State v. Eaton

• Decision Date: 25 March 2010
• Docket Number: No. 81348-5.,81348-5.
• Citation: 168 Wash.2d 476,229 P.3d 704
• Parties: STATE of Washington, Petitioner, v. Thomas Harry EATON, Respondent.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

229 P.3d 704

168 Wash.2d 476

STATE of Washington, Petitioner, v. Thomas Harry EATON, Respondent.

No. 81348-5.

Supreme Court of Washington, En Banc.

Argued June 11, 2009.

Decided March 25, 2010.

Michael C. Kinnie, Scott Shigeo Ikata, Clark County Prosecuting Attorney's Office, Vancouver, WA, for Petitioner.

Anne Mowry Cruser, Law Office of Anne Cruser, Kalama, WA, for Respondent.

CHAMBERS, J.

¶ 1 Thomas Eaton was arrested for driving under the influence (DUI) and taken by police to the Clark County Jail. At the jail, Eaton was searched by staff who discovered a small bag of methamphetamine taped to his sock. The State charged Eaton with DUI and possession of methamphetamine and sought a sentencing enhancement for possessing a controlled substance in a jail or prison. A jury convicted Eaton on both charges and found by special verdict that Eaton possessed methamphetamine while in a jail. The trial court imposed an enhanced sentence.

¶ 2 At issue is whether a sentencing enhancement for possession of a controlled substance in a jail or prison requires a finding that that defendant took a volitional act to place himself in the enhancement zone. We hold that the enhancement does require a volitional act and affirm the Court of Appeals.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶ 3 On September 22, 2005, Vancouver Police Department Officer Jeff Starks saw Eaton driving with his headlights turned off and made a routine traffic stop. After performing field sobriety tests Officer Starks concluded that Eaton was impaired and arrested him for DUI. Eaton was read his Miranda¹ rights and was taken to jail. There he was searched and officers found "what appeared to be a plastic bag taped to the top of Eaton's sock." I Report of Proceedings at 99. The contents of the bag tested positive for methamphetamine.

¶ 4 The State charged Eaton with one count of DUI and one count of possession of a controlled substance. Because the methamphetamine was discovered on Eaton while he was in the county jail the State sought a sentence enhancement. The jury found Eaton guilty of both counts and, by special verdict, found that Eaton possessed methamphetamine in a county jail. Eaton's standard sentencing range would have been 0 to 6 months, but with the sentence enhancement, his range became 12 to 18 months. The trial court sentenced Eaton to 12 months and 1 day.

¶ 5 The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's imposition of the sentencing enhancement, reasoning that the State failed to prove Eaton acted voluntarily. State v. Eaton, 143 Wash.App. 155, 164-65, 177 P.3d 157 (2008). The court held that the sentencing enhancement statute was not intended to punish defendants for their involuntary acts. Id. at 164, 177 P.3d 157. Eaton's convictions for DUI and possession of a controlled substance are not before us; we are reviewing only the sentencing enhancement for possession of methamphetamine in a jail.

ANALYSIS

¶ 6 Questions of statutory interpretation are reviewed de novo. State v. Wadsworth, 139 Wash.2d 724, 734, 991 P.2d 80 (2000). Our purpose in interpreting a statute is to determine and carry out the intent of the legislature. State v. Cromwell, 157 Wash.2d 529, 539, 140 P.3d 593 (2006). We must construe statutes consistent with their underlying purposes while avoiding constitutional deficiencies. State v. Crediford, 130 Wash.2d 747, 755, 927 P.2d 1129 (1996). In construing a statute, we presume the legislature did not intend absurd results. State v. J.P., 149 Wash.2d 444, 450, 69 P.3d 318 (2003).

Criminal Responsibility

¶ 7 As the Court of Appeals correctly observed: "as a general rule, every crime must contain two elements: (1) an actus reus and (2) a mens rea." Eaton, 143 Wash.App. at 160, 177 P.3d 157 (citing State v. Utter, 4 Wash.App. 137, 139, 479 P.2d 946 (1971)). Actus reus is defined as "`the wrongful deed that comprises the physical components of a crime,'" Id. (alteration in original) (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 39 (8th ed.2004)), and the mens rea is "`the state of mind that the prosecution . . . must prove that a defendant had when committing a crime.'" Id. (alteration in original) (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1006 (8th ed.2004)). At common law it was said that "to constitute a crime against human laws, there must be, first, a vitious will; and, secondly, an unlawful act consequent upon such vitious will." WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 5 COMMENTARIES *21. "An involuntary act, as it has no claim to merit, so neither can it induce any guilt: the concurrence of the will, when it has its choice either to do or to avoid the fact in question, being the only thing that renders human actions either praiseworthy or culpable." Id.

¶ 8 Although most criminal laws since codified still adhere to this general principle, we now recognize that the "legislature has the authority to create a crime without a mens rea element." State v. Bradshaw, 152 Wash.2d 528, 532, 98 P.3d 1190 (2004) (citing State v. Anderson, 141 Wash.2d 357, 361, 5 P.3d 1247 (2000)). Though they are disfavored, these "strict liability" crimes criminalize unlawful conduct regardless of whether the actor possesses a culpable mental state. State v. Rivas, 126 Wash.2d 443, 452, 896 P.2d 57 (1995); see also Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 256 n. 14, 72 S.Ct. 240, 96 L.Ed. 288 (1952). In this way, the legislature seeks to deter harmful conduct by creating harsh penalties that focus on the defendant's actions and their consequences. "The law threatens certain pains if you do certain things, intending thereby to give you a new motive for not doing them." O.W. HOLMES, Jr., THE COMMON LAW 40 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., Harvard Univ. Press, 1967) (1881).

¶ 9 Fundamental to our notion of an ordered society is that people are punished only for their own conduct. Where an individual has taken no volitional action she is not generally subject to criminal liability as punishment would not serve to further any of the legitimate goals of the criminal law.² We punish people for what they do, not for what others do to them. We do not punish those who do not have the capacity to choose.³ Where the individual has not voluntarily acted, punishment will not deter the consequences.

¶ 10 As these principles suggest, although an individual need not possess a culpable mental state in order to commit a crime, there is "a certain minimal mental element required in order to establish the actus reus itself." Utter, 4 Wash.App. at 139, 479 P.2d 946. Movements must be willed; a spasm is not an act. Holmes, supra, at 45-46. It is this volitional aspect of a person's actions that renders her morally responsible and her actions potentially deterrable. To punish an individual for an involuntary act would run counter to the principle that "a person cannot be morally responsible for an outcome unless the outcome is a consequence of that person's action." A.P. Simester, On the So-called Requirement for Voluntary Action, 1 Buff. Crim. L. Rev. 403, 405 (1998). It would create what Simester has called "situational liability," penalizing a defendant for a situation she simply finds herself in. Id. at 410. "Unless there is a requirement of voluntariness, situational offenses are at odds with the deepest presuppositions of the criminal law." Id. at 412. As Holmes tells us, the "reason for requiring an act is, that an act implies a choice, and that it is felt to be impolitic and unjust to make a man answerable for harm, unless he might have chosen otherwise." Holmes, supra, at 46. "The choice to act must be made with a chance of contemplating the consequence complained of, or else it has no bearing on responsibility for that consequence." Id. A person cannot be answerable for a state of affairs unless she could have done something to avoid it.⁴ Simester, supra, at 412.

The Enhancement

¶ 11 The purpose of sentencing enhancements is to provide legislative guidance to courts in calibrating the appropriate punishment for crimes based on relevant circumstances surrounding the underlying conduct. "Zone" enhancements direct courts to sentence offenders beyond the standard range if they are found committing some designated crime in a particular area. For example, the legislature has enacted statutes creating mandatory increased penalties for individuals convicted of possession with intent to deliver controlled substances in a variety of "zones," including near schools, parks, bus stops, and on public transport vehicles. RCW 69.50.435. In this case, Eaton was convicted of possession of methamphetamine and his sentence was enhanced because the police found the methamphetamine while he was in a jail, which has been designated an enhancement zone. RCW 9.94A.533(5).

¶ 12 The Court of Appeals held that Eaton committed no actus reus amounting to voluntary possession of methamphetamine in the enhancement zone. Eaton, 143 Wash.App. at 157, 177 P.3d 157. RCW 69.50.4013(1) states that "it is unlawful for any person to possess a controlled substance." In addition, RCW 9.94A.533(5) requires courts to impose a sentencing enhancement under certain circumstances. The statute states in relevant part:

The following additional times shall be added to the standard sentence range if the offender or an accomplice committed the offense while in a county jail or state correctional facility and the offender is being sentenced for one of the crimes listed in this subsection.

. . . .

(c) Twelve months for offenses committed under RCW 69.50.4013.

For the purposes of this subsection, all of the real property of a state correctional facility or county jail shall be deemed to be part of that facility or county jail.

RCW 9.94A.533(5).

¶ 13 The State argues that the plain language of the statute does not contain a volitional element, that one should not be inferred, and that the sentencing enhancement should be upheld. The State is correct that the language of RCW 9.94A.533(5) is silent on whether a volitional act is required before...