State v. Hannon
| Decision Date | 20 December 2001 |
| Docket Number | No. C0-00-2013.,C0-00-2013. |
| Citation | 636 N.W.2d 796 |
| Parties | STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Kevin Terrance HANNON, Appellant. |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Leslie J. Rosenberg, Asst. State Public Defender, Minneapolis, for appellant.
James B. Early, Asst. Atty. Gen., St. Paul, Roger S. Van Heel, Stearns County Atty., St. Cloud, for respondent.
Heard, considered, and decided by the court en banc.
On June 20, 2000, a jury found appellant Kevin Terrance Hannon guilty of one count of premeditated first-degree murder, two counts of felony murder (kidnapping), one count of felony murder (arson), and one count of second-degree intentional murder. Appellant argues, among other things, that his federal and state constitutional rights were violated because the interrogating officers failed to cease the interrogation after appellant invoked his Miranda rights.1 As to this issue, we must decide whether the trial court clearly erred in finding that appellant made an equivocal request for counsel when, after the interrogating officers told the appellant that they believed he had killed Deborah Tolhurst, appellant stated "Can I have a drink of water and then lock me up—I think we really should have an attorney." For the reasons stated herein, we reverse and remand for a new trial.
Around 9:00 p.m. on September 21, 1999, a security guard working at the Clearwood Park Apartments located in St. Cloud, Minnesota, noticed black smoke rolling out of a window of apartment 304. The security guard immediately notified the police department and then went into the apartment building. After arriving in front of the door of apartment 304, the security guard was able to observe smoke coming from underneath the door. He pounded on the door and yelled to see if anyone was inside the apartment but received no response. The security guard then discovered that the door was unlocked and opened the door in an attempt to enter the apartment, but was unable to enter because he was immediately overcome by the smoke.
Firefighters arrived at the scene shortly thereafter. The firefighters saw smoke and flames coming from the third floor window, proceeded to the third floor, and discovered that the hallway was filled with smoke from floor to ceiling. They moved down the hallway with a fire hose and entered apartment 304. Once in the apartment, the firefighters located the fire, which was coming out of the bedroom along the ceiling and into the living room. They proceeded to spray water at the fire and then entered the bedroom, at which point one of the firefighters noticed a body lying on the floor in the bedroom. After the fire was extinguished, firefighters and police officers determined that the badly burned body was lying face down, with the victim's arms crossed at the wrists behind the victim's back just above the belt line. The victim was ultimately identified as Deborah Tolhurst.
After the fire was put out, the police received information that appellant lived in apartment 304 with Tolhurst and began looking for him. At around 6:45 p.m. on the next day, officers arrived at the Germaine Towers in downtown St. Cloud and asked the caretaker if he recognized appellant from the picture the officers showed him. The caretaker told the officers that he believed appellant was in the apartment of one of his tenants. The officers went to this apartment and found appellant hiding in the bedroom. He was then arrested and transported to the Stearns County Law Enforcement Center.
A detective with the Stearns County Sheriff's Department and an officer with the St. Cloud Police Department began interrogating appellant immediately after his arrest. They read appellant his Miranda rights and he signed a document indicating that he understood these rights. The officers then began questioning appellant. One of the officers told appellant that he smelled like alcohol and asked appellant if he was drunk. Appellant admitted that he had a couple of drinks, but told the officers that he did not believe he was drunk.
He initially explained that he lived with Tolhurst and claimed that the last time he saw her was around 5:30 p.m. on September 21, 1999 in her apartment. Appellant told the officers that he arrived at Tolhurst's apartment between 9:00 and 9:30 a.m. on September 21 after working all night. He then stated that Tolhurst's brother and another man named Paul Mackey came to Tolhurst's apartment around 6:00 or 7:00 p.m. Appellant told the officers that Tolhurst told him to leave and that he then went to a bar nearby named J.D. Beamer's.
The officers then confronted appellant with information they had obtained from other people in the apartment complex about hearing appellant and Tolhurst engaged in a heated argument during the afternoon of September 21. Appellant admitted to arguing some with Tolhurst that day, but told the officers he did not remember it being a heated argument. As the officers questioned appellant, he repeatedly indicated that he did not know what the officers were talking to him about. After the officers finally told appellant that Tolhurst was dead, the following exchange took place:
(Emphasis added.) The interrogation continued and appellant made numerous statements regarding his involvement in Tolhurst's death. Specifically, appellant admitted to hitting and kicking Tolhurst multiple times, knocking Tolhurst out, putting duct tape around her legs, and lighting a paper bag on fire and throwing it on top of her while stating "You need to burn, you bitch." Appellant told the officers that he put the duct tape around Tolhurst's legs because she was kicking him. He also said that he only wanted to scare her when he lit the bag on fire and immediately patted the fire out. All of these admissions were recorded on videotape.
Appellant then gave a formal statement to the interrogating officers. He was not read his Miranda rights again before this statement was taken. In this formal statement, appellant again admitted to hitting and kicking Tolhurst multiple times, knocking her out, putting duct tape on her feet and mouth, and throwing a burning paper bag on her. He also admitted to grabbing Tolhurst by the throat, cutting telephone lines in Tolhurst's apartment, and throwing the white shirt he had on when he was fighting with Tolhurst into the back of a pick-up truck parked outside of J.D. Beamer's, the bar he went to after leaving Tolhurst's apartment. The majority of this formal statement was videotaped, with the end of it being audiotaped after the videotape ran out. Appellant was subsequently indicted on four counts of first-degree murder and one count of second-degree intentional murder.
On February 17, 2000, an omnibus hearing was held to consider appellant's motion to suppress the admission of all statements made after he requested an attorney and indicated that he did not want to talk anymore on the grounds that the police violated appellant's right to counsel and his right to remain silent. The trial court concluded that, "[appellant's] poorly enunciated statement, `[c]an I have a drink of water and then lock me up I think we really should have an attorney,' is, if anything, an equivocal request for an attorney." Citing State v. Robinson, 427 N.W.2d 217, 223 (Minn.1988), the court recognized that, since there was an equivocal request for counsel, the investigating officers were required to stop asking any more questions except those narrowly tailored to clarify appellant's true desire with respect to counsel. The court concluded that, while the detective's comment to appellant that his side of the story would never be known if he wanted to talk to an attorney was gratuitous and approached impermissible interrogation, it was still "narrowly designed to clarify [appellant's] wishes with respect to counsel." The court went on to find:
The Defendant did not indicate that he wanted an attorney at that juncture. Instead, he reinitiated the conversation by asking [the detective] a question of his own. The Court concludes that [the detective] could then respond to the Defendant's inquiries and continue on with the interrogation. The Defendant's re-initiation of the conversation, together with his choice not to respond to [the...
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...v. Thaggard, 527 N.W.2d 804 (Minn.1995). In 2001, only one case addressed the validity of a Miranda warning and waiver. State v. Hannon, 636 N.W.2d 796 (Minn.2001). 2. Eleven states had already found recording was not required under their state due process clause prior to Scales: Colorado, ......
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