State v. Byars

• Decision Date: 03 July 2002
• Docket Number: No. SC01-1930.,SC01-1930.
• Citation: 823 So.2d 740
• Parties: STATE of Florida, Petitioner, v. Eugene Michael BYARS, Respondent.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

823 So.2d 740

STATE of Florida, Petitioner, v. Eugene Michael BYARS, Respondent.

No. SC01-1930.

Supreme Court of Florida.

July 3, 2002.

Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, Celia A. Terenzio, Assistant Attorney General, Chief, West Palm Beach Bureau, and Melynda L. Melear, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, FL, for Petitioner.

Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and Jeffrey L. Anderson, Assistant Public Defender, Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, West Palm Beach, FL, for Respondent.

Bethanne Walz, Tallahassee, FL, for The Florida Coalition Against Domestic Violence, Amicus Curiae.

LEWIS, J.

We have for review a decision of a district court of appeal in which the following question has been certified to be of great public importance:

DOES A RESTRAINING ORDER ENJOINING A DEFENDANT FROM ENTERING A STRUCTURE WITHDRAW THE CONSENT ENJOYED BY MEMBERS OF THE GENERAL PUBLIC FROM ENTRY INTO THE STRUCTURE, THEREBY PREVENTING THE DEFENDANT FROM RAISING THE OPEN TO THE PUBLIC DEFENSE RECOGNIZED IN MILLER V. STATE, 733 So.2d 955 (Fla. 1998)?

State v. Byars, 792 So.2d 1235, 1235 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001). We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const.

Facts and Procedural History

Despite an existing domestic violence injunction prohibiting his physical presence within his wife's place of employment, the respondent entered the consignment store in which she worked on September 17, 1998. Once inside the shop, Byars allegedly shot and killed his wife, Kathleen Kincaid. Respondent was charged with first-degree murder, armed burglary of an occupied structure with an assault or battery, violation of an injunction with violence, and possession of a firearm with an altered serial number. Prior to trial, the trial court dismissed only the burglary charge based upon this Court's decision in Miller v. State, 733 So.2d 955 (Fla.1998). The State appealed the dismissal of the burglary charge to the Fourth District Court of Appeal. The remaining charges of first-degree murder, violation of an injunction with violence, and possession of a firearm with an altered serial number were unaffected by the trial court's dismissal of the burglary charge, and are not before us at this time. Indeed, upon the issuance of this opinion, the trial court should proceed with these charges.

On appeal, the Fourth District affirmed. See State v. Byars, 804 So.2d 336 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001)

. The appellate court held:

Because the premises where appellee allegedly committed the murder were open to the public, even though he was prevented by a domestic violence injunction from entering the store, we are compelled to affirm on the authority of Miller.

Id. Subsequently, the district court granted the State's motion and certified the above-stated question to this Court as one of great public importance. See Byars, 792 So.2d at 1235

.

Analysis

The relevant statutory provision in the instant case is section 810.02, Florida Statutes (1999), Florida's legislative provision which addresses burglary. At the time of the respondent's prosecution, it provided:

(1) "Burglary" means entering or remaining in a dwelling, structure, or a conveyance with the intent to commit an offense therein, unless the premises are at the time open to the public or the defendant is licensed or invited to enter or remain.

(2) Burglary is a felony of the first degree ... if, in the course of committing the offense, the offender:

(a) Makes an assault or battery upon any person; or

(b) Is or becomes armed ... with ... a dangerous weapon....

§ 810.02, Fla. Stat. (1999). To resolve the issue certified by the district court below, our review must focus upon the statute's exception for conduct which occurs where "the premises are at the time open to the public." Id.

"One of the most fundamental principles of Florida law is that penal statutes must be strictly construed according to their letter." Perkins v. State, 576 So.2d 1310, 1312 (Fla.1991); see also McFadden v. State, 737 So.2d 1073 (Fla. 1999)

; § 777.02(1), Fla. Stat. (2001) ("The provisions of this code and offenses defined by other statutes shall be strictly construed ..."). Therefore, any ambiguity or situations in which statutory language is susceptible to differing constructions must be resolved in favor of the person charged with an offense. See id.; Perkins, 576 So.2d at 1312.

The doctrine that mandates construing statutes in favor of the accused also requires that courts give effect to the language and intent of the Legislature in its interpretations of statutes. See, e.g., Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, 772 So.2d 1220, 1234 (Fla.2000)

; see also Vocelle v. Knight Bros. Paper Co., 118 So.2d 664, 668 (Fla. 1st DCA 1960) (holding that "neither the courts nor the administrative agencies have power to modify the plain purpose and intent of the legislature as expressed by the language employed in the statutes"). For this reason, "[w]ords and meanings beyond the literal language may not be entertained nor may vagueness become a reason for broadening a penal statute." Perkins, 576 So.2d at 1312.

In the instant case, the Legislature's intent is apparent: A person who enters or remains in a structure with the intent to commit an offense therein will be guilty of burglary, "unless the premises are at the time open to the public." § 810.02(1), Fla. Stat. (1999) (emphasis supplied). The plain intention of the Legislature's use of the disjunctive "unless" was to create an exception to the preceding inclusive statement. Thus, under the Florida burglary statute, when a structure is open to the public it cannot be burglarized.

In 1999, we had occasion to interpret the "open to the public" exception in Miller v. State, 733 So.2d 955 (Fla.1999). There, this Court stated in absolute and unmistakable terms:

[W]e hold that if a defendant can establish that the premises were open to the public, then this is a complete defense. Whether or not consent may have been withdrawn, either by direct or circumstantial evidence, is not an issue. The only relevant question is whether the premises were open to the public at the time the defendant entered or remained with the intent to commit an offense therein.

Id. at 957 (citations omitted). With these words, this Court clearly established that a defendant's proof that a structure and specific location therein was open to the public ends the inquiry with regard to burglary. We have subsequently reaffirmed our adherence to the Miller bright-line rule in State v. Butler, 735 So.2d 481 (Fla.1999), and Johnson v. State, 786 So.2d 1162 (Fla. 2001). Just as we determined that an owner's notification to a defendant that he was unwelcome in a building is immaterial to a burglary prosecution, see Miller, 733 So.2d at 957,

we must conclude that the existence of an injunction prohibiting the instant defendant from entering his wife's place of employment is also irrelevant here to the strict analysis of the premises. Interpretation of the burglary statute's exception must be specifically directed to the general nature of the premises, not the personal characteristics of the individual charged with the crime. Thus, the injunction in effect against Byars does not affect the impropriety of charging him with burglary.

The State contends that this Court should refer to the decisions of the Washington and Oregon courts of appeals for direction here. In State v. Kutch, 90 Wash.App. 244, 951 P.2d 1139 (1998), the court held that written and verbal notice to the defendant operated to preclude him from entering a shopping mall. See id. at 1140. Additionally, the ban on the defendant's entering the mall allowed the state to prosecute the defendant for burglary. See id. at 1142. Kutch, however, is inapposite here. The Washington burglary statute is far different and does not have an exception for places open to the public as does the Florida statute. Instead, the Washington statute defines a person who "enters or remains unlawfully in a building" as one who is "not then licensed, invited, or otherwise privileged to enter or remain." Id. at 1141 (quoting Wash. Rev. Code §§ 9A.52.010(3), 9A.52.030(1) (1998)). Thus, we do not find this decision persuasive in view of the significant differences in statutory language.

In State v. Ocean, 24 Or.App. 289, 546 P.2d 150 (1976), however, the Oregon Court of Appeals interpreted a burglary statute which contained a variation of an "open to the public" exception. In Ocean, the court held that a store's banning the defendant from returning to the store removed his membership in the general public. See id. at 152-53. Therefore, he was subject to prosecution for burglary even when the establishment was open for business. See id.

Examination of the text of the Oregon statute, however, reveals the reason for the court's conclusion. The statute in question in Ocean provided:

A person commits the crime of burglary in the second degree if he enters or remains unlawfully in a building with intent to commit a crime therein.

. . . .

"Enter or remain unlawfully" means:

.... To enter or remain in or upon premises when the premises, at the time of such entry or remaining, are not open to the public or when the entrant is not otherwise licensed or privileged to do so....

Id. at 152 (quoting Or.Rev.Stat. §§ 164.205(3), 164.215(1) (1975)). Close attention must be given to the definition of "enter or remain unlawfully," which makes it absolutely clear that in Oregon, one can commit burglary when the building is either not open to the public, or when the entrant is not otherwise licensed to enter or remain in the structure.

Clearly, the Oregon statute is not constructed in the same manner as Florida's. The Florida "open to the public" condition is an independent exception to the inclusive definition of burglary which precedes it. See § 810.02(1) ("`Burglary' means entering or remaining in a ... structure ... with the intent to commit an offense therein, unless the premises are...