State v. Decoite
Decision Date | 28 February 2014 |
Docket Number | No. SCWC–30186.,SCWC–30186. |
Citation | 132 Hawai'i 436,323 P.3d 80 |
Parties | STATE of Hawai‘i, Respondent/Plaintiff–Appellant, v. Herman DECOITE, Petitioner/Defendant–Appellee. |
Court | Hawaii Supreme Court |
Craig W. Jerome, (Summer M.M. Kupau with him on the briefs), for petitioner.
Emlyn N. Higa, (Pamela Lundquist with him on the briefs), for respondent.
On application for writ of certiorari, Petitioner–Defendant Herman Decoite (Decoite) asks us to determine whether Abuse of Family or Household Member, HRS § 709–906(1), can be charged as a "continuing course of conduct" offense. On narrower grounds, we hold that an alleged two-year period of domestic abuse could not be charged on a continuing course of conduct theory. Accordingly, we reverse the Intermediate Court of Appeals's (ICA) judgment on appeal and affirm the Circuit Court of the Second Circuit's (family court) order dismissing the State's complaint without prejudice.
This case arises out of alleged acts of domestic abuse that Decoite committed against his former girlfriend over the course of their five-year relationship. On April 3, 2009, the State filed a misdemeanor complaint against Decoite, charging him with one count of abuse of a family or household member (domestic abuse) pursuant to Hawai‘i Revised Statutes (HRS) § 709–906 (Supp.2006).1 The complaint stated in relevant part: "during or about the period between February 1, 2005, through June 1, 2007, inclusive, as a continuing course of conduct, ... Herman Decoite did intentionally, knowingly or recklessly engage in and cause physical abuse of a family or household member[.]"
Decoite requested discovery, and the State produced police reports of two incidents that occurred on November 29, 2006, and March 13, 2007, respectively. Decoite then filed a motion to dismiss the State's complaint in the family court.2 Decoite argued that the domestic abuse statute does not permit charging domestic abuse as a continuous crime, and also that the only incidents of alleged domestic abuse produced in discovery fell outside of the applicable two-year statute of limitations. The State responded that the domestic abuse statute punishes "physical abuse," and that because physical abuse can extend beyond isolated moments, it may be charged on a theory of continuing conduct. The State further argued that its complaint against Decoite was not time barred because it had alleged a continuing course of conduct that ended within the two-year statute of limitations.
The family court concluded that domestic abuse cannot be charged on a continuous conduct theory, and issued an order dismissing the State's complaint without prejudice. On appeal, the ICA reversed, holding that in some cases domestic abuse may be charged as a continuous offense. We granted Decoite's application for writ of certiorari to resolve this issue as a matter of first impression.
Conclusions of law are reviewed de novo under the right/wrong standard. Chun v. Bd. of Trs. of Emps.' Ret. Sys. of Haw., 106 Hawai‘i 416, 431, 106 P.3d 339, 354 (2005).
When interpreting a statute, this court follows several well established canons of interpretation.
State v. Arceo, 84 Hawai‘i 1, 19, 928 P.2d 843, 861 (1996) (some citations omitted).
A. Domestic abuse cannot be charged as a continuing conduct offense based on discrete abusive transactions that occurred over a two-year period
The conduct element of the domestic abuse statute states in relevant part: "It shall be unlawful for any person ... to physically abuse a family or household member[.]" HRS § 709–906(1) (emphasis added). The narrow issue of this case is whether that conduct, "to physically abuse," permits the State to charge two temporally discrete instances of domestic abuse on a continuous course of conduct theory. The State argues that abusive domestic relationships are defined by a cycle of violence that is motivated by the abuser's singular desire for power and control. Thus, the State would have us hold that temporally discrete acts of abuse can all be linked to one continuous criminal impulse that forms the basis of one crime. However, HRS § 709–906(1) criminalizes "physical abuse," which is conduct that is necessarily discrete and episodic. In fact, the discrete nature of the actus reus of domestic abuse is a crucial element of the statutory scheme's graduated penalty structure, which is specifically tailored to punish repeated acts of abuse separately and with increasing severity. Accordingly, we hold that HRS § 709–906(1) does not permit charging temporally discrete episodes of domestic abuse that occurred over a two-year period as a continuous course of conduct offense.3
The test to determine whether a crime may be charged on a continuous conduct theory is whether the language, structure, and purpose of the statute reveals a legislative intent to criminalize continuing conduct. See HRS § 701–108(4) (supp.2006) (); see also Arceo, 84 Hawai‘i at 19, 928 P.2d at 861 ( ). Additionally, a crime may only be charged on the theory of continuing conduct if the statute actually prohibits conduct that may be deemed continuous. See State v. Rabago, 103 Hawai‘i 236, 253, 81 P.3d 1151, 1168 (2003) ( ).
This court has defined a continuous offense as "a continuous, unlawful act or series of acts set on foot by a single impulse and operated by an unintermittent force, however long a time it may occupy[.]" Arceo, 84 Hawai‘i at 18, 928 P.2d at 860 (quoting State v. Temple, 65 Haw. 261, 267 n. 6, 650 P.2d 1358, 1362 n. 6 (1982) ). "The test to determine whether [a] defendant intended to commit more than one offense in the course of a criminal episode is whether the evidence discloses one general intent or discloses separate and distinct intents." State v. Castro, 69 Haw. 633, 653, 756 P.2d 1033, 1047 (1988) (citations omitted). "If there is but one intention one general impulse, and one plan, there is but one offense." Id.
We first applied this rule in State v. Martin, 62 Haw. 364, 369, 616 P.2d 193, 197 (1980), where we held that first degree theft could constitute a continuous offense. There, the defendant periodically filed fraudulent public assistance forms for a six-year period in order to obtain welfare disbursements from the State. Id. at 366, 616 P.2d at 195–96. We held that the defendant had committed a continuing offense because each fraudulent transaction was the continuation of a single and uninterrupted criminal impulse. Id. at 369, 616 P.2d at 197 (); see also Temple, 65 Haw. at 267, 650 P.2d at 1362 ( ); State v. Kealoha, 95 Hawai‘i 365, 376, 22 P.3d 1012, 1023 (App.2000) ( ).
We have also found continuing conduct in criminal transactions that were temporally quite short. For example, in State v. Rapoza, we held that attempted murder in the second degree could constitute a continuing offense. 95 Hawai‘i 321, 329, 22 P.3d 968, 976 (2001). There, Rapoza discharged a firearm five to seven times in the span of a few seconds while pointing it in the general direction of three complaining witnesses. Id. at 323, 22 P.3d at 970. We stated: "As to any given complainant, [Rapoza's] conduct in discharging the firearm several times did not amount to ‘separate and distinct culpable acts,’ but rather betokened ‘a continuous, unlawful ... series of acts set on foot by a single impulse and operated by an unintermittent force [.]’ " Id. at 329, 22 P.3d at 976 (quoting Arceo, 84 Hawai‘i at 18, 928 P.2d at 860).
Turning to the statute at issue in this case, the conduct element of HRS § 709–906(1) makes it a crime to "physically abuse" a family or household member. We have defined the term ...
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