State v. Brown

• Decision Date: 29 August 1985
• Docket Number: No. 84-776,84-776
• Citation: 376 N.W.2d 910
• Parties: STATE of Iowa, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. David Lee BROWN, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Iowa Court of Appeals

Page 910

376 N.W.2d 910

STATE of Iowa, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. David Lee BROWN, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 84-776.

Court of Appeals of Iowa.

Aug. 29, 1985.

Charles L. Harrington, Chief Appellate Defender, for defendant-appellant.

Thomas J. Miller, Atty. Gen., and Ann E. Brenden, Asst. Atty. Gen., for plaintiff-appellee.

Considered by OXBERGER, C.J., and SNELL, and HAYDEN, JJ.

HAYDEN, Judge.

Defendant appeals from a conviction of assault causing bodily injury, as defined in Iowa Code sections 708.1 and 708.2(2) (1983). He asserts that the district court failed to explain to him and determine the nature of the charge to which he was pleading guilty, as required by Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 8(2)(b)(1).

Defendant David Lee Brown was charged by trial information with assault causing bodily injury. The minutes of testimony indicated that the victim would testify (1) that on July 19, 1983, defendant hit him on the head with what he believed to be a hammer, causing a 3 1/2 inch laceration which required stitches, and (2) that when he was being treated at the hospital, he identified defendant from a photograph as the one who had hit him. The minutes also indicated that the police officer who investigated the assault would testify that the victim had identified defendant from a photo array. Defendant entered a guilty plea.

At the plea proceeding, the district court did not explain the offense charged to defendant and ask him whether he understood. Nor did the district court engage in a factual basis colloquy with defendant which related the facts of the case to the elements of the offense charged. Instead, the district court named the offense and then elicited defendant's admission that the minutes of testimony were "substantially correct." The district court then accepted defendant's guilty plea.

Brown waived the time for sentencing and his opportunity to file motion in arrest of judgment; the district court proceeded to sentence him. The defendant has appealed.

I. Failure to File Motion in Arrest of Judgment. Pursuant to Iowa Rules of Criminal Procedure 23(3)(a), "[a] defendant's failure to challenge the adequacy of a guilty plea proceeding by motion in arrest of judgment shall preclude his or her right to assert such challenge on appeal." However, a defendant is not precluded from attacking the plea proceedings unless the court has personally informed the defendant "that he may file a motion in arrest of judgment and the consequences of failing to do so...." State v. Worely, 297 N.W.2d 368, 370 (Iowa 1980).

Although the defendant in this action waived his opportunity to file a motion in arrest of judgment, it is apparent from the record that the court did not explain the consequences. Thus, Brown's attack on his plea proceeding is not precluded by Iowa Rules of Criminal Procedure 23(3)(a). We therefore consider the issues raised by defendant.

II. Explanation of the Nature of the Charge. Brown's sole argument on appeal is that the trial court erred in failing to inform him of the elements of the offense and make certain he understood the nature of the offense as required by Iowa Rules of Criminal Procedure 8(2)(b)(1).

In guilty plea proceedings, lack of explanation of the elements of an offense is not reversible error if, under the circumstances, it is apparent that the accused understood the nature of the charge. State v. Victor, 310 N.W.2d 201, 204 (Iowa 1981). In fact, in some situations, the name of the offense itself has been held to be sufficiently descriptive. State v. Worely, 297 N.W.2d 368, 371 (Iowa 1980).

In the present case, the trial court made the following inquiry when the guilty plea was accepted.

THE COURT: Having read over the Minutes of Testimony in both of these cases, David, with your attorney, now, I ask you to recall back to those two respective dates of April 10 and the other one in July--July 19, 1983, do you find any serious discrepancies with the facts that the State is telling the Court here on the Minutes?

THE DEFENDANT: No, sir.

THE COURT: They are substantially accurate?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: Do you want to add anything to either one of these matters at all?

THE DEFENDANT: No. I wish it wouldn't have happened.

Although the court did not advise Brown of the elements of the crime, the minutes of testimony described exactly how the crime was committed in simple, easily understood terms. We believe this was adequate to ensure that Brown was aware of the elements of assault and understood the nature of the crime. See State v. Oberbreckling, 235 N.W.2d 121, 122 (Iowa 1975) (explanation of crime of sodomy in minutes of testimony served to inform defendant of elements of crime).

Defendant, however, claims that the minutes of testimony do not establish that the alleged assault was intentional. He argues that assault causing bodily injury is a specific intent crime and the court failed to ascertain his understanding of this intent element.

Our case law indicates that when dealing with a specific intent crime it is generally necessary to document the defendants understanding of the specific intent element in order to accept the guilty plea. State v. Worely, 297 N.W.2d at 371; State v. Fluhr, 287 N.W.2d 857, 866 (Iowa 1980); but see State v. Reaves, 254 N.W.2d 488, 494 (Iowa 1977); Michels v. Brewer, 211 N.W.2d 293, 296 (Iowa 1973) (understanding of the nature of the charge apparent under all circumstances despite the trial court's failure to specifically explain the intent element). Thus, in order to determine whether Brown's guilty plea is valid it is necessary to determine whether assault causing bodily injury is a specific intent crime.

The definition of assault causing bodily injury is set forth in Iowa Code section 708.2(2): "A person who commits an assault, as defined in section 708.1, without the intent to inflict a serious injury upon another, and who causes bodily injury or disabling mental illness, is guilty of a serious misdemeanor." Since there is no additional intent element set forth in this definition, it is apparent that our analysis turns on whether assault, as defined in section 708.1, contains a specific intent element.

Our decision is necessarily one of statutory interpretation. The intent of the legislature is controlling. Hubbard v. State, 163 N.W.2d 904, 909 (Iowa 1969). The court is to look at the object to be accomplished, the evils to be remedied or the purpose to be served, and then give a liberal construction to the law which will best effect its purpose. Shidler v. All American Life and Financial Corporation, 298 N.W.2d 318, 321 (Iowa 1980). All parts of the statute should be read together and we are not to give undue importance to a single or isolated part. Iowa Beef Processors, Inc. v. Miller, 312 N.W.2d 530, 532 (Iowa 1981).

Section 708.1 defines assault as follows:

1. Any act which is intended to cause pain or injury to, or which is intended to result in physical contact which will be insulting or offensive to another, coupled with the apparent ability to execute the act.

2. Any act which is intended to place another in fear of immediate physical contact which will be painful, injurious, insulting, or offensive, coupled with the apparent ability to execute the act.

3. Intentionally points any firearm toward another, or displays in a threatening manner any dangerous weapon toward another.

In determining whether this provision contains a specific intent element several principles guide us. In State v. Redmon, 244 N.W.2d 792, 797 (Iowa 1976), the supreme court recognized the following distinction between specific and general intent:

Specific intent is present when from the circumstances the offender must have subjectively desired the prohibited result. General intent exists when from the circumstances the prohibited result may reasonably be expected to follow from the offender's voluntary act, irrespective of any subjective desire to have accomplished such result.

In Eggman v. Scurr, 311 N.W.2d 77, 79 (Iowa 1981), the supreme court stated:

"[T]he most common usage of "specific intent" is to designate a special mental element which is required above and beyond any mental state required with respect to the actus reus of the crime." W. La Fave & A. Scott, Jr., supra § 28 at 202.

When the definition of a crime consists of only the description of a particular act, without reference to intent to do a further act or achieve a further consequence, we ask whether the defendant intended to do the proscribed act. This intention is deemed to be a general criminal intent. When the definition refers to defendant's intent to do some further act or achieve some additional consequence; the crime is deemed to be one of specific intent.

P. Johnson, Criminal Law, 329 (1975).

However, it has also been recognized that the mere use of the word "intent" in a statute does not mean that it is a specific intent crime. K. Dunahoo, The New Iowa Criminal Code, 29 Drake L.Rev. 237, 301-02 (1979-80). "[T]he effect of the element requiring the requisite proscribed act to have been done intentionally is merely to state the obvious, viz. accidental or unintentional acts are not punishable under the Criminal Code irrespective of their results." Id.; see, e.g., Iowa Code §§ 710.7 (False Imprisonment), 716.1 (Criminal Mischief), and 719.4 (Escape) (1985).

The application of these principles is quite clear in some contexts. For instance, going armed with intent as defined in Iowa Code section 708.8 requires 1) that the person be armed with a dangerous weapon and 2) that the person have the specific intent to use the weapon against another person. Likewise, assault with intent to inflict serious injury obviously has a specific intent element beyond the intent necessary to commit an assault. However, in analyzing the general assault provision, the distinction is not as clear; the difficulty stems from the fact that the intent element is not easily separated from the...