State v. Hagans

• Decision Date: 23 April 2018
• Docket Number: A–37 September Term 2016,078014
• Citation: 233 N.J. 30,182 A.3d 909
• Parties: STATE of New Jersey, Plaintiff–Respondent, v. Malcolm C. HAGANS, Defendant–Appellant.
• Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

233 N.J. 30

182 A.3d 909

STATE of New Jersey, Plaintiff–Respondent,

v.Malcolm C. HAGANS, Defendant–Appellant.

A–37 September Term 2016

078014

Supreme Court of New Jersey.

Argued January 16, 2018

Decided April 23, 2018

Rebecca Gindi, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for appellant (Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney; Rebecca Gindi, of counsel, and Susan Brody, Deputy Public Defender, on the briefs).

Jane C. Schuster, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent (Christopher S. Porrino, Attorney General, attorney; Jane C. Schuster, of counsel and on the briefs).

JUSTICE TIMPONE delivered the opinion of the Court.

In this case, the Court considers the validity of a driver's consent to search her automobile after she initially denied a police officer's request to search it. Because the trial court's determination that the driver ultimately knowingly and voluntarily gave consent to search is supported by sufficient credible evidence, we find that the trial court properly denied defendant's motion to suppress the evidence seized during the search.

I.

We garner these undisputed facts from the record, including the dash-cam videos taken at the scene by the Mobile Video Recorder (MVR) in the police vehicle. The parties stipulated to the admission of the MVR recording and agreed it contained sufficient facts for a hearing on defendant's motion to suppress. No witnesses testified, and the parties agreed to rely solely on the MVR recording to support their arguments. We have reviewed that video.

In March 2012, New Jersey State Trooper John Faust pulled over a 2002 Mercury Sable with a damaged taillight on Interstate 295 in Burlington County. The driver, Shonsheray Chandler, had changed lanes without signaling. There were passengers in Chandler's car: her six-year-old daughter, who was in the back seat, and defendant Malcolm Hagans, sitting in the front passenger seat. Faust approached the passenger side of the vehicle and asked Chandler for her driving documents.

While waiting, Faust smelled the odor of burnt marijuana in the vehicle. He asked defendant, who was on his cell phone, to hang up. When defendant objected, Faust asked him to step out of the vehicle, arrested him, handcuffed him, called for back-up, and administered Miranda warnings. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).

Faust then asked Chandler to step out of the vehicle, administered Miranda warnings, and questioned her about the presence of marijuana in the vehicle. Faust handcuffed Chandler and placed her in the backseat of his police vehicle. Chandler denied knowing defendant had marijuana on him and denied that she had been smoking marijuana in the car. Upon request, Faust brought Chandler's daughter to the police car to be with her mother. Officers at the scene placed defendant in another police vehicle.

Faust requested Chandler consent to a search of her vehicle. Before reading the consent form to her, Faust told Chandler that "it would be a lot easier if you would just make things easy."

Faust read the consent form aloud. He advised Chandler of her right to refuse consent and that if she refused, barring any other reason to detain her, she could leave. He also explained if she consented, she had a right to be present during the search and could withdraw her consent at any time. Faust asked whether she would give consent, and Chandler responded "no."

Faust then discussed his next steps. "I know, but at this time ... we are going to apply for a search warrant, okay, and that is kinda going to prolong the inevitable. I would just like it to be easier." Chandler replied, "Go ahead." Faust then inquired, "What's that ma'am?," to which Chandler repeated "Go ahead." Faust asked, "Are you sure?" Chandler answered, "Yeah." Faust countered, "So you're saying yes?" Chandler responded, "Yes."

To confirm Chandler's decision, Faust re-read her the consent-to-search form in its entirety. Faust then again asked Chandler if she consented to the search of her vehicle; she responded "yes." Faust repeated for the MVR that Chandler had initially denied consent but changed her mind and consented because she "did not want to wait any longer."

The search produced a bag of marijuana and a loaded .22 caliber pistol. Chandler denied knowledge of the pistol, which police found behind the front passenger seat, near Chandler's daughter. Faust explained to Chandler that the Division of Youth and Family Services—now the Division of Child Protection and Permanency—would be notified given the proximity of the pistol to her young daughter.

Defendant ultimately admitted to ownership of the marijuana and the pistol. He was charged with unlawful possession of a weapon, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:39–5(b), fourth-degree child abuse, in violation of N.J.S.A. 9:6–1, and a disorderly persons offense for possession of marijuana. Chandler was not charged.

At a suppression hearing, the trial court found that Faust had probable cause to pull the vehicle over for changing lanes without a signal and probable cause for a search upon smelling burnt marijuana. Although the court found that several of the factors set forth in State v. King, 44 N.J. 346, 352–53, 209 A.2d 110 (1965), militated against a finding of Chandler's voluntary consent, it determined the totality of the circumstances indicated that the consent to search was valid and not coerced. The court found no taint in Chandler's consent, determining Faust did not badger her or attempt to further persuade her to consent.

Defendant pleaded guilty to gun possession, preserving his right to appeal the denial of the motion to suppress. The remaining charges against him were dismissed. The trial court sentenced defendant to a five-year term of imprisonment with a one-year period of parole ineligibility.

The Appellate Division affirmed based on the totality of the evidence, finding that the initial stop was justified by Faust's reasonable suspicion of a motor vehicle infraction and found valid the subsequent search because the driver's consent to search was not coerced.

This Court granted certification, limited to the issue of whether Chandler's "consent to search the motor vehicle was freely and voluntarily given." 229 N.J. 161, 160 A.3d 709 (2017).

II.

A.

Defendant urges this Court to reverse the Appellate Division's finding that Chandler voluntarily consented to the search of her vehicle.

Defendant insists the circumstances surrounding Chandler's consent were steeped in coercion leading to her involuntarily consenting to the search. Defendant maintains the Appellate Division misapplied the five factors delineated by the Court in King. Defendant argues the following circumstances establish Chandler's coerced consent: (1) Chandler consented while under arrest; (2) Faust had physically restrained Chandler by handcuffing and placing her in a police vehicle; (3) Chandler denied knowledge of contraband in the car and knew that a search would result in the discovery of marijuana; and (4) Faust attempted to persuade Chandler to consent after she initially refused.

Lastly, defendant contends that Faust's statement concerning the inevitability of a search warrant rendered Chandler's consent involuntary. Defendant asserts that the circumstances facing Chandler were substantially more coercive than those facing the defendant in State v. Cancel, in which an officer made a similar statement but the court nevertheless found the consent voluntary. 256 N.J. Super. 430, 433–34, 607 A.2d 199 (App. Div. 1992).

B.

The State argues that Chandler's consent was knowing and voluntary under the totality of the circumstances and urges this Court to affirm the Appellate Division. The State asserts the MVR conveyed Faust's professionalism in dealing with Chandler throughout their exchanges.

The State also notes that the factors in King merely guide the voluntariness analysis and are not dispositive. Concerning Faust's statement about the inevitability of a search warrant, the State argues the Appellate Division correctly applied Cancel, holding that police may constitutionally provide a fair prediction of events to follow a denial of consent.

III.

A.

In reviewing the grant or denial of a motion to suppress, we uphold the trial court's factual findings underlying that decision "so long as those findings are supported by sufficient credible evidence in the record." State v. Gamble, 218 N.J. 412, 424, 95 A.3d 188 (2014) (citing State v. Elders, 192 N.J. 224, 243, 927 A.2d 1250 (2007) ). We "reverse only when the trial court's determination is ‘so clearly mistaken that the interests of justice demand intervention and correction.’ " Id. at 425, 95 A.3d 188 (quoting Elders, 192 N.J. at 244, 927 A.2d 1250 ).

Video-recorded evidence is reviewed under the same standard. State v. S.S., 229 N.J. 360, 381, 162 A.3d 1058 (2017) (concluding that a trial court's fact-finding based solely on a video recording is disturbed only "when factual findings are so clearly mistaken—so wide of the mark—that the interests of justice demand intervention").

The panel's decision here predated our opinion in S.S. and included findings based on the panel's own de novo review of the MVR. We adhere to the principles we enunciated in S.S.

We review the legal determinations of the trial court de novo. Gamble, 218 N.J. at 425, 95 A.3d 188 (citing State v. Gandhi, 201 N.J. 161, 176, 989 A.2d 256 (2010) ). Those determinations are not entitled to any special deference. Ibid. (citing Gandhi, 201 N.J. at 176, 989 A.2d 256 ).

Defendant has automatic standing to challenge the automobile search because the marijuana and gun recovered as a result of the search constitute essential elements of the crime with which he was charged. State v. Lamb, 218 N.J. 300, 313, 95 A.3d 123 (2014) (citing Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 80 S.Ct. 725, 4 L.Ed.2d 697 (1960), overruled by United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 100 S.Ct. 2547, 65 L.Ed.2d 619 (1980) ).

B.

The Fourth...