State v. Hall
| Decision Date | 04 June 2021 |
| Docket Number | No. 28882,28882 |
| Citation | 173 N.E.3d 166 |
| Court | Ohio Court of Appeals |
| Parties | STATE of Ohio, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Aaron L. HALL, Defendant-Appellant |
MATHIAS H. HECK, JR., by LISA M. LIGHT, Atty. Reg. No. 0097348, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, Montgomery County Prosecutor's Office, Appellate Division, Montgomery County Courts Building, 301 West Third Street, 5th Floor, Dayton, Ohio 45422, Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellee.
BEN M. SWIFT, Atty. Reg. No. 0065745, P.O. Box 49637, Dayton, Ohio 45449, Attorney for Defendant-Appellant.
{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant Aaron L. Hall appeals from his convictions for the following offenses: Count I, aggravated robbery (deadly weapon), in violation of R.C. 2911.01(A)(1), a felony of the first degree; Count II, aggravated robbery (deadly weapon), in violation of R.C. 2911.01(A)(1), a felony of the first degree; Count III, aggravated robbery (deadly weapon), in violation of R.C. 2911.01(A)(1), a felony of the first degree; Count IV, kidnapping (felony or flight-safe release), in violation of R.C. 2905.01(A)(2), a felony of the second degree, and Count V, tampering with evidence (alter/destroy), in violation of R.C. 2921.12(A)(1), a felony of the third degree. Hall filed a timely notice of appeal on August 26, 2020.
{¶ 2} The incident which formed the basis for Hall's convictions occurred on June 28, 2019, when Hall committed a robbery of a bank in West Carrollton, Ohio. The robbery involved three employees of the bank, and Hall was found to have used a firearm while committing the offenses.
{¶ 3} On July 24, 2019, Hall was indicted for three counts of aggravated robbery (Counts I-III), each with a firearm specification; one count of kidnapping (Count IV); one count of tampering with evidence (Count V); and one count of having a weapon while under disability (Count VI). At his arraignment on July 30, 2019, Hall stood mute, and the trial court entered pleas of not guilty on his behalf. On August 7, 2019, Hall filed a motion to suppress, but he later withdrew the motion on October 25, 2019.
{¶ 4} In July 2020, Hall pled guilty to Counts I-V. In exchange for Hall's guilty pleas, the State dismissed Count VI and the firearm specifications attached to Counts I-III. In relation to his guilty plea to Count IV, kidnapping, Hall acknowledged that he was required to register as a violent offender. On August 21, 2020, the court sentenced Hall pursuant to the Reagan Tokes Act ("RTA"); the trial court sentenced Hall to an indefinite mandatory minimum term of ten years (maximum of 15 years) on Counts I-III; an indefinite mandatory term of six years (maximum of 12 years) on Count IV1 ; and 36 months on Count V. The trial court ordered all of the sentences to be served concurrently for an aggregate sentence of a minimum of ten years to a maximum of 15 years in prison. The trial court also informed Hall of his duties to register as a violent offender and the requirements of that designation.
{¶ 5} It is from this judgment that Hall now appeals.
{¶ 6} Hall's first assignment of error is as follows:
THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO FOLLOW THE MANDATES OF CRIM.R. 11, RENDERING HALL'S PLEA INVOLUNTARY AND UNKNOWING.
{¶ 7} In his first assignment, Hall contends that his pleas were not made in a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary manner because the trial court did not properly advise him of the maximum sentence he could serve. Specifically, Hall advances the following arguments: 1) the plea form for Count IV, kidnapping, did not contain the correct post-release control period; 2) the trial court improperly advised Hall that his mandatory minimum prison term could be reduced by earned credit for good behavior; and 3) the trial court failed to explain the duties associated with Hall's designation as a violent offender.
{¶ 8} Crim.R. 11(C) sets forth the requisite notice to be given to a defendant at a plea hearing on a felony. To be fully informed of the effect of the plea, the court must determine that the defendant's plea was made with an "understanding of the nature of the charges and the maximum penalty involved." Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a).
{¶ 9} In order for a plea to be made knowingly and voluntarily, the trial court must follow the mandates of Crim.R. 11(C). If a defendant's guilty plea is not voluntary and knowing, "it has been obtained in violation of due process and is therefore void." Boykin v. Alabama , 395 U.S. 238, 243, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969), fn. 5, quoting McCarthy v. United States , 394 U.S. 459, 89 S.Ct. 1166, 22 L.Ed.2d 418 (1969).
{¶ 10} A trial court must strictly comply with Crim.R. 11 as it pertains to the waiver of federal constitutional rights. These include the right to trial by jury, the right of confrontation, and the privilege against self-incrimination. Id. at 243, 89 S.Ct. 1709. However, substantial compliance with Crim.R. 11(C) is sufficient when waiving non-constitutional rights. State v. Nero , 56 Ohio St.3d 106, 108, 564 N.E.2d 474 (1990). The non-constitutional rights of which a defendant must be informed are the nature of the charges with an understanding of the law in relation to the facts, the maximum penalty , and that after entering a guilty plea or a no contest plea, the court may proceed to judgment and sentence. Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a)(b) ; State v. Morgan , 2018-Ohio-319, 104 N.E.3d 941, ¶ 9 (2d Dist.), quoting State v. Balidbid , 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 24511, 2012-Ohio-1406, 2012 WL 1079543 ; see also McCarthy v. U.S. , 394 U.S. 459, 466, 89 S.Ct. 1166, 22 L.Ed.2d 418 (1969). Substantial compliance means that under the totality of the circumstances, the defendant subjectively understands the implications of his plea and the rights he is waiving. Nero at 108, 564 N.E.2d 474.
{¶ 11} If there is a lack of substantial compliance regarding a non-constitutional right, then the reviewing court is to determine whether there was a partial or a total failure to comply with the rule. State v. Cassell , 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 27899, 2018-Ohio-1668, 2019 WL 1976987, ¶ 14. A complete failure to advise of a non-constitutional right requires that the plea be vacated without an analysis of prejudice. Id ., citing State v. Sarkozy , 117 Ohio St.3d 86, 2008-Ohio-509, 881 N.E.2d 1224, ¶ 22, 25. "However, if the court's advisement on a non-constitutional right is considered partial compliance with the rule, then the plea cannot be vacated unless the defendant demonstrates prejudice." Id. , citing State v. Clark, 119 Ohio St.3d 239, 2008-Ohio-3748, 893 N.E.2d 462, ¶ 32, 40. Prejudice in this context means that the plea would otherwise not have been entered. Id. at ¶ 15. Where the trial court completely fails to comply with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a) or (b), however, "an analysis of prejudice" is not implicated. Sarkozy at ¶ 22.
{¶ 12} Under Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a), a trial court's responsibility to determine that a defendant's plea is voluntary includes assuring that the defendant has an " ‘understanding of the nature of the charges and of the maximum penalty involved * * *.’ " State v. Riddle , 2017-Ohio-1199, 88 N.E.3d 475, ¶ 12 (2d Dist.), quoting State v. Jones , 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 24772, 2013-Ohio-119, 2013 WL 209184, ¶ 6. "The ‘maximum penalty’ includes any mandatory post-release control sanction[.]" Jones at ¶ 7. "Thus if the defendant will be subject to a period of post-release control, to comply with Crim.R. 11 [,] the court must inform the defendant of post-release control." Id.
{¶ 13} In order to properly inform a defendant of post-release control, a trial court must both "notify [the] offender at the sentencing hearing about post-release control and * * * incorporate post-release control into its sentencing entry." State v. Grimes , 151 Ohio St.3d 19, 2017-Ohio-2927, 85 N.E.3d 700, ¶ 11, quoting State v. Jordan , 104 Ohio St.3d 21, 2004-Ohio-6085, 817 N.E.2d 864, ¶ 22. Furthermore, "statutorily compliant notification" includes "notifying the defendant of the details of the post-release control and the consequences of violating post-release control," including whether post-release control is discretionary or mandatory and the term of supervision. Id ., citing State v. Qualls , 131 Ohio St.3d 499, 2012-Ohio-1111, 967 N.E.2d 718, ¶ 18, Jordan at ¶ 22-23, and State v. Billiter , 134 Ohio St.3d 103, 2012-Ohio-5144, 980 N.E.2d 960, ¶ 12.
{¶ 14} While the sentencing entry must incorporate the post-release control notifications given at the sentencing hearing, it "need not repeat those notifications verbatim." Id. at ¶ 13. Rather, "a minimally compliant entry must provide the [Adult Parole Authority] the information it needs to execute the post-release-control portion of the sentence." Id.
{¶ 15} Here, Hall argues that the plea form for kidnapping incorrectly stated that he was subject to a mandatory post-release control period of five years, when the correct term of post-release control was a mandatory period of three years. However, this issue was addressed at the plea hearing after the mistake was brought to the attention of the trial court in the following exchange:
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