State v. Clowes, 25325-9-II.
Decision Date | 15 February 2001 |
Docket Number | No. 25325-9-II.,25325-9-II. |
Citation | 18 P.3d 596,104 Wash.App. 935 |
Court | Washington Court of Appeals |
Parties | STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Kyle D. CLOWES, Appellant. |
Thomas Edward Doyle, Robert Quillian, Hansville, Court Appointed, for Appellant.
Carol L. Case, Mason County Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, Shelton, for Respondent.
Kyle D. Clowes appeals his convictions for interfering with the reporting of domestic violence and for violating a no-contact order. Clowes contends that the charging information and jury instructions were defective. We agree and, thus, reverse one conviction and dismiss the other.
On May 29, 1999, Tiffany Thomas had an argument with Clowes, the father of her youngest child. Thomas later told the police that Clowes had spit in her face three times and slapped her in the mouth.
During the argument, Clowes disconnected the phone to prevent Thomas from using it. In addition, when Thomas made several attempts to leave, Clowes blocked her way. And when Thomas told her daughter to go next door, thereby suggesting that the girl call the police, Clowes stood in front of the child and said, "she didn't need to call the cops because if you do, your dad will go to jail." Report of Proceedings at 30.
At the time of the incident, there was a no-contact order in effect between Thomas and Clowes. Clowes told the police that he believed but was not sure that a no-contact order was in effect.
The State charged Clowes by information with felony violation of a no-contact order in violation of RCW 10.99.050, count I, and with interfering with the reporting of domestic violence, RCW 9A.36.150, count II. Thomas testified at trial that Clowes had accidentally hit her as he walked past her.
The jury found Clowes guilty of both counts but also found, by special verdict, that the conduct constituting the no-contact order violation was not an assault.1 Clowes appeals both convictions.
Clowes argues that count II of the information, which charges him with interfering with domestic violence reporting, is defective because it does not specify the underlying domestic violence crime or allege that he committed the crime against a family or household member. The State does not dispute that count II, viewed in isolation, is incomplete. Rather, it argues that under the liberal construction doctrine, we should consider count II in conjunction with count I, which describes both the crime of domestic violence mentioned in count II and identifies the victim as a household member.
Although an appellant may challenge a charging document's failure to include all the essential elements of the crime for the first time on appeal, we liberally construe the document in favor of its validity. State v. Davis, 119 Wash.2d 657, 661, 835 P.2d 1039 (1992); State v. Kjorsvik, 117 Wash.2d 93, 102, 812 P.2d 86 (1991). We first determine whether the "necessary facts appear in any form, or by fair construction can ... be found[ ] in the charging document" and, if so, whether the inartful language resulted in a lack of notice that caused actual prejudice. Kjorsvik, 117 Wash.2d at 105-06,812 P.2d 86.
Merely reciting the statutory language may not be sufficient unless the statute defines the offense with certainty. Kjorsvik, 117 Wash.2d at 98-99, 812 P.2d 86; Leach, 113 Wash.2d at 686, 688, 782 P.2d 552. Here, count II of the information states in part:
That said defendant, KYLE D. CLOWES, in the County of Mason, State of Washington, on or about the 29th day of May, 1999, did commit a crime of Domestic Violence and prevented or attempted to prevent the victim of or a witness to that Domestic Violence crime from calling a 911 emergency communication system, obtaining medical assistance, or making a report to any law enforcement official, contrary to RCW 9A.36.150[.]
Clerk's Papers (CP) at 40. RCW 9A.36.150, in part, defines this offense:
(2) Commission of a crime of domestic violence under subsection (1) of this section is a necessary element of the crime of interfering with the reporting of domestic violence.
Count II does not specify the underlying domestic violence crime or the identity of the victim. Although count I contains those details, this does not cure the defect in count II.3 As we have previously ruled, we will not fill voids in a defective count with facts located elsewhere in the information. State v. Gill, 103 Wash.App. 435, 442, 13 P.3d 646 (2000). Here, as in Gill, there is no basis for the State's assertion that "elements can be plucked out of one count in a charging document and dropped into another." 103 Wash. App. at 442, 13 P.3d 646. Thus, we view count II in isolation.
review denied, 142 Wash.2d 1018, 16 P.3d 1266 (2001).
Clowes also challenges instruction 9, the elements instruction on this count, claiming that it does not accurately and completely list the elements of the crime of interfering with the reporting of domestic violence. Because we dismiss the conviction based upon the inadequacy of the information, we need not address this issue.
Clowes claims that instruction 8,4 which advised the jury of the elements necessary to convict him of violating a no-contact order, mistakenly substitutes "knowingly" for "willfully," fails to define the word "willfully," and fails to tell the jury that it must find that he willfully had contact with Thomas, that a no-contact order prohibited the contact, and that he knew of the no-contact order. Clowes took no exception to any instructions below.
Generally, we will not review an appellant's claim of trial court error where the appellant failed to object below unless it is a manifest constitutional error. RAP 2.5(a)(3). Failing to instruct the jury on an element of the charged crime is such an error; failing to define an instruction's individual terms generally is not. State v. Scott, 110 Wash.2d 682, 688 n. 5, 757 P.2d 492 (1988); see also State v. Brown, 132 Wash.2d 529, 612, 940 P.2d 546 (1997)
(. )
Under RCW 10.99.050, a defendant commits the offense of violating a no-contact order when he willfully has contact with another knowing that a no-contact order exists and prohibits the contact. There are three essential elements: the willful contact with another; the prohibition of such contact by a valid no-contact order; and the defendant's knowledge of the no-contact order. See also 11 WASHINGTON PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS: CRIMINAL 36.50 and 36.51, at 181-82 (Supp. 1998) (WPIC).
Clowes asserts that the trial court incorrectly substituted "knowingly" for the appropriate statutory intent element, "willfully." RCW 10.99.050; see also WPIC 36.51. But proof that a person acted "knowingly" is proof that they acted "willfully." RCW 9A.08.010(4).5 And instruction 15 defines "knowingly." Because clarifying definitions of elements may be contained in separate instructions, the use of "knowingly" without further definition in instruction 8 is not a manifest constitutional error. See State v. Holt, 56 Wash.App. 99, 106, 783 P.2d 87 (1989)
.
Clowes also argues that instruction 8 failed to advise the jury that it had to find that he willfully had contact with Thomas, that a no-contact order prohibited the contact, and that Clowes knew that there was a no-contact order. We agree with his contentions.
Although no single instruction need contain a complete statement of the law, the elements instruction serves as a "yardstick" by which the jury measures all the evidence to determine innocence or guilt; thus, it must contain all the essential elements. State v. Smith, 131 Wash.2d 258, 262-63, 930 P.2d 917 (1997); State v. Emmanuel, 42 Wash.2d 799, 819, 259 P.2d 845 (1953). Here, instruction 8 contains a single statement as to the elements, "the defendant knowingly violated the provisions of a no contact order[.]" CP at 22. As Clowes argues, the instruction is inadequate because it does not tell the jury that not only must the defendant know of the...
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