State v. Harris
| Decision Date | 29 May 2014 |
| Docket Number | No. 4-010 / 12-2139,4-010 / 12-2139 |
| Parties | STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CORTRAIL ANDRE HARRIS, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Iowa Court of Appeals |
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Black Hawk County, George L. Stigler and Todd A. Geer, Judges.
Defendant appeals his convictions, asserting he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. AFFIRMED.
Andrew B. Howie of Hudson, Mallaney, Shindler & Anderson, P.C., West Des Moines, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Bridget A. Chambers, Assistant Attorney General, Thomas J. Ferguson, County Attorney, and Brad Walz, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.
Heard by Danilson, C.J., and Potterfield and McDonald, JJ.
In this consolidated appeal of two separate criminal cases, Cortrail Harris appeals his convictions for possession of more than fifty grams of cocaine base with intent to deliver, and possession of crack cocaine, third offense, as well as his conviction for a drug tax stamp violation. He contends he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial in both cases. In one case, Harris maintains counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion to suppress following the execution of a search warrant. In both cases he also maintains counsel was ineffective for failing to timely assert that Harris was not mentally competent to stand trial or enter a plea. We conclude filing a motion to suppress would have been meritless, but we preserve Harris's ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims regarding his competency for postconviction relief. Finding no basis to disturb the convictions, we affirm.
On October 19, 2009, the State charged Harris with possession of crack cocaine, third offense, in violation of Iowa Code section 124.401(5)(c) (2009) (FECR164821).
On November 17, 2010, Officer Herkelman of the Tri-County Drug Enforcement Task Force obtained a warrant to search Harris' home. As a result of the search, the State charged Harris with possession with intent deliver more than fifty grams of crack cocaine, in violation of section 124.401(1), and a drug tax stamp violation, in violation of section 453B.12 (FECR172905).
On April 3, 2012, a jury trial on the November 2010 charges commenced. Harris was found guilty of both charges on April 6, 2012, and the court set trial on the habitual offender sentencing enhancements for May 8, 2012. On the date scheduled for trial, Harris admitted to being a second offender and admitted to his prior felony convictions.
On June 5, 2012, Harris entered an Alford plea1 regarding the October 2009 charge for possession of crack cocaine, third offense. Three days later Harris filed a motion in arrest of judgment, asserting he "suffers from bipolar disorder, schizophrenia, and mental retardation, and as a result, did not fully understand the legal consequences of his guilty plea or that his plea was not made knowingly, voluntarily, or intelligently." On June 12, 2012, Harris filed an application for psychological examination to determine competency.
A hearing was held on the matter on July 6, 2012. The court stated:
I have had, during the trial, an opportunity to observe Mr. Harris communicating rather extensively with [his attorney] and feel that he was able to assist in his defense. I think it's highly unlikely that it's going to be determined that Mr. Harris is incompetent, but I do believe it's appropriate at least to have him evaluated at this time.
The court then entered an order granting Harris' application. Because Harris had not been sentenced in either case, the court cross-filed its order for the competency evaluation and suspended all proceedings in both cases.
Harris underwent psychological evaluation on September 11, 2012. He was evaluated by both Dr. Arnold Andersen, M.D., and Dr. John Bayless, Ph.D.2 Both completed and filed separate reports, which were admitted and reviewed bythe court. Each concluded it was impossible to determine Harris' competency because of his lack of effort and intentional vagueness during the examination.
The court held a hearing to determine competency on October 29, 2012. In a written order, filed October 30, 2012, the court found Harris was competent to stand trial.
After the competency hearing but before sentencing, Harris filed a pro se motion in arrest of judgment in each of the cases. On November 19, 2012, the district court conducted a hearing on Harris' motions and overruled both of them. The court then imposed sentencing for both cases. In case FECR172905, for his conviction of possession with intent deliver more than fifty grams of crack cocaine, the court sentenced Harris to an indeterminate term of imprisonment not to exceed 150 years with a one-third minimum term. For the drug tax stamp violation, Harris was sentenced to an indeterminate term, not to exceed fifteen years, which the court set to run concurrently to the 150-year term. In case FECR164821, for his conviction of possession of crack cocaine, third offense, Harris was also sentenced to an indeterminate term of imprisonment not to exceed fifteen years; this term was also set to run concurrently. Harris appeals.
A defendant may raise an ineffective-assistance claim on direct appeal if he has reasonable grounds to believe the record is adequate for us to address the claim on direct appeal. State v. Straw, 709 N.W. 2d 128, 133 (Iowa 2006). If we determine the record is adequate, we may decide the claim. Id. We review claims for ineffective assistance of counsel de novo. State v. Rodriguez, 804N.W.2d 844, 848 (Iowa 2011). This is our standard because such claims have their basis in the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. State v. Clay, 824 N.W.2d 488, 494 (Iowa 2012).
The standard of review where the issue of the defendant's competency to stand trial is raised is de novo review, as constitutional rights are implicated. State v. Lyman, 776 N.W.2d 865, 873 (Iowa 2010).
To succeed on his claims, Harris must show by a preponderance of the evidence (1) his counsel failed to perform an essential duty and (2) prejudice resulted. See Rodriguez, 804 N.W.2d at 848. To prove counsel failed to perform an essential duty, Harris must show "counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness . . . under prevailing professional norms." See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984). In doing so, he must overcome "a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance." See id. at 689. Prejudice has resulted when "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Bowman v. State, 710 N.W.2d 200, 203 (Iowa 2006). We can affirm if either prong is absent and need not engage in both prongs of the analysis if one is lacking. See Everett v. State, 789 N.W.2d 151, 159 (Iowa 2010).
"Ineffective assistance of counsel claims are an exception to our normal rules of error preservation." Rodriguez, 804 N.W.2d at 848. We generally preserve ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims for postconviction reliefproceedings. State v. Utter, 803 N.W.2d 647, 651 (Iowa 2011). "Only in rare cases will the trial record alone be sufficient to resolve the claim on direct appeal." State v. Tate, 710 N.W.2d 237, 240 (Iowa 2006). We prefer to reserve such claims for development of the record and to allow trial counsel to defend against the charge. Id. If the record is inadequate to address the claim on direct appeal, we must preserve the claim for a postconviction-relief proceeding, regardless of the potential viability of the claim.3 State v. Johnson, 784 N.W.2d 192, 198 (Iowa 2010). We find the record adequate to address this issue in respect to the claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion to suppress.
Harris contends he received ineffective assistance because his trial attorney failed to file a motion to suppress. Harris claims the police obtained evidence through execution of a defective warrant. In support of this contention, Harris maintains his trial attorney should have challenged the existence of probable cause to support the warrant issued to search his home because "the warrant potentially lacked probable cause because the confidential information may not have been reliable." Counsel is not considered ineffective for failing to seek the suppression of admissible evidence. Love v. State, 543 N.W.2d 621, 623 (Iowa Ct. App. 1995). Thus, Harris must establish that the evidence was inadmissible. Here, Harris has not identified any reasons why the confidentialinformant may not have been reliable or that the application did not otherwise support a finding of probable cause. Notwithstanding, we will examine the record to determine if the general allegations have merit.
Probable cause to search requires a probability determination that "(1) the items sought are connected to criminal activity and (2) the items sought will be found in the place to be searched." United States v. Edmiston, 46 F.3d 786, 789 (8th Cir. 1995); see State v. Weir, 414 N.W.2d 327, 330 (Iowa 1987). The issuing judge "is simply to make a practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, including the 'veracity' and 'basis of knowledge' of persons supplying hearsay information," probable cause exists. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983); accord State v. Hennon, 314 N.W.2d 405, 407 (Iowa 1982). In doing so, the judge may rely on "reasonable, common sense inferences" from the information presented. See State v. Green, 540 N.W.2d 649, 655 (Iowa 1997). "The same approach is followed in determining whether evidence seized pursuant to a warrant must be suppressed; the affidavit of probable cause is interpreted in a common sense, rather than a hypertechnical, manner." State v. Gogg, 561 N.W.2d...
To continue reading
Request your trial