State v. Clark

• Decision Date: 25 July 2013
• Docket Number: No. 87376–3.,87376–3.
• Citation: 308 P.3d 590,178 Wash.2d 19
• Parties: STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Michael Allen CLARK, Petitioner.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

178 Wash.2d 19

308 P.3d 590

STATE of Washington, Respondent,

v.Michael Allen CLARK, Petitioner.

No. 87376–3.

Supreme Court of Washington, En Banc.

July 25, 2013.

Stephen Thomas Graham, Law Office of Steve Graham, Spokane, WA, for Petitioner.

Jennifer R. Richardson, Stephen Michael Bozarth, Okanogan County Prosecutors Office, Okanogan, WA, for Respondent.

Lisa Marie Koop, Saza Osawa, The Tulalip Tribes, Tulalip, WA, Amicus Curiae on behalf of the Tulalip Tribes.

Brian Cammiade Gruber, Joshua Osborne–Klein, Ziontz Chestnut Varnell Berley & Slonim, Seattle, WA, Timothy W. Woolsey, Dana Cleveland, Colville Tribes Office of Reservation At, Nespelem, WA, Amicus Curiae on behalf of Colville Confederated Tribes.

Pamela Beth Loginsky, Washington Assoc of Prosecuting Atty, Olympia, WA, Amicus Curiae on behalf of Washington Association of Prosec.

Nancy Lynn Talner, Attorney at Law, Sarah a Dunne, ACLU of Washington Foundation, Gabriel Steven Galanda, Anthony S. Broadman, Ryan David Dreveskracht, Galanda

Broadman, PLLC., Seattle, WA, Amicus Curiae on behalf of ACLU.

FAIRHURST, J.

[178 Wash.2d 21]¶ 1 This case presents a question about the State's ability to search tribal trust land for a crime committed on a reservation over which the State has jurisdiction. While the State lacks explicit statutory authorization to issue search warrants for tribal lands, federal law has not preempted the State's ability to do so, and the Confederated Tribes of the Colville Reservation (Colville Tribes) had not, at the time of this search, utilized their inherent sovereignty to regulate the manner in which state agents could execute state search warrants on the Colville Indian Reservation. This absence of preemption or tribal regulation allowed the State to search Michael Allen Clark's property. Consequently, we affirm Clark's conviction for theft because the trial court properly denied his motion to suppress evidence gathered on tribal trust land without a tribal warrant.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶ 2 On October 13, 2009, a break-in occurred at a facility owned by the Cascade and Columbia River Railroad (CCRR). The facility sits on fee land within both the city of Omak and the Colville Indian Reservation.

¶ 3 An Omak detective later arrested Clark, an enrolled member of the Colville Tribes, at his home for a different crime. Clark resided on tribal trust land also located within both the city of Omak and the Colville Indian Reservation. Based on information gathered at the scene of this arrest, the detective sought a search warrant for Clark's residence to look for evidence related to the CCRR break-in.¹ Though attempting to search tribal trust land, the detective sought the warrant from the Okanogan County District Court (OCDC) instead of the Colville Tribal Court or the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Washington. The OCDC issued the search warrant and police seized evidence related to the break-in. The State charged Clark with burglary in the second degree, theft in the first degree, and malicious mischief in the third degree.

¶ 4 Clark moved to suppress the seized evidence, arguing that the Colville Tribal Court had jurisdiction over his property, not the OCDC, rendering the warrant and search invalid. The trial court denied this motion.

¶ 5 The jury convicted Clark only of theft in the first degree. Clark appealed, assigning error to the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress.² The Court of Appeals, Division Three, rejected Clark's claim in a published opinion. State v. Clark, 167 Wash.App. 667, 274 P.3d 1058 (2012).

¶ 6 Clark petitioned for review, which we granted. State v. Clark, 175 Wash.2d 1005, 285 P.3d 885 (2012). In addition to briefing from the parties, we have received amicus briefs from the Washington Association of Prosecuting Attorneys, the American Civil Liberties Union of Washington, and the Colville Tribes.

II. ISSUES PRESENTED

¶ 7 Does the State's jurisdiction over crimes committed on fee land within an Indian reservation allow it to issue and execute a valid state search warrant for tribal trust property?

III. ANALYSIS

¶ 8 Clark argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress the evidence that police gathered at his residence. He contends that the tribal court had jurisdiction over his property and therefore the State could not authorize or execute the search without obtaining, or attempting to obtain, the permission of the tribal court. Suppl. Br. of Pet'r at 2.

[178 Wash.2d 24] ¶ 9 A warrant issued without authority is inherently void and cannot authorize a search. Bosteder v. City of Renton, 155 Wash.2d 18, 29, 117 P.3d 316 (2005), superseded by statute on other grounds, Wright v. Terrell, 162 Wash.2d 192, 170 P.3d 570 (2007). Generally, a search conducted without authorization by a warrant violates the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.³,⁴State v. Garcia–Salgado, 170 Wash.2d 176, 184, 240 P.3d 153 (2010). The remedy for a Fourth Amendment violation is the exclusion of the illegally obtained evidence. State v. Eserjose, 171 Wash.2d 907, 913 n. 5, 259 P.3d 172 (2011).

¶ 10 Washington's statutory authority over reservation lands derives from a federal delegation of jurisdiction. Pub.L. No. 83–280, 67 Stat. 588 (1953) (hereinafter PL–280); Washington v. Confederated Bands & Tribes of the Yakima Indian Nation, 439 U.S. 463, 470–71, 99 S.Ct. 740, 58 L.Ed.2d 740 (1979). Washington accepted only a limited portion of the jurisdiction offered by Congress,

obligat[ing] and bind[ing] itself to assume criminal and civil jurisdiction over Indians and Indian territory, reservations, country, and lands within this state in accordance with the consent of the United States given by the act of August 15, 1953 (Public Law 280, 83rd Congress, 1st Session), but such assumption of jurisdiction shall not apply to Indians when on their tribal lands or allotted lands within an established Indian reservation and held in trust by the United States or subject to a restriction against alienation imposed by the United States, unless the provisions of RCW 37.12.021 have been invoked, except for the following:

[178 Wash.2d 25]1) Compulsory school attendance;

(2) Public assistance;

(3) Domestic relations;

(4) Mental illness;

(5) Juvenile delinquency;

(6) Adoption proceedings;

(7) Dependent children; and

(8) Operation of motor vehicles upon the public streets, alleys, roads, and highways: PROVIDED FURTHER, That Indian tribes that petitioned for, were granted and became subject to state jurisdiction pursuant to this chapter on or before March 13, 1963 shall remain subject to state civil and criminal jurisdiction as if chapter 36, Laws of 1963 had not been enacted.

RCW 37.12.010 (reviser's note omitted).

¶ 11 Under RCW 37.12.010, the State has jurisdiction over crimes committed on fee lands within the borders of a reservation or on trust or allotment lands outside a reservation's borders. State v. Pierre, 66 Wash.2d 703, 704, 404 P.2d 788 (1965); State v. Cooper, 130 Wash.2d 770, 775–76, 928 P.2d 406 (1996). The State lacks jurisdiction over crimes committed on trust or allotment land within reservation borders. RCW 37.12.010. The CCRR theft occurred on fee land within the reservation's borders; consequently, RCW 37.12.010 provides the State with jurisdiction over Clark's crime.

¶ 12 While RCW 37.12.010 provides the State with criminal jurisdiction over the CCRR break-in, it does not explicitly authorize the State to issue and execute a search warrant for tribal trust land pursuant to this jurisdiction. See id. (no explicit provision allowing state courts to issue search warrants for tribal lands to investigate crimes for which the State has jurisdiction); State v. Mathews, 133 Idaho 300, 986 P.2d 323, 335 (1999) (reasoning that a similar, limited assumption of jurisdiction under PL–280 did not provide Idaho with the explicit statutory power to authorize searches of Indian country for crimes over which it had criminal jurisdiction).

¶ 13 However, the absence of explicit statutory authorization does not mean that the OCDC lacked the authority to issue a search warrant for trust property or that the Omak police lacked the authority to execute this warrant. The State may exert its authority on reservation lands, even without statutory authorization, subject to certain limitations. White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 141, 100 S.Ct. 2578, 65 L.Ed.2d 665 (1980); Powell v. Farris, 94 Wash.2d 782, 785–87, 620 P.2d 525 (1980). First, Congress' plenary power over tribal affairs allows it to preempt the application of state law to tribal members or tribal lands. Bracker, 448 U.S. at 142, 100 S.Ct. 2578;McClanahan v. State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 172, 93 S.Ct. 1257, 36 L.Ed.2d 129 (1973). Second, tribal sovereignty may also prevent the exertion of state authority in Indian country. Bracker, 448 U.S. at 142, 100 S.Ct. 2578 (citing United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 557, 95 S.Ct. 710, 42 L.Ed.2d 706 (1975)). Because of this sovereignty, states may exert their authority over reservation lands only where doing so does not undermine tribal self-governance by “infring[ing] ‘on the right of reservation Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by them.’ ” McClanahan, 411 U.S. at 179, 93 S.Ct. 1257 (quoting Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220, 79 S.Ct. 269, 3 L.Ed.2d 251 (1959)); Powell, 94 Wash.2d at 786–87, 620 P.2d 525.

¶ 14 The first limitation, federal preemption, poses no barrier to the State's ability to serve criminal process on a suspect or defendant on reservation lands. No federal statute bars the State from doing so. Mathews, 986 P.2d at 337. Further, we cannot say that Congress has shown any intent to prevent the states from serving criminal process on reservations given PL–280's intent to devolve law enforcement duties from the federal government to the states. Yakima Indian Nation, 439 U.S. at 498, 99 S.Ct. 740.

¶ 15 However,...