State v. De Graff

• Decision Date: 15 April 1927
• Docket Number: 20353.
• Citation: 255 P. 371,143 Wash. 326
• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE ex rel. CITY OF SPOKANE v. DE GRAFF, County Treasurer.

255 P. 371

143 Wash. 326

STATE ex rel. CITY OF SPOKANE v. DE GRAFF, County Treasurer.

No. 20353.

Supreme Court of Washington, En Banc.

April 15, 1927

Appeal from Superior Court, Spokane County; Huneke, Judge.

Action by the State of Washington, on the relation of the City of Spokane, against G. F. De Graff, as County Treasurer. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff appeals. Reversed.

Tolman J., and Mackintosh, C.J., dissenting.

J. M Geraghty and Alex. M. Winston, both of Spokane, for appellant.

Thomas J. L. Kennedy, Arthur Schramm, Jr., and J. Ambler Newton, all of Seattle, amici curiae.

C. W Greenough and A. O. Colburn, both of Spokane, for respondent.

FRENCH J.

The following finding of fact made by the trial court, we think, sufficiently states the case:

'The city of Spokane, desiring to redeem certain land from certain delinquent general taxes pursuant to chapter 170, Laws of 1925, Extraordinary Session, tendered to the county treasurer the face of such tax with the costs of sale and without penalty or interest, and demanded a certificate of redemption which the treasurer refused, and this action resulted to compel the treasurer to issue such certificate. There is no dispute as to the facts, but counsel for defendant maintain that the legislative act referred to is unconstitutional and void, and hence compliance therewith cannot be required. The act in question is an amendment of section 9393, Rem. Comp. Stats. That section provided, among other things, that, in case any property was struck off to the county for general taxes and was later sold by the county, the proceeds of such sale should be applied first to discharge in full the lien for general taxes, then to discharge all local assessment liens upon the property, the surplus, if any, to be distributed among the proper county funds. The amendment practically rewrites this section, and thus, when property is struck off to the county and there are unpaid local improvement assessments against it, the city has the right at any time before the county has sold the property to redeem such property from the lien of general taxes plus the costs of foreclosure, and without penalty or interest.'

This act is questioned on the ground that it violates section 12, article 1, of the state Constitution, providing that no law shall be passed granting to any citizen, class of citizens, or corporation (other than municipal) privileges or immunities which, upon the same terms, do not equally belong to all citizens or corporations.

It is also claimed that it violates section 28, article 2, of the state Constitution relative to the assessment and collection of taxes, and extending the time for the collection thereof.

It is also claimed that it is in violation of section 1, article 4, of the state Constitution, which provides that the judicial powers of the state shall be in the Supreme Court, the superior courts, justices of the peace, and such inferior courts as the Legislature may provide.

It is also claimed that it is superseded and annulled by chapter 130 of the Laws of 1925 (Ex. Sess.); that it violates section 19, article 2, of the state Constitution, which provides that no bill shall embrace more than one subject and that it shall be expressed in the title.

Section 9393, Rem. Comp. Stats., of which the act in question is amendatory, has been heretofore carefully considered by the court, and has been held constitutional in every particular, so that the last objection raised is no longer an open question in this state. Holzman v. Spokane, 91 Wash. 418, 157 P. 1086; Everett v. Morgan, 133 Wash. 225, 233 P. 317, 237 P. 508; Perkins v. Kennewick (Wash.) 254 P. 458.

Passing to the first objection; namely, that the act in question violates section 12, article 1, of the state Constitution, we think it is sufficient to say that we are dealing here with the rights of municipal corporations acting not in their private character, because the levy and collection of local improvement assessments is a branch of the sovereign power of taxation, and is therefore public in character. In Seattle v. Hill, 14 Wash. 487, 45 P. 17, 35 L. R. A. 372, this court said:

'Assessments levied for the improvement of a street are based upon the same sovereign power which is asserted in the levying of general taxes.'

And, further on in the same opinion:

'It seems to us to follow that assessments for such improvements are put upon the same footing as general taxes upon real estate, and the liens created by such assessments have precisely the same force and effect.'

See, also, State ex rel. Olmstead v. Mudgett, 21 Wash. 99, 57 P. 351; Lawrence v. Tacoma, 103 Wash. 86, 173 P. 1017; Seattle v. Algar, 122 Wash. 367, 210 P. 664; Seattle v. Everett, 125 Wash. 39, 215 P. 337; Carstens & Earles v. Seattle, 84 Wash. 88, 146 P. 381, Ann. Cas. 1917A, 1070; State ex rel. Case v. Howell, 85 Wash. 281, 147 P. 1162; Seattle v. Equitable Bond Co., 126 Wash. 111, 217 P. 721.

In the Holzman Case, supra, this court said:

'The extent to which texes, whether general or special, shall become liens upon property and the relative rank of such liens is purely a question of legislative will.'

We think it necessarily follows that whatever privileges or immunities are granted by the act in question, being granted as they are to a municipal corporation exercising the sovereign right of taxation, are exempt from the constitutional prohibition.

In discussing the other objections it should be remembered that the county is but an arm of the state, created by the state for the advantage of the people of the particular county and of the state generally; that the powers of the county are the powers of the state, and the duties of the county are the duties of the state.

'A county is a governmental agency or political subdivision of the state, organized for purposes of exercising some functions of the state government.' County of San Mateo v. Loren Coburn, 130 Cal. 631, 63 P. 78, 621; Madden v. Lancaster County (C. C. A.) 65 F. 188; Askew v. Hale County, 54 Ala. 639, 25 Am. Rep. 730; 15 C.J. 292, and cases cited.

'It will be observed that the Legislature, and not the municipality, fixes the date of the delinquency and the interest charge; in other words, creates the delinquent fund arising from this source. In tax laws penalties proper and interest charges are imposed for mere delinquencies in order to hasten payment. The general law of the state imposes this charge as a penalty for neglect to pay the tax in due season. The fund arising from this source is created by the legislative act of the sovereign state, and it follows that the Legislature has a right to dispose of this fund to the same extent as other fines and penalties arising from the violation of other laws of the state.' New Whatcom v. Roeder, 22 Wash. 570, 61 P. 767.

In view of what we have said, we think it is plain that the constitutional limitations stated by respondent were never intended to apply to the state in administering the affairs of the state through the agency of the counties.

Again it is contended that the act is superseded by chapter 130, Session Laws of 1925, which is a general recodification of the taxation laws of the state. Chapter 130 was enacted by the 1925 Legis...