State v. Dennis
| Citation | 421 P.3d 944 |
| Decision Date | 26 July 2018 |
| Docket Number | No. 95083-1,95083-1 |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Washington |
| Parties | STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Edgar DENNIS III, Petitioner. |
Lawand Sha Anderson, Attorney at Law, 22030 7th Avenue S, Suite 103, Des Moines, WA 98198-6219, Lauren D. McLane, Attorney at Law, University of Wyoming, College of Law Dept. 3035, Laramie, WY 82071 for Petitioner.
Laura Ann Petregal, King County Prosecutors Office, 516 3rd Avenue, Suite W554, Seattle, WA 98104-2390, for Respondent.
¶ 1 This case concerns the statutory interpretation of the portion of RCW 9.41.040 dealing with requirements for restoration of firearm rights. The statute allows an offender to petition for restoration of firearm rights "after five or more consecutive years in the community without being convicted ... or currently charged with any felony, gross misdemeanor, or misdemeanor crimes." RCW 9.41.040(4)(a)(ii)(A). At issue is whether this required five-year period must immediately precede the petition for restoration or if any conviction-free five-year period suffices. We reverse the Court of Appeals and hold that any five-year conviction-free period satisfies this requirement for eligibility to petition for restoration of firearm rights.
¶ 2 In 1991, Edgar Dennis III was convicted of second degree robbery, third degree assault, and two counts of felony violation of the Uniform Controlled Substances Act, chapter 69.50 RCW. His convictions disqualified him from possessing a firearm. Dennis was also convicted of third degree assault in 1998. After serving his sentence, he lived in the community for over 15 years without a conviction. Then, in 2014, he was convicted of first degree negligent driving, a misdemeanor.
¶ 3 In April 2016, Dermis petitioned the court for restoration of his firearm rights. He did not disclose his 2014 conviction. The State objected to his petition and informed the court of his 2014 conviction, arguing the statutory requirement of a five-year conviction-free period must immediately precede a petition for restoration. The superior court denied the petition. In a motion for reconsideration, Dennis argued that the trial court had erred in not following the Division Two of the Court of Appeals’ interpretation of the statute that any conviction-free five-year period satisfies the requirement. Payseno v . Kitsap County, 186 Wash. App. 465, 473, 346 P.3d 784 (2015). The superior court denied the motion. Dennis appealed to Division One and the court affirmed, holding that the five-year period must immediately precede a petition for restoration. State v . Dennis, 200 Wash. App. 654, 666, 402 P.3d 943 (2017). We granted review to resolve this split between Divisions One and Two. State v . Dennis, 189 Wash.2d 1031, 407 P.3d 1146 (2018).
¶ 4 Whether RCW 9.41.040(4)(a)(ii)(A) requires a petitioner be conviction-free for five consecutive years or more immediately preceding the filing of the petition.
¶ 5 RCW 9.41.040(4)(a)(ii)(A) allows a person who has lost his or her firearm rights to petition the court for restoration of those rights. Once all the statutory requirements for restoration have been satisfied, a superior court’s role in approving the petition is purely ministerial; the court has no discretion. State v . Swanson, 116 Wash. App. 67, 78, 65 P.3d 343 (2003). The statute states in relevant part:
An individual may petition a court of record to have his or her right to possess a firearm restored ... [i]f the conviction or finding of not guilty by reason of insanity was for a felony offense, after five or more consecutive years in the community without being convicted or found not guilty by reason of insanity or currently charged with any felony, gross misdemeanor, or misdemeanor crimes, if the individual has no prior felony convictions that prohibit the possession of a firearm counted as part of the offender score under RCW 9.94A.525.
RCW 9.41.040(4)(b), (4)(a)(ii)(A) (emphasis added).
¶ 6 We review issues of statutory interpretation de novo. State v . Evans, 177 Wash.2d 186, 192, 298 P.3d 724 (2013). The purpose of statutory interpretation is " ‘to determine and give effect to the intent of the legislature.’ " Evans, 177 Wash.2d at 192, 298 P.3d 724 (quoting State v . Sweany, 174 Wash.2d 909, 914, 281 P.3d 305 (2012) ).
"When we interpret a criminal statute, we give it a literal and strict interpretation." State v . Delgado, 148 Wash.2d 723, 727, 63 P.3d 792 (2003) (citing State v . Wilson, 125 Wash.2d 212, 217, 883 P.2d 320 (1994) ). We derive the legislative intent of a statute solely from the plain language by considering the text of the provision in question, the context of the statute in which the provision is found, related provisions, and the statutory scheme as a whole. Evans, 177 Wash.2d at 192, 298 P.3d 724 (citing State v. Ervin, 169 Wash.2d 815, 820, 239 P.3d 354 (2010) ).
¶ 7 If, after this inquiry, there is more than one reasonable interpretation of the plain language, then a statute is ambiguous and we may rely on principles of statutory construction, legislative history, and relevant case law to discern legislative intent. Ervin, 169 Wash.2d at 820, 239 P.3d 354 (quoting Christensen v . Ellsworth, 162 Wash.2d 365, 373, 173 P.3d 228 (2007) ). A statute is "not ambiguous simply because different interpretations are conceivable." Berger v . Sonneland, 144 Wash.2d 91, 105, 26 P.3d 257 (2001) (citing State v. Tili, 139 Wash.2d 107, 115, 985 P.2d 365 (1999) ).
¶ 8 Both parties argue the provision is unambiguous and should be interpreted their way. Dennis argues that the State’s interpretation requires reading "immediately preceding" into the statute. It is a well-established principle of statutory interpretation that we may not add words "to an unambiguous statute when the legislature has chosen not to include that language." Delgado, 148 Wash.2d at 727, 63 P.3d 792. No language in the statute states the five-year period must immediately precede the petition. If the legislature wanted the five-year period to immediately precede a petition for restoration, it would have said so; we may not read language into a statute that is not there.
¶ 9 In response, the State argues that the language "five or more consecutive years" has no effect unless the five years must immediately precede the petition. Another tenet of statutory interpretation is that we must interpret a statute so as to "render no portion meaningless or superfluous." Rivard v . State, 168 Wash.2d 775, 783, 231 P.3d 186 (2010). Per this tenet, the State argues that if the legislature had intended any five-year period to qualify, it would have said "five-year period" without including the "or more" language. As an example, the State points to the washout provision of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1981, chapter 9.94A RCW, that says a class C felony washes out if "the offender spent five years in the community without committing any crime that subsequently results in a conviction" since the last date of release from confinement. RCW 9.94A.525(2)(d). The State argues that because of the way the legislature wrote the washout provision, the legislature knew how to establish that any five-year period would suffice, but the legislature instead chose to add the words "or more" to signal the five years must immediately precede the petition.
¶ 10 The washout provision is somewhat different from the restoration provision in that an offender’s conviction automatically washes out after the required time period, whereas the restoration provision requires affirmative action in the form of a petition from an eligible offender to trigger restoration of rights. Given this procedural distinction, the legislature may have understandably used different language in the restoration provision to put offenders on notice about when they could petition for restoration.
¶ 11 The restoration provision cites the washout provision in the last part of the statute: "if the individual has no prior felony convictions that prohibit the possession of a firearm counted as part of the offender score under RCW 9.94A.525." RCW 9.41.040(4)(a)(ii)(A). Dennis argues this reference to the washout provision is crucial to understanding the legislature’s inclusion of the words "or more." Dennis’s argument situates the language at issue within the context of the restoration provision as a whole. For a class C felony, the washout provision is five years, so an offender does not need to wait any more than the five years already required by the restoration provision. RCW 9.94A.525(2)(c). The washout period for a class B felony is 10 years, so depending on his or her criminal history, not every offender will be able to petition five years after his or her last conviction. RCW 9.94A.525(2)(b). Thus, the "or more" language lets those petitioners who must wait more than five years know that they can still petition once any prior convictions that would affect their offender scores have washed out. Class A felonies and felony sex offenses never wash out, so offenders who have committed those crimes will never be able to petition for restoration of their firearm rights. RCW 9.94A.525(2)(a).
¶ 12 Although not necessary for our interpretation of the restoration provision's plain language, a review of the bill reports supports Dennis’s argument. The final bill report states that an offender may petition for restoration of firearm rights "after five years in the community without a conviction or current charge for any crime," but "the person must also have passed the ‘washout’ period under the Sentencing Reform Act before he or she may petition the court." FINAL B. REP. ON SUBSTITUTE H.B. 2420, at 2, 54th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 1996). Thus, the legislature seemed focused on offenders’ prior convictions washing out before they could become eligible to petition for restoration of firearm rights. The "or more" language reflects the legislature’s concern for those offenders who may need to wait...
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