State v. Johnson, 86885–9.
| Decision Date | 09 January 2014 |
| Docket Number | No. 86885–9.,86885–9. |
| Citation | 315 P.3d 1090,179 Wash.2d 534 |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
| Parties | STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Stephen Chriss JOHNSON, Petitioner. |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Jon Emmett Cushman, Attorney at Law, Kevin Hochhalter, Cushman Law Offices, Olympia, WA, for Petitioner.
Shane Michael O'Rourke, Sara I. Beigh, Lewis County Prosecutors Office, Chehalis, WA, for Respondent.
Andra Kranzler, Columbia Legal Services, Seattle, WA, Amicus Curiae on behalf of Got Green.
Isabel Bussarakum, Los Angeles, CA, Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defender Association's Racial Disparity Project.
Karen L. Campbell, Vancouver, WA, Mary E. Welch, Bellingham, WA, Amicus Curiae on behalf of Northwest Justice Project.
Nancy Lynn Talner, Attorney at Law, Aileen Shin-ling Tsao, Sarah A. Dunne, Seattle, WA, Christine Hawkins, Davis Wright Tremaine, Bellevue, WA, Amicus Curiae on behalf of ACLU.
Travis Stearnsm, Seattle, WA, Amicus Curiae on behalf of Washington Defender Association.
Robert Charles Boruchowitz, Seattle University School of Law, Suzanne Lee Elliott, Attorney at Law, Seattle, WA, Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defender Initiative.
Lila Jane Silverstein, Washington Appellate Project, Seattle, WA, Amicus Curiae on behalf of Washington Appellate Project.
Julie Johnson Schaffer, Center for Justice, Spokane, WA, Amicus Curiae on behalf of Center for Justice.
Schuyler Brady Rue, Office of the Attorney General, Olympia, WA, Amicus Curiae on behalf of Washington Department of Licensing.
¶ 1 The Washington State Department of Licensing (DOL) suspended petitioner Stephen Chriss Johnson's driver's license after receiving notice that he had failed to pay a traffic fine. Johnson was later arrested and convicted for driving while license suspended in the third degree (DWLS 3rd).
¶ 2 Johnson appeals his DWLS 3rd conviction on two grounds. First, he argues former RCW 46.20.342(1)(c)(iv) (2008), the statute defining DWLS 3rd, did not proscribe his continuing to drive after the suspension of his license for failing to pay a traffic fine. Alternatively, he argues that because he is indigent, the suspension is invalid under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution's due process and equal protection clauses, which Johnson argues required the State to inquire into his ability to pay the fine before suspending his license, and the State apparently did not do so. Johnson also argues that his indigence entitled him to appointed counsel for his appeal and that the district court erred by denying him this counsel. Consequently, he seeks reimbursement for attorney fees spent in his defense.
¶ 3 We reject Johnson's challenges to his conviction but remand for further proceedings to determine Johnson's right to reimbursement for attorney fees. We hold that the plain meaning of former RCW 46.20.342(1)(c)(iv) allows the State to convict a driver for DWLS 3rd where the underlying license suspension occurred for failure to pay a fine. We further hold that Johnson is not constitutionally indigent, and so we decline to address Johnson's constitutional challenge to the suspension of his license because he lacks standing to raise that challenge. Finally, we hold that Johnson is statutorily indigent, and we remand Johnson's case to the district court with instructions to enter an order designating him either as (1) indigent or (2) indigent and able to contribute. If he is able to contribute, the district court must enter an order determining the costs he should bear for his appeal.
¶ 4 Johnson's driver's license expired in 2001, and a dispute with DOL about the validity of his mailing address prevented him from renewing it. In 2007, police stopped Johnson and issued to him a notice of infraction for driving without a valid license. Johnson requested and appeared for a hearing to contest the notice, but the district court found he committed the infraction and imposed a fine of $260. Johnson did not pay the fine, and DOL suspended his license after the infraction trial court notified DOL of his failure to pay.
¶ 5 In September 2008, nearly 11 months after the effective date of the suspension of Johnson's license, a Lewis County deputy sheriff witnessed a truck driving without a rear bumper or mud flaps. The deputy ran a check of the truck's plates and discovered that DOL had suspended the driver's license of the truck's registered owner—Johnson. The deputy then stopped Johnson and arrested him for DWLS 3rd.
¶ 6 Johnson proceeded to trial, where the Lewis County District Court found him guilty of DWLS 3rd, imposed an $805.50 fine, and sentenced him to 90 days in jail, but suspended all jail time except for the four days Johnson had already served. The court offered Johnson a payment plan for the fine, but he refused and asked the court to send the fine to collections.
¶ 7 Johnson appealed his conviction to the Lewis County Superior Court. During the pendency of this appeal, Johnson moved to replace his appointed counsel. Considering this motion, the district court noted that Johnson had filled out the forms for determining his status as indigent incompletely and examined Johnson under oath to determine whether he had a right to appointed counsel. Johnson testified that he had no income, had not worked in nearly 30 years, and received state aid in the form of food stamps and energy assistance. However, he also testified that he owned his $300,000 home free of liens and had obtained a nearly $3 million judgment against his neighbor in a tort suit, although he stated the neighbor appeared judgment proof. After this hearing, the district court determined that Johnson was not indigent and removed his appointed counsel.
¶ 8 The superior court affirmed Johnson's conviction. Johnson then moved for discretionary review from the Court of Appeals. The court commissioner denied review by order, and a panel of the court denied Johnson's motion to modify this order. Johnson then moved for discretionary review by this court, which we granted.
¶ 9 A. Do the reasons for license suspension codified in former RCW 46.20.342(1)(c)(iv) encompass the failure to pay the fine for a traffic infraction?
¶ 10 B. Does Johnson have standing to raise his constitutional challenge to the suspension of his license?
¶ 11 C. Did the trial court err in denying Johnson appointed counsel for his appeal?
¶ 12 Johnson first contends that his conviction is invalid because while he admits he did not pay his fine, he argues that is not one of the enumerated bases on which the State may support a DWLS 3rd charge under former RCW 46.20.342(1)(c)(iv). We review de novo the meaning of a statute. State v. Siers, 174 Wash.2d 269, 274, 274 P.3d 358 (2012).
¶ 13 “In interpreting a statute, our fundamental objective is to ascertain and carry out the legislature's intent.” State v. Gray, 174 Wash.2d 920, 926, 280 P.3d 1110 (2012). “To properly understand this statute, we look for its plain meaning, ‘discerned from all that the Legislature has said in the statute and related statutes which disclose legislative intent about the provision in question.’ ” Dissent at pp. 1102–03 (quoting Dep't of Ecology v. Campbell & Gwinn, LLC, 146 Wash.2d 1, 11, 43 P.3d 4 (2002)). Where a statute is ambiguous after the plain meaning analysis, “we ‘may look to the legislative history of the statute and the circumstances surrounding its enactment.’ ” State v. Sweany, 174 Wash.2d 909, 915, 281 P.3d 305 (2012) (quoting Rest. Dev., Inc. v. Cananwill, Inc., 150 Wash.2d 674, 682, 80 P.3d 598 (2003)). The statute in question here is not ambiguous.
¶ 14 We begin with the text of the DWLS statute, former RCW 46.20.342, which provides, in relevant part:
(1) It is unlawful for any person to drive a motor vehicle in this state while that person is in a suspended or revoked status or when his or her privilege to drive is suspended or revoked in this or any other state.
....
(c) A person who violates this section when his or her driver's license or driving privilege is, at the time of the violation, suspended or revoked solely because ... (iv) the person has failed to respond to a notice of traffic infraction, failed to appear at a requested hearing, violated a written promise to appear in court, or has failed to comply with the terms of a notice of traffic infraction or citation, as provided in [former] RCW 46.20.289 [ (2005) ] ... is guilty of driving while license suspended or revoked in the third degree, a misdemeanor.1
The reason for the underlying license suspension is an essential element of any DWLS charge. State v. Smith, 155 Wash.2d 496, 502, 120 P.3d 559 (2005). Consequently, a conviction under former RCW 46.20.342(1)(c)(iv) requires the State to prove both (1) that the defendant drove with a suspended license and (2) that the license suspension occurred because of one of the enumerated reasons—that is, that the defendant (a) failed to respond to a notice of infraction, (b) failed to appear in court, (c) violated a written promise to appear in court, or (d) failed to comply with the terms of a notice of infraction.
¶ 15 Johnson did not fail to respond to a notice of infraction—Johnson responded by contesting the citation and requesting a hearing, as provided by former RCW 46.63.070(3) (2006). Johnson also did not fail to appear in court or violate a written promise to appear in court, as provided by former RCW 46.63.070(6)(b)—it is undisputed Johnson appeared for the hearing he requested to contest his notice of infraction.
¶ 16 However, in failing to pay the fine imposed when the infraction trial court rejected Johnson's challenge, Johnson failed to comply with the notice of infraction. Former RCW 46.20.342(1)(c)(iv) includes, as an underlying basis for...
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