State v. Carlisle

• Decision Date: 09 January 1974
• Docket Number: No. 738SC709,738SC709
• Citation: 20 N.C.App. 358,201 S.E.2d 704
• Court: North Carolina Court of Appeals
• Parties: STATE of North Carolina v. Preston Maynard CARLISLE.

Page 704

201 S.E.2d 704

20 N.C.App. 358

STATE of North Carolina v. Preston Maynard CARLISLE.

No. 738SC709.

Court of Appeals of North Carolina.

Jan. 9, 1974.

Atty. Gen. Robert Morgan by William W. Melvin and William B. Ray, Asst. Attys. Gen., Raleigh, for the State.

Sasser, Duke & Brown by John E. Duke, Goldsboro, for defendant-appellee.

BALEY, Judge.

The question for decision upon this appeal is the constitutionality of Article 8 of Chapter 20 of the General Statutes of North Carolina (G.S. §§ 20--220 through 20--231), which is applicable to habitual offenders of the motor vehicle laws. The trial court has interpreted this statute to be criminal in nature requiring all the safeguards to which a defendant charged with a criminal offense is entitled, including trial by jury, protection from double jeopardy, and compliance with the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. We do not agree with this interpretation and hold the statute to be constitutional.

It is fundamental that a statute is presumed to be constitutional and will not be declared unconstitutional by the courts unless the conclusion is so clear that there can be no reasonable doubt. Mitchell v. Financing Authority, 273 N.C. 137, 159 S.E.2d 745; Assurance Co. v. Gold, Comr. of Insurance, 249 N.C. 461, 106 S.E.2d 875; State v. Anderson, 3 N.C.App. 124, 164 S.E.2d 48, aff'd, 275 N.C. 168, 166 S.E.2d 49. In determining whether this statute is constitutional, it is important to consider the nature of a license to operate motor vehicles and the type of proceeding involved in the revocation of such license.

'A license to operate a motor vehicle is a privilege in the nature of a right of which the licensee may not be deprived save in the manner and upon the conditions prescribed by statute.'

In re Revocation of License of Wright, 228 N.C. 584, 589, 46 S.E.2d 696, 699--700.

"'The right of a citizen to travel upon the public highways is a common right, but the exercise of that right may be regulated or controlled in the interest of public safety under the police power of the State. The operation of a motor vehicle on such highways is not a natural right. It is a conditional privilege, which may be suspended or revoked under the police power. The license of permit to so operate is not a contract or property right in a constitutional sense.' . . .'

'. . . (I)t is well to keep in mind that the suspension or revocation of a driver's license is no part of the punishment for the violation or violations of traffic laws. It will be deemed that the court or courts in which the licensee was convicted, meted out the appropriate punishment under the facts and circumstances of each case. The purpose of the suspension or revocation of a driver's license is to protect the public and not to punish the licensee. However, the suspension or revocation of a driver's license should serve to impress such offender with the necessity for obedience to the traffic laws and regulations, not only for the safety of the public but for his own safety as well.'

Honeycutt v. Scheidt, 254 N.C. 607, 609--610, 119 S.E.2d 777, 780.

'(T)he revocation of a license to operate a motor vehicle is not a part of, nor within the limits of punishment to be fixed by the court, wherein the offender is tried. . . .

". . . Nor is it . . . an added punishment for the offense committed. It is civil and not criminal in its nature."

Harrell v. Scheidt, Comr. of Motor Vehicles, 243 N.C. 735, 739, 92 S.E.2d 182, 185. See also Atkinson v. Parsekian, 37 N.J. 143, 179 A.2d 732 (1962); Commonwealth v. Funk, 323 Pa. 390, 186 A. 65 (1936); Parker v. State Highway Dep't, 224 S.C. 263, 78 S.E.2d 382 (1953); Prichard v. Battle, 178 Va. 455, 17 S.E.2d 393 (1941).

Since an action to revoke a driver's license is a civil action, jury trial is not necessary. Under the North Carolina Constitution every criminal defendant is entitled to a trial by jury. N.C.Const. art. I, § 24. But in civil cases, jury trial is required only for those action which were tried by jury in 1868. N.C.Const. art. I, § 25; Kaperonis v. Highway Commission, 260 N.C. 587, 596, 133 S.E.2d 464, 470; In re Annexation Ordinances, 253 N.C. 637, 117 S.E.2d 795. Driver's license revocation proceedings do not fall into this category. Therefore, the statute is not void for failure to allow trial by jury.

Similarly, the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy applies only to criminal cases. See generally Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 89 S.Ct. 2056, 23 L.Ed.2d 707 (1969). A defendant is placed in double jeopardy when he is tried twice or punished twice for the same crime. State v. Summrell, 282 N.C. 157, 192 S.E.2d 569; State v. Birckhead, 256 N.C. 494, 124 S.E.2d 838. Since the revocation of a driver's license is not a form of criminal punishment, it cannot constitute double jeopardy. Atkinson v. Parsekian, Supra; Commonwealth v. Funk, Supra.

Article 8 of Chapter 20 simply establishes a procedure in North Carolina under which the driver's licenses of habitual offenders of the motor vehicle laws may be revoked. It sets out a policy 'to provide maximum safety for all persons who travel or otherwise use the public highways of this State; and (t)o deny the privilege of operating motor vehicles on such highways to persons who by their conduct and record have demonstrated their indifference to the safety and welfare of others and their disrespect for the laws of this State. . . .' G.S. § 20--220. Section § 20--221 enumerates in detail the type and number of convictions necessary to constitute an 'habitual offender.' When the record maintained by the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles appears to bring any person within in the definition of an habitual offender, the Commissioner shall certify in the manner provided by G.S. § 20--42(b) abstracts of the conviction record of such person to the superior court solicitor of the judicial district in which such person resides, and this abstract may be admitted into evidence to show that the person named therein was duly convicted of the offenses set out in the abstract. Upon receiving the abstract of the conviction record from the Commissioner, the solicitor shall file a...