State v. Bonnewell

• Citation: 196 Ariz. 592,2 P.3d 682
• Decision Date: 23 November 1999
• Docket Number: No. 1 CA-CR 98-0977 to 1 CA-CR 98-0979., No. 1 CA-CR 98-0973
• Parties: STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Kurt BONNEWELL, Lauralu Harkins, Lee Hulsey, and Walter Randall, Appellants.
• Court: Arizona Court of Appeals

2 P.3d 682

196 Ariz. 592

STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Kurt BONNEWELL, Lauralu Harkins, Lee Hulsey, and Walter Randall, Appellants.

Nos. -0973, - CA-CR 98-0979.

Court of Appeals of Arizona, Division 1, Department E.

November 23, 1999.

As Amended December 7, 1999.

Review Denied May 23, 2000.

Janet Napolitano, Arizona Attorney General by Paul J. McMurdie, Chief Counsel, Criminal Appeals Section and Randall M. Howe, Assistant Attorney General, Phoenix, Attorneys for Appellee.

Thomas K. Kelly, Prescott, Attorney for Appellants.

Warren R. Darrow, Prescott, Attorney for Appellants.

Angelo Patane and Janet Evans, Phoenix, Attorneys for Amicus Curiae Help Abolish Leghold Traps (H.A.L.T.)

OPINION

RYAN, Judge.

¶ 1 Kurt Bonnewell, Lauralu Harkins, Lee P. Hulsey, and Walter John Randall ("Defendants") were convicted of setting a leghold trap on public land in violation of Arizona Revised Statutes Annotated ("A.R.S.") section 17-301(D)(1),¹ a class two misdemeanor. On appeal, they argue that the statute is a special or local law in violation of the Arizona Constitution and that it violates the equal protection clauses of the Arizona and United States Constitutions.

¶ 2 We hold that A.R.S. section 17-301(D) is not an unconstitutional local or special law because it rationally furthers a legitimate governmental purpose, applies to all persons in Arizona, and benefits no static class of individuals. We also hold that the statute does not violate the equal protection clauses of either the Arizona Constitution or the United States Constitution because it is rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose. We therefore affirm.

Background

¶ 3 In the November 1994 general election, voters passed Proposition 201, which was codified as A.R.S. section 17-301(D). The pertinent part of the statute made unlawful the taking of wildlife on public lands by leghold trap.² The statute makes exceptions for the use of traps by government officials to protect against threats to human health or safety, or for research, falconry, relocation of wildlife, or rodent control. See A.R.S. § 17-301(D)(1), (3), (4), and (5) (Supp.1998). According to the pamphlet issued by the Secretary of State on the 1994 Ballot Propositions, the purposes of the initiative were, among others, to prevent cruelty to wildlife on public lands and to prevent injuries to pets, children, and adults using public lands for recreation.

¶ 4 Defendants were each charged with setting a leghold trap in violation of A.R.S. section 17-301(D). Each filed a motion to dismiss the charges, arguing that the statute constituted a local or special law that violated article 4, part 2, section 19 of the Arizona Constitution and violated the equal protection guarantees of the Arizona and United States Constitutions because it made criminal behavior on public land that remained legal when practiced on private land.³ At an evidentiary hearing, each Defendant admitted setting a prohibited leghold trap on public land, but presented evidence that leghold traps were humane, that they did not indiscriminately injure people or nontarget species, and that the law provided a benefit to private landowners at the expense of those who trapped on public land. The State presented no evidence. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss, ruling that voters could have rationally determined that characteristics of leghold traps justified banning them from public lands and that the distinction between public and private lands was legitimate. The parties stipulated that the court could consider admissions made during the evidentiary hearing in determining whether Defendants had committed the offense. The trial court found Defendants guilty and fined each $150. Defendants appealed.

Discussion

¶ 5 We review the constitutionality of a statute de novo. See City of Tucson v. Woods, 191 Ariz. 523, 530, 959 P.2d 394, 401 (App.1997). In conducting that review, we presume that the statute is constitutional and must construe it, if possible, to give it a constitutional meaning. See State Compensation Fund v. Symington, 174 Ariz. 188, 193, 848 P.2d 273, 278 (1993). The presumption applies to laws enacted through initiatives as well as by legislative action. See Ruiz v. Hull, 191 Ariz. 441, 448, ¶ 25, 957 P.2d 984, 991, ¶ 25 (1998), cert. denied sub nom., Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 525 U.S. 1093, 119 S.Ct. 850, 142 L.Ed.2d 703 (1999). The party alleging the constitutional violation bears the burden of proving it. See Eastin v. Broomfield, 116 Ariz. 576, 580, 570 P.2d 744, 748 (1977). We will declare legislation unconstitutional only if we are clearly convinced that it conflicts with the Arizona or United States Constitutions. See State v. Arnett, 119 Ariz. 38, 48, 579 P.2d 542, 552 (1978). And, "[i]n construing an initiative, we may consider ballot materials and publicity pamphlets circulated in support of the initiative." Ruiz, 191 Ariz. at 449, ¶ 36, 957 P.2d at 993, ¶ 36.

Special or Local Law

¶ 6 Defendants argue that section 17-301(D) constitutes a special or local law prohibited by the Arizona Constitution. Defendants contend that the statute conveys benefits to private landowners who can still use leghold traps to control predation of their livestock and game and to trap fur-bearing animals for financial gain. We conclude, however, that A.R.S. section 17-301(D) is not a special law because its classification furthers a legitimate government objective, it encompasses all members of the relevant class, and the class is flexible.

¶ 7 The Arizona Constitution prohibits any special or local law "granting any individual any special or exclusive privilege or immunities," or "when a general law can be made applicable." Art. 4, part 2, § 19(13), (20). The prohibition against special legislation is intended to prevent the legislature from providing special benefits and favors to certain groups or locations. See State Compensation Fund, 174 Ariz. at 192, 848 P.2d at 277. A law is not a "special" law if (1) the classification is rationally related to a legitimate government objective, (2) the classification encompasses all members of the relevant class, and (3) the class is flexible, allowing members to move into and out of the class. See Republic Inv. Fund I v. Town of Surprise, 166 Ariz. 143, 149, 800 P.2d 1251, 1257 (1990). If a law treats all members of a class alike and the classification is reasonable, the law is not special legislation. See Lerma v. Keck, 186 Ariz. 228, 234, 921 P.2d 28, 34 (App.1996). Also, the classification must be accepted as reasonable unless "palpably arbitrary." Tucson Elec. Power Co. v. Apache County, 185 Ariz. 5, 13, 912 P.2d 9, 17 (App. 1995).

¶ 8 We first consider whether section 17-301(D)'s classification based on location is rationally related to a legitimate purpose. The statute establishes classifications based on location; it prohibits the use of leghold traps on public land but not on private land. The information pamphlet on Proposition 201 indicates that among the purposes of the law are the prevention of cruelty to animals on public land and the protection from injury of pets, children, and adults on public land. We believe the statute rationally furthers these legitimate governmental interests.

¶ 9 Defendants agree that prevention of cruelty to animals on public lands is a legitimate State interest, but argue that the classification does not rationally further that interest. Defendants assert that the only rational means of furthering the State's interest in preventing cruelty to animals, assuming that leghold traps are cruel, would be to enact a general law prohibiting the use of leghold traps throughout the State on both public and private land. However, to be general, a law need not apply to every person, place, or thing within the State; the law must apply uniformly to those cases and members within the circumstances provided for by the law. See Republic Inv. Fund I, 166 Ariz. at 150, 800 P.2d at 1258. While a law governing all land throughout the State would certainly further the State's interest in preventing cruelty to animals, it does not necessarily follow that the approach taken by the initiative does not further the State's interests. Legislation can be enacted one step at a time, addressing first what is perceived as the most acute aspect of a problem. See Lerma, 186 Ariz. at 234, 921 P.2d at 34. Consequently, Defendants are mistaken in assuming that only a statute prohibiting all leghold trapping could further the interest involved.

¶ 10 We do not believe the classification here to be palpably arbitrary. The people of Arizona could legitimately determine that cruelty to animals should be eliminated on land belonging to the people of the State and that the State should prohibit the use of devices perceived to be inhumane and cruel. The statute furthers that purpose.

¶ 11 The statute also furthers the State's interest in preventing injury to people who use public lands for recreation. The classification between private and public lands is reasonably related to this purpose of the statute. Unlike private land, in which the owner has control over the access of individuals onto the property, public lands are accessible to and used by the general public. The private owner, being responsible for his property, would presumably know of the presence of traps that might pose a danger and be able to warn anyone admitted on the property to avoid injury. Such is not the case on public lands, where anyone using the land might accidentally and unexpectedly place a foot in one of the traps, causing injury. Prohibiting the placement of leghold traps on public lands furthers the purpose of the statute to protect users of public lands from injury caused by the traps.

¶ 12 We next consider whether the statute meets the second requirement of a general law. This requirement mandates that the classification encompass all members of the relevant...