State v. Dolson

• Decision Date: 19 August 1999
• Docket Number: No. 67038-2.,67038-2.
• Citation: 982 P.2d 100,138 Wash.2d 773
• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Parties: The STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Timothy Gene DOLSON, Petitioner.

982 P.2d 100

138 Wash.2d 773

The STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Timothy Gene DOLSON, Petitioner.

No. 67038-2.

Supreme Court of Washington, En Banc.

Argued March 23, 1999.

Decided August 19, 1999.

Neil M. Fox, Seattle-King County Public Defender Assoc., Seattle, for Amicus Curiae on Behalf of Seattle-King County Public Defender.

Lee Grochmal, Whatcom County Public Defender, Bellingham, for Petitioner.

David McEachran, Whatcom County Prosecutor, Eric Richey, Deputy, Bellingham, for Respondent.

DURHAM, J.

Timothy Dolson challenges his conviction for driving with a suspended license in the first degree. He contends that the Department of Licensing (DOL) violated his right to due process by failing to notify him of the license revocation at his address of record. We agree and accordingly reverse Dolson's conviction.

FACTS

In 1990, after years of traffic infractions and convictions for Driving Under the Influence, DOL adjudged Timothy Dolson to be a habitual traffic offender. Under the Washington Habitual Traffic Offenders Act, RCW 46.65, DOL must revoke the driver's license of any person who is convicted of three serious traffic offenses within a five-year period. RCW 46.65.020(1). DOL sent Dolson a letter by certified mail informing him that he was a habitual traffic offender and that DOL was revoking his license for five years. The letter explained that Dolson could appeal the habitual traffic offender determination within 10 days¹ of receipt of the letter. However, Dolson never received the letter, which was returned to DOL marked "Not Deliverable as Addressed, UNABLE TO FORWARD."

The revocation letter was sent to "1726 E. Central, Spokane, WA.," an address apparently obtained from a traffic ticket issued to Dolson in 1989. However, the Central Street address was not Dolson's official address of record as maintained by DOL. Instead, Dolson's address of record was his mother's residence. Neither Dolson's prior driver's license nor his identicard (issued by DOL) listed the Central Street address.

In 1992, two years after DOL sent Dolson the letter informing him that his license had been revoked, Dolson was convicted of driving with a revoked license. In 1994 and 1995, he was convicted three more times for driving without a license. In July 1996, Dolson was pulled over while driving the wrong way on a freeway on-ramp. He was again charged with driving with a revoked license. Before trial, Dolson challenged the underlying 1990 revocation, arguing that he never received notice of the revocation because the letter notifying him of the revocation was sent to the wrong address. The Whatcom County District Court rejected this argument and entered a finding of guilt against Dolson. On appeal, the Whatcom County Superior Court reversed and dismissed the 1996 conviction on the grounds that DOL's noncompliance with statutory notice procedures invalidated the original license revocation. The Court of Appeals reversed the Whatcom County Superior Court and reinstated Dolson's conviction. The court held that regardless of DOL's statutory violation, sending notice to Dolson's most recently known address did not abrogate Dolson's due process rights. We granted review.

ANALYSIS

A driver's license represents an important property interest and cannot be revoked without due process of law. Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 91 S.Ct. 1586, 29 L.Ed.2d 90 (1971). Due process requires that the State afford both notice and the opportunity to be heard prior to revocation. State v. Rogers, 127 Wash.2d 270, 275, 898 P.2d 294 (1995). This notice must be reasonably calculated to inform the affected party of the pending action and of the opportunity to object. See, e.g., State v. Baker, 49 Wash. App. 778, 781, 745 P.2d 1335 (1987) (citing Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 70 S.Ct. 652, 94 L.Ed. 865 (1950)). In a prosecution for driving with a revoked license, the State has the burden to prove that the revocation of the defendant's license complied with due process. State v. Storhoff, 133 Wash.2d 523, 527, 946 P.2d 783 (1997). A revocation that does not comply with due process is void. Baker, 49 Wash. App. at 782, 745 P.2d 1335.

RCW 46.65.065 codifies these constitutional due process requirements. The statute mandates that DOL notify habitual traffic offenders of their license revocation, the right to a formal hearing, and the procedure for obtaining a hearing. The statute reads in part:

(1) Whenever a person's driving record, as maintained by the department, brings him or her within the definition of an habitual traffic offender, as defined in RCW 46.65.020, the department shall forthwith notify the person of the revocation in writing by certified mail at his or her address of record as maintained by the department.... Notices of revocation shall inform the recipient thereof of his or her right to a formal hearing and specify the steps which must be taken in order to obtain a hearing.

RCW 46.65.065(1) (emphasis added).

The statute unequivocally directs DOL to send notice of the revocation to the driver's address of record. At the time of Dolson's revocation, RCW 46.20.205 provided that a licensee's address of record maintained by DOL could be changed only through written notification to DOL by the licensee. The statute has since been amended, but at the time DOL sent notice to Dolson, Washington law required DOL to send the revocation notice to the address supplied by Dolson.²

As noted above, DOL sent Dolson's notice of revocation not to his address of record, but to his last known address. At the time of revocation, Dolson's address of record was his mother's residence. The Court of Appeals observed that DOL failed to follow the statutory mandate to send notification to Dolson's address of record. However, the court concluded that DOL's error did not violate Dolson's right to due process because DOL's notice procedure was reasonably calculated to inform Dolson of the revocation. The court remarked that, although the statute was "technically violated, the spirit of the statute was not." State v. Dolson, 91 Wash. App. 187, 194, 957 P.2d 243 (1998). Employing a "commonsense analysis," the court held that because DOL's practice of sending notification to the licensee's last known address went above and beyond the statutory requirements, it did not offend constitutional due process requirements. Id. at 191, 957 P.2d 243.

The Court of Appeals is correct that there is no inherent constitutional problem with sending notice of license revocation to a licensee's last known address. In fact, prior to 1989, the Court of Appeals required DOL to search its records for a driver's last known address. Baker, 49 Wash.App. at 782,745 P.2d 1335. In Baker, the licensee did not receive notification of his license revocation because DOL relied on the address of record, rather than sending the notice to a more recent address contained in DOL files. The court held the revocation to be invalid, explaining that due process required DOL to search its records for the most recent address rather than relying on an old address of record. Id. Baker's holding rests on the assumption that a notification sent to a driver's last known address is an effective means of notice.

However, Baker was superceded by a 1989 amendment to RCW 46.20.205. Laws of 1989, ch. 337, § 6. The Legislature implicitly overruled Baker by requiring that modification by the licensee be the "exclusive means" for establishing the address of record. This court subsequently held in State v. Rogers, 127 Wash.2d 270, 280, 898 P.2d 294 (1995) that due process is satisfied when DOL sends notice to the licensee's address of record as supplied by the licensee. Thus, although the procedure approved in Baker is not inherently defective, this court must examine whether DOL's decision to send the revocation letter to Dolson's last known address was "reasonably calculated" to provide notice in light of the fact that it violated RCW 46.65.065, which mandates that notice be sent to the address of record.

Given that the Legislature has set out the exclusive means for notification, we conclude that DOL's repudiation of that procedure in favor of another was not reasonably calculated to provide notice. Under RCW 46.20.205, a driver has the responsibility to ensure that DOL's records of his address are correct. Along with this responsibility comes the assurance that DOL will rely upon the address of record for the mailing of all official documents. The statute affords licensees control over the notification process by giving them exclusive authority to establish and maintain the address of record. As amicus explains, this control is particularly important to low income people who may have difficulty establishing permanent housing. Br. of Amicus Curiae (PDA) at 11-12. A person experiencing such instability would rely on the "address of record" supplied to DOL, even if the person does not always reside at that address. Given the unequivocal mandate of RCW 46.20.205, a person would expect DOL to send all important documents to the address of record maintained by the licensee. Should DOL "update" its records based on information gleaned from a ticket or an arrest, a licensee would not know that the address of record had been changed. This would prevent the licensee from taking appropriate steps to ensure that DOL had his correct address in its files.

Contrary to the Court of Appeals' conclusion, a notice procedure that contradicts a licensee's legal expectations cannot be reasonably calculated to provide notice. DOL's decision to send notification to an address other than the address of record did not comply with the spirit of the statute because it conflicted with the statutory objective to put control over the notification process in the hands of the licensee.

We must now address whether DOL's defective notice procedure rose to the level of a due process violation. This court...