State v. Conley
| Decision Date | 26 September 2019 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 19CA1091 |
| Citation | 2019 Ohio 4172 |
| Parties | STATE OF OHIO, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. PATRICK CONLEY, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Ohio Court of Appeals |
DECISION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY
APPEARANCES:
Brian T. Goldberg, Cincinnati, Ohio, for appellant.
Kris D. Blanton, Assistant Adams County Prosecuting Attorney, West Union, Ohio, for appellee.
CRIMINAL APPEAL FROM COMMON PLEAS COURT
{¶ 1} This is an appeal from an Adams County Common Pleas Court judgment of conviction and sentence. After Patrick Conley, defendant below and appellant herein, entered a guilty plea, the trial court found him guilty of (1) second-degree-felony aggravated possession of drugs in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A), and (2) first-degree-misdemeanor operating a vehicle while intoxicated in violation of R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(a).
{¶ 2} Appellant assigns the following errors for review:
{¶ 3} On October 8, 2018, an Ohio State Highway Patrol Trooper Steve Rabold stopped appellant's vehicle for speeding. The ensuing traffic stop led to the discovery of a large amount of methamphetamine and resulted in appellant being charged with aggravated possession of drugs and operating a motor vehicle while under the influence.
{¶ 4} Appellant subsequently filed a motion to suppress the evidence obtained as a result of the traffic stop, as well as any incriminating statements that he made during the stop.
{¶ 5} On January 7, 2019, the trial court held a hearing to consider appellant's motion to suppress evidence. Trooper Rabold testified that after he stopped appellant and approached the vehicle from the passenger side, appellant was "rocking back and forth in the chair and talking to himself." Rabold stated that he "just stood there for a couple moments and just watched [appellant] just to make sure he wasn't reaching for a weapon or anything like that."
{¶ 6} After watching appellant for a moment, Trooper Rabold walked around his patrol car and approached the vehicle from the driver's side. Appellant informed Rabold that appellant did not know who owned the vehicle and that he did not have a driver's license. Rabold then asked appellant to exit the vehicle. Rabold explained that he intended to ask appellant "where he was going, why he was driving so fast, just things of that nature."
{¶ 7} During the conversation, Trooper Rabold informed appellant about a pat-down check for weapons. However, immediately after Rabold advised appellant about the pat-down, appellant stated that he had methamphetamine in his right front pocket. Appellant also immediately reported that the vehicle contained additional drugs.
{¶ 8} After Trooper Rabold conducted a series of field sobriety tests, he arrested appellant. After the arrest, Rabold searched the vehicle and discovered methamphetamine, marijuana, drug paraphernalia, and some clear plastic bags. Shortly thereafter a sheriff's deputy arrived on the scene and Trooper Rabold advised appellant of the Miranda1 warnings.
{¶ 9} Appellant testified at the hearing and explained that he believed that he had been placed under arrest "the moment that [he] got out of the car."
{¶ 10} On January 30, 2019, the trial court denied appellant's motion to suppress evidence. Appellant subsequently entered a no contest plea to second-degree-felony aggravated possession of drugs and to first-degree-misdemeanor operating a vehicle while intoxicated. Atthe change-of-plea hearing, the court informed appellant that, because appellant is on postrelease control, any sentence imposed for violating postrelease control "may be required to be served in addition to or consecutive to any other prison term imposed" for the felony offense. Appellant stated that he understood. The court additionally advised appellant that the court "typically require[s]" offenders who violate postrelease control to serve the sentence for the postrelease control violation consecutively to any prison sentence imposed for the underlying felony offense. Appellant stated that he understood and that he did not have any questions.
{¶ 11} The trial court found appellant guilty and sentenced him to serve five years in prison for the aggravated drug possession offense and to serve 180 days of local incarceration for the operating a vehicle while intoxicated offense. The court also ordered the two terms to be served concurrently to one another. The court also imposed an additional 902 days for violating postrelease control and ordered that appellant serve the postrelease control sentence consecutively to the others. The court further recited that it "reserved for denial" appellant's transfer to a transitional control program and his placement in an intensive program prison upon notification that the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction desires consideration of appellant for either. This appeal followed.
{¶ 12} Appellant's first and second assignments of error challenge the trial court's decision to deny his motion to suppress evidence. Because the same standard of review applies to both assignments of error, for ease of analysis we combine our review of the two assignments of error.
{¶ 13} In his first assignment of error, appellant asserts that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress all evidence uncovered as a result of the traffic stop. In particular, appellant contends that Trooper Rabold did not have any lawful basis to conduct a pat-down search for weapons. Appellant contends that the evidence presented at the motion to suppress hearing fails to show that the trooper had a legitimate concern that appellant possessed a weapon so as to justify a pat-down search for weapons. Appellant claims that "[t]he only plausible reason the trooper could have suspected [appellant] had weapons on him was because of the movements with his hands." Appellant thus alleges that the testimony presented at the hearing fails to show that the movements appellant made with his hands led the trooper to believe that appellant might be carrying a weapon.
{¶ 14} Appellant further argues that any consent that he may have given did not validate the pat-down search. Appellant claims that any consent that he may have given occurred after Trooper Rabold had conducted the invalid pat-down search. Appellant also asserts that he did not consent to a search of his vehicle and that the evidence obtained from the search must be suppressed.
{¶ 15} In his second assignment of error, appellant asserts that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress the incriminating statements that he made during the traffic stop. Appellant contends that he was "in custody" during the traffic stop and that Trooper Rabold should have advised appellant of his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination.
{¶ 16} Appellate review of a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress evidence involves a mixed question of law and fact. E.g., State v. Castagnola, 145 Ohio St.3d 1, 2015-Ohio-1565, 46 N.E.3d 638, ¶ 32; State v. Burnside, 100 Ohio St.3d 152, 2003-Ohio-5372, 797 N.E.2d 71, ¶ 8; State v. Moore, 2013-Ohio-5506, 5 N.E.3d 41 (4th Dist.), ¶ 7. Appellate courts "'must accept the trial court's findings of fact if they are supported by competent, credible evidence.'" State v. Leak, 145 Ohio St.3d 165, 2016-Ohio-154, 47 N.E.3d 821, ¶ 12, quoting Burnside at ¶ 8. Accepting those facts as true, reviewing courts "'independently determine as a matter of law, without deference to the conclusion of the trial court, whether the facts satisfy the applicable legal standard.'" Id., Burnside at ¶ 8.
{¶ 17} The Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, as well as Section 14, Article I of the Ohio Constitution, protect individuals against unreasonable governmental searches and seizures. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 662, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 1400, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979); State v. Gullett, 78 Ohio App.3d 138, 143, 604 N.E.2d 176 (1992). "[S]earches [and seizures] conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions." Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357, 88 S.Ct. 507, 514, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967); e.g., State v. Roberts, 110 Ohio St.3d 71, 2006-Ohio-3665, 850 N.E.2d 1168, ¶ 98. Once the defendant demonstrates that he was subjected to a warrantless search or seizure, the burden shifts to the state to establish that the warrantless search or seizure was constitutionally permissible. State v. Banks-Harvey, 152 Ohio St.3d 368, 2018-Ohio-201, 96 N.E.3d 262, ¶ 18; Maumee v. Weisner, 87 Ohio St.3d 295, 297, 720 N.E.2d 507 (1999); Xenia v. Wallace, 37 Ohio St.3d 216, 524 N.E.2d 889 (1988), paragraph two of the syllabus.
{¶ 18} A traffic stop initiated by a law enforcement officer constitutes a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 809-810, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996); Prouse, 440 U.S. at 653. Thus, a traffic stop must comply with the Fourth Amendment's general reasonableness requirement. Whren, 517 U.S. at 810. "[T]he decision to stop an automobile is reasonable where the police have probable...
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