State v. Blanton
| Decision Date | 19 December 1978 |
| Citation | 284 Or. 591,588 P.2d 28 |
| Parties | STATE of Oregon, Petitioner, v. Michael Ray BLANTON, Respondent. TC 21229, CA 7543; SC 25685. |
| Court | Oregon Supreme Court |
Donald L. Paillette, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salem, argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief were James A. Redden, Atty. Gen., and W. Michael Gillette, Sol. Gen.
Gary L. Hooper, Deputy Public Defender, Salem, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was Gary D. Babcock, Public Defender, Salem.
Defendant was charged in October, 1976, with the offense of criminal activity in drugs. The statute in effect at that time, ORS 167.207, provided:
(1) A person commits the offense of criminal activity in drugs if he knowingly and unlawfully manufactures, cultivates, transports, possesses, furnishes, prescribes, administers, dispenses or compounds a narcotic or dangerous drug.
(2) Except as provided in subsections (3) and (4) of this section, criminal activity in drugs is a Class B felony, or the court may, under the criteria set forth in ORS 161.705, enter judgment for a Class A misdemeanor and impose sentence accordingly.
(3) Notwithstanding subsection (2) of this section, if the conviction is for possession of less than one avoirdupois ounce of marijuana it is a violation punishable by a fine of not more than $100.
(4) Notwithstanding subsection (2) of this section, if the defendant is 18 years of age or over and the conviction is for furnishing a narcotic or dangerous drug to a person under 18 years of age and who is at least three years younger than the defendant, criminal activity in drugs i(s) a Class A felony. 1
The district attorney's information charged that defendant, being of the age of 21 years, "did unlawfully and knowingly furnish to David McMillan, a 17-year old person, the narcotic drug, marijuana . . . ."
The trial court refused defendant's request for an instruction requiring the state to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant knew the recipient of the marijuana to be 17 years old. The court accepted the state's view that the word "knowingly" in the statute and in the charging instrument referred to knowledge of the other elements of the offense but not of the recipient's age. Defendant was convicted of the Class A felony defined in ORS 167.207(4). On appeal, the Court of Appeals held that defendant's conviction of the higher degree of the offense under subsection (4) could not stand in the absence of the requested instruction on defendant's knowledge of the recipient's age, and it remanded the case to the trial court for entry of judgment and sentence under subsection (2). 31 Or.App. 327, 570 P.2d 411 (1977). Having allowed the state's petition for review, we affirm the conclusion reached by the Court of Appeals.
Defendant's argument places much reliance on the general policy of the 1971 criminal code to avoid "strict liability" offenses, at least when the penalty includes possible imprisonment. 2 That argument overshoots the mark, since culpable knowledge is a requirement of criminal activity in drugs under ORS 167.207 whether or not it extends to the age element of subsection (4). A policy against criminal liability without fault need not go so far as to protect a culpable defendant from an unanticipated extent of liability. However, the policy adopted by the legislature is to require a culpable mental state with respect to each element in the definition of an offense, with the exceptions stated in ORS 161.105. See note 2 Supra. ORS 161.095(2) provides that, with those exceptions, "a person is not guilty of an offense unless he acts with a culpable mental state with respect to each material element of the offense that necessarily requires a culpable mental state." And ORS 161.115(1) provides guidance in determining which culpable mental state is required:
If a statute defining an offense prescribes a culpable mental state but does not specify the element to which it applies, the prescribed culpable mental state applies to each material element of the offense that necessarily requires a culpable mental state.
As the Court of Appeals noted, the qualifying phrase "that necessarily requires a culpable mental state" in these sections introduces a confusing appearance of circularity in the text. The court concluded that the phrase apparently was meant to distinguish those elements defining the substance or quality of the forbidden conduct from others relating, in the explanation of the Criminal Law...
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State v. Prophet
...pointed out since 1978, *** are confusing." State v. Ruggles , 238 Or. App. 86, 89, 242 P.3d 643 (2010) (citing State v. Blanton , 284 Or. 591, 595, 588 P.2d 28 (1978) ).Those general culpability statutes for the most part reflect the legislature's policy choice to "use the Model Penal Code......
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State v. Belen, 12C47258
...161.095 unless it relates " ‘solely to the statute of limitations, jurisdiction, venue’ or similar matters" (quoting State v. Blanton, 284 Or. 591, 595, 588 P.2d 28 (1978) )).In Nelson, we held that the "subjected to forcible compulsion" element in the first-degree rape and first-degree sex......
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State v. Engen
...] that necessarily requires a culpable mental state." ORS 161.095(2); ORS 161.115(1). Defendant particularly invokes State v. Blanton, 284 Or. 591, 588 P.2d 28 (1978), affirming 31 Or.App. 327, 570 P.2d 411 (1977), and contends that our holding in State v. Van Norsdall, 127 Or.App. 300, 873......
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State v. Anderson
...state must prove a culpable mental state has been described as presenting a "confusing appearance of circularity," State v. Blanton, 284 Or. 591, 595, 588 P.2d 28 (1978); a "patchwork of appellate decisions" that has not been "`entirely consistent,'" Andrews, 174 Or.App. at 362, 27 P.3d 137......