennan, 2 S. Dak. 384; Boston Beer Co. v. Massachusetts, 97 U.S. 33; License Cases, 5 How. 504; Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623. When it has been judicially ascertained that the traffic may be restrained, it is a matter of legislative discretion what kind of restraint can be imposed. Tiedemann on Police Powers, pp. 278, 299; Cooley on Taxation, p. 592. The tax or fee exacted by this act is not a tax upon property, as shown by the following authorities: Cooley on Taxation, 586; Black on Intoxicating Liquors, sec. 55; State ex rel. v. Hudson, 78 Mo. 303; Albrecht v. State, 34 Am. Rep. 737; State v. Bixman, supra; State v. Strange, 39 Ohio St. 414; Senior v. Batterman, 44 Ohio St. 661. It is within the power of the Legislature to tax the liquor traffic, and an act providing for the taxing of such is not a bill to raise revenue, but simply an exercise of the police power of the State. Black on Intoxicating Liquors, sec. 55; Kurth v. State, 86 Tenn. 134. A law may be referred to the police power of the State notwithstanding it may be a revenue-producing measure, and the Legislature may have expected the act to create a fund for governmental purposes. State v. Hudson, 78 Mo. 303; Tiedemann on Police Powers, 277. It has been held that notwithstanding such an exaction may be called a tax, still its imposition may be referred to the police power. The dramshop-license law now in force is good evidence of the truth of this statement, that a revenue-producing measure may still be a police regulation. The fees paid for licenses may yield a large revenue and it may not be doubted that the Legislature intended that this should be the result. While providing for the regulation of a business, the general effect of which is to obstruct good morals, the law-making power is not bound to exclude from its consideration the fact that revenue may be produced by the enforcement of such regulation. Cooley on Taxation (2 Ed.), 587. It is immaterial that a property tax has been paid upon the value of the liquor. Other exactions and duties may be laid by the State upon the business. It has been held that taxes or fees imposed upon the business of manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquor may be classified according to the kind of drinks sold or that they may be regulated by the amount as well. Albrecht v. State, 8 Tex.App. 226; State v. Bixman, supra. If the power of a State to prohibit the manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquors be conceded -- and it is no longer open to question -- it will follow unavoidably that the power of the State to regulate the sale of such articles and to impose conditions, burdens and responsibilities on those who desire to engage in the traffic, is practically unlimited. Black on Intoxicating Liquors, sec. 39; State v. Luddington, 33 Wis. 113. The provisions of the act attach to and become a part of the regular license laws of the State regulating the right to manufacture and sell distilled liquors. It will not do to say that this is not a tax upon the privilege of business on the ground that the right to engage in the business is given by another statute. It was still within the power of the Legislature to impose additional burdens, conditions and restrictions upon the traffic. It is not necessary that all the regulations upon the liquor traffic should be contained in one statute. State v. Luddington, 33 Wis. 107; Kurth v. State, supra. The State plainly has the power to regulate the manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquors within its border. It may entirely prohibit the same or permit it upon such terms as the Legislature may see proper. Having the right to absolutely prohibit, it may authorize the manufacture and sale upon such terms as may seem best to control and regulate the business in the State. Vance v. Vanderhook Company, 170 U.S. 438. (3) The special license tax provided for in the law operates uniformly upon all persons and classes. It seems that in a number of cases in this State objection has been unsuccessfully made to license charges on the ground that some are required to pay more than others, and such cases fall directly within the line of the case at bar. St. Louis v. Sternberg, 69 Mo. 289; Glasgow v. Rowse, 43 Mo. 479; St. Louis v. Greene, 70 Mo. 562; St. Louis v. Bowler, 94 Mo. 634; State v. Bixman, supra. (4) The fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States is not violated. The statute accords equal protection of law to all persons falling within its provisions. As a measure of police regulation, looking to the preservation of public morals, this law is not repugnant to and violates no clause of the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States. State v. Brennan, 2 S. Dak., 390; Boston Beer Company v. Massachusetts, 97 U.S. 25; Foster v. Kansas, 112 U.S. 201; Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U.S. 678. Soon after the passage of the Wilson Act its constitutionality was called to the attention of the Supreme Court of the United States, which declared that the purpose of Congress in adopting the statute was to allow State laws to operate on liquors shipped from one State into another, so as to prevent the sale of original packages in violation of State laws. The constitutionality of the act was upheld. In re Rahrer, 140 U.S. 545; Rhodes v. Iowa, 170 U.S. 112; Vance v. Vanderhook, 170 U.S. 445. (5) What may be deemed an emergency is a purely legislative question. The courts will not inquire into it, nor entertain any question of its sufficiency. Sutherland on Statutory Construction, sec. 108; Gentile v. State, 29 Ind. 409; Carpenter v. Montgomery, 7 Blatchf. 415; Biggs v. McBride, 17 Ore. 640. The emergency clause is no part of the bill; in fact, the bill might become a law without the emergency clause. Had it been defeated, and failed to receive the necessary two-thirds vote in either branch of the Legislature, it would not have appeared in this case and defendant would not then have had the opportunity to assert that it indicated the full context of the act and was the only meaning that should be given to it. When the entire act is taken into consideration, it will not do to say that the Legislature intended to violate the Constitution of the State and pass an unconstitutional measure. The purpose and intent of the act can not be controlled by the emergency clause, simply because revenue is indirectly raised by it. The same might be said of our regular dramshop license law; a vast amount of money is collected into ...