State v. Ferguson, No. A10–0540.
| Decision Date | 10 February 2012 |
| Docket Number | No. A10–0540. |
| Citation | 808 N.W.2d 586 |
| Parties | STATE of Minnesota, Appellant, v. Michael James FERGUSON, Respondent. |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Syllabus by the Court
1. For purposes of the rule that a defendant may not be sentenced for more than one crime for each victim, an offense for a single count of drive-by shooting at an occupied building does not constitute an offense for each building occupant.
2. The district court did not err when it sentenced respondent on the drive-by shooting at an occupied building conviction and eight second-degree assault convictions because a single sentence for drive-by shooting at an occupied building is not commensurate with respondent's culpability for using a dangerous weapon to intentionally cause eight persons to fear immediate bodily harm.
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and John J. Choi, Ramsey County Attorney, Mitchell L. Rothman, Assistant County Attorney, St. Paul, Minnesota, for appellant.
David W. Merchant, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Benjamin J. Butler, Assistant State Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota, for respondent.
Michael James Ferguson was convicted of one count of felony drive-by shooting at an occupied building, Minn.Stat. § 609.66, subd. 1e(b) (2010), and eight counts of second-degree assault, Minn.Stat. § 609.222, subd. 1 (2010), arising out of an incident in which multiple shots were fired at a duplex occupied by eight people. After Ferguson successfully appealed his original sentence, the district court imposed sentence on the drive-by shooting conviction and on all eight assault convictions. On appeal, the court of appeals held that Minn.Stat. § 609.035 (2010) required the district court to sentence Ferguson only on the drive-by shooting at an occupied building conviction and remanded for resentencing on that conviction. We conclude that the court of appeals misapplied the rule that a district court may not sentence a defendant to more than one crime for each victim, and that a single sentence for drive-by shooting at an occupied building is not commensurate with Ferguson's culpability for using a dangerous weapon to intentionally cause eight persons to fear immediate bodily harm. We therefore reverse the decision of the court of appeals and uphold the sentence imposed by the district court.
On September 27, 2007, Michael James Ferguson and his brothers Marcus Dillard and Matthew Dillard went to a house in St. Paul to talk with someone about a dog Marcus had purchased. When the brothers knocked on the door, someone on the second floor yelled at them to leave. The brothers then got into a van; Matthew drove with Marcus in a rear passenger seat and Ferguson in the front passenger seat. Matthew initially drove the van away from the house, but then turned around. As the van passed by the house, Ferguson handed a gun to Marcus, who fired approximately six rounds at the house. Eight people were inside the house, but no one was injured.
Ferguson was charged with one count of drive-by shooting at an occupied building, Minn.Stat. § 609.66, subd. 1e(b), and eight counts of second-degree assault, Minn.Stat. § 609.222, subd. 1, each by aiding and abetting, Minn.Stat. § 609.05, subd. 1 (2010). A jury found Ferguson guilty as charged. After convicting Ferguson on all nine counts, the district court sentenced Ferguson on the eight assault convictions, imposing one 36–month sentence, a second 36–month sentence to be served consecutively with the first sentence, and six 39–month sentences to be served concurrently with the first sentence. The district court did not sentence Ferguson on the drive-by shooting conviction because it found that the drive-by shooting was part of a continuing course of conduct with the assaults.
Ferguson appealed his convictions and sentence. The court of appeals affirmed the convictions, concluding that there was sufficient evidence to prove that Marcus had committed eight counts of second-degree assault and that Ferguson had intentionally aided Marcus in all eight assaults. State v. Ferguson ( Ferguson I ), No. A08–1327, 2009 WL 3172139, at *2–4, 6 (Minn.App. Oct. 6, 2009). But the court of appeals reversed and remanded for resentencing, concluding that State v. Franks, 765 N.W.2d 68 (Minn.2009), required the district court to sentence Ferguson on the drive-by shooting conviction, which was the most serious of the offenses. Ferguson I, 2009 WL 3172139, at *5. The court stated that Ferguson's new sentence could not exceed his original aggregate sentence of 75 months. Id. (citing State v. Jackson, 749 N.W.2d 353, 358 (Minn.2008)).
On remand, Ferguson asked the district court to impose sentence only on the drive-by shooting conviction and to set the sentence at 50 months, which was the minimum non-departing sentence for an offense with severity level VIII and a criminal history score of one. See Minn. Sent. Guidelines IV. Over Ferguson's objection, the district court sentenced Ferguson to 39 months on the drive-by shooting conviction, 36 months on the first assault conviction, to be served consecutively with the drive-by shooting charge, and 39 months on each of the remaining seven assault convictions, to be served concurrently, for an aggregate sentence of 75 months. The district court explained that the downward departure on the drive-by shooting conviction was not based on any mitigating factors but was granted so that nine sentences could be imposed without exceeding Ferguson's initial sentence. The district court could have sentenced Ferguson to as many as 69 months on the drive-by shooting conviction without departing from the guidelines. See Minn. Sent. Guidelines IV.
Ferguson appealed his revised sentence. The court of appeals held in a published decision that the district court could only sentence Ferguson on the drive-by shooting conviction. State v. Ferguson ( Ferguson II ), 786 N.W.2d 640, 645 (Minn.App.2010). The court vacated Ferguson's sentences on his assault convictions and remanded for Ferguson to be resentenced on the drive-by shooting conviction to a sentence of not more than 75 months. Id. We granted review.
Minnesota Statutes § 609.035 generally “prohibits multiple sentences, even concurrent sentences, for two or more offenses that were committed as part of a single behavioral incident.” State v. Norregaard, 384 N.W.2d 449, 449 (Minn.1986). The purpose of section 609.035 is “to protect against exaggerating the criminality of a person's conduct and to make both punishment and prosecution commensurate with culpability.” State ex rel. Stangvik v. Tahash, 281 Minn. 353, 360, 161 N.W.2d 667, 672 (1968). Section 609.035 “contemplates that a defendant will be punished for the ‘most serious' of the offenses arising out of a single behavioral incident because ‘imposing up to the maximum punishment for the most serious offense will include punishment for all offenses.’ ” State v. Kebaso, 713 N.W.2d 317, 322 (Minn.2006) (quoting State v. Johnson, 273 Minn. 394, 399, 141 N.W.2d 517, 522 (1966)); State v. Franks, 765 N.W.2d 68, 77 (Minn.2009) (same). But the legislature did not intend section 609.035 to immunize offenders in every case from “the consequences of separate crimes intentionally committed in a single episode against more than one individual.” State ex rel. Stangvik, 281 Minn. at 360, 161 N.W.2d at 672. We have therefore “carved out an exception to [ section 609.035] when multiple victims are involved.” State v. Whittaker, 568 N.W.2d 440, 453 (Minn.1997).
Under the multiple-victim exception, “courts are not prevented from giving a defendant multiple sentences for multiple crimes arising out of a single behavioral incident if: (1) the crimes affect multiple victims; and (2) multiple sentences do not unfairly exaggerate the criminality of the defendant's conduct.” State v. Skipintheday, 717 N.W.2d 423, 426 (Minn.2006). “ ‘[T]he purpose of the protection against multiple punishment is to insure that the defendant's punishment will be commensurate with his criminal liability and a defendant who commits an act of violence with the intent to harm more than one person or by means likely to cause harm to several persons is more culpable than a defendant who harms only one person.’ ” State ex rel. Stangvik, 281 Minn. at 361, 161 N.W.2d at 672 (quoting People v. Ridley, 63 Cal.2d 671, 47 Cal.Rptr. 796, 408 P.2d 124, 128 (1965)). “In other words, we determined that multiple convictions arising from a single behavioral incident did not violate our rule against double punishment because where multiple victims are involved, a defendant is equally culpable to each victim.” State v. Edwards, 774 N.W.2d 596, 605 (Minn.2009). But a defendant “may not be sentenced for more than one crime for each victim” when the defendant's conduct is motivated by a single criminal objective. State v. Prudhomme, 303 Minn. 376, 379, 228 N.W.2d 243, 245 (1975).
Here, the court of appeals concluded that the single count of drive-by shooting at an occupied building was the most serious offense committed against each of the eight victims. Ferguson II, 786 N.W.2d at 645. Based on this conclusion, the court held that Minn.Stat. § 609.035 prohibited the district court from imposing the seven additional second-degree assault sentences because “a defendant convicted of offenses arising out of a single behavioral incident and committed against multiple victims may be sentenced only on the most serious offense against each victim.” Id. The court of appeals effectively held that, under the facts of this case, the rule in question—a district court may not sentence a defendant to more than one crime for each victim—required the district court to impose one sentence, despite the fact that Ferguson's conduct victimized eight people. Because the court of appeals misapplied the multiple-victim rule and because a single sentence for drive-by shooting at an occupied...
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