State v. Hoffman
| Decision Date | 13 May 2009 |
| Docket Number | No. 04-08-00614-CR.,No. 04-08-00615-CR.,04-08-00614-CR.,04-08-00615-CR. |
| Parties | The STATE of Texas, Appellant, v. Amanda Marie HOFFMAN, Appellee. |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
Lucy Wilke, Assistant District Attorney-216th Judicial District, Kerrville, TX, for Appellant.
Robert Hennecke, Kerrville, TX, for Appellee.
Sitting: REBECCA SIMMONS, Justice, STEVEN C. HILBIG, Justice, MARIALYN BARNARD, Justice.
Amanda Marie Hoffman was indicted for the offenses of tampering with physical evidence and possession of a controlled substance in the amount of over one gram but less than four grams. After conducting a pre-trial hearing, the trial court granted Hoffman's motion to suppress. In one issue on appeal, the State argues the trial court erred in granting Hoffman's motion to suppress because there was probable cause and exigent circumstances for the officers to conduct a warrantless search; therefore, no evidence was obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment of the United States and Texas Constitutions. We affirm the trial court's ruling.
On January 26, 2008, an officer received information from a confidential informant that Adam Triana was selling drugs from a room in the rear area of a certain motel. The confidential informant did not have firsthand personal knowledge of the selling but was advised of it by an unidentified third person. The officer did not have any information as to the credibility or reliability of the third person.
On January 28, 2008, Triana was arrested for Driving while License Suspended and Possession of Marihuana. While Triana was in jail, two investigators went to the motel where Triana stated he was living with Hoffman, his girlfriend. Hoffman was an employee of the motel and was provided a room in which to reside as part of her compensation. The investigators did not have a warrant.
When the investigators arrived at the motel, they met with Hoffman's boss, the motel manager, and asked her to assist them in walking up to Hoffman's room. As all three approached Hoffman's room with the motel manager in the lead, Hoffman exited her room and appeared to be speaking with someone on the floor below over a railing outside her room. When the manager and investigators were about twenty feet from Hoffman's room, Hoffman saw them, stopped her conversation, and rushed back into her residence, leaving the door open. The investigators approached the door as fast as they could and heard the toilet flush. Although they had no information regarding Hoffman possessing any drugs, they immediately entered her room and performed a warrantless search. One of the investigators saw Hoffman standing over the toilet although he admitted the bathroom was dark. The investigator pulled Hoffman away from the toilet, reached inside the toilet, and removed a bag of crack cocaine. The investigators also found marijuana in the room and information identifying Triana as a possible occupant.
Hoffman was indicted for the offenses of tampering with physical evidence and possession of a controlled substance in the amount of over one gram but less than four grams. The trial court conducted a pre-trial hearing on Hoffman's motion to suppress, which was granted. This appeal followed.
In one issue, the State argues the trial court erred in granting Hoffman's motion to suppress evidence obtained during the search of Hoffman's residence.1 The State contends the search was valid because the officers had probable cause and there were exigent circumstances for them to enter the motel room and conduct a warrantless search. Therefore, no evidence was obtained in violation of any provisions of the Fourth Amendment of the United States and Texas Constitutions.
While the search of a residence without a warrant is presumptively invalid, some circumstances exist which justify a warrantless search. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980). Examples of these circumstances include when the police have probable cause coupled with an exigent circumstance, when they have obtained voluntary consent, or when the search is conducted incident to a lawful arrest. Gutierrez v. State, 221 S.W.3d 680, 685 (Tex. Crim.App.2007) (citing McGee v. State, 105 S.W.3d 609, 615 (Tex.Crim.App.2003)). In these situations, the Fourth Amendment endures a warrantless search. Id.
We review a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress under a bifurcated standard of review, giving almost complete deference to the trial court's findings of historical fact supported by the record and reviewing de novo the trial court's application of the law of search and seizure. Carmouche v. State, 10 S.W.3d 323, 327 (Tex. Crim.App.2000); Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 89 (Tex.Crim.App.1997). The Court of Criminal Appeals recently summarized the approach to be taken when examining the validity of a warrantless search:
To validate a warrantless search based on exigent circumstances, the State must satisfy a two-step process. First, there must be probable cause to enter or search a specific location. In the context of warrantless searches, probable cause exists "when reasonably trustworthy facts and circumstances within the knowledge of the officer on the scene would lead a man of reasonable prudence to believe that the instrumentality ... or evidence of a crime will be found." Second, an exigency that requires an immediate entry to a particular place without a warrant must exist.... If the State does not adequately establish both probable cause and exigent circumstances, then a warrantless entry will not withstand judicial scrutiny.
Gutierrez, 221 S.W.3d at 685-86 (citations omitted). The State argues the investigators had probable cause to conduct the search based on the information received from the confidential informant, coupled with the exigent circumstance of Hoffman quickly entering her residence after making eye contact with the investigators, and the subsequent sound of a flushing toilet.
As noted above, probable cause exists "when reasonably trustworthy facts and circumstances within the knowledge of the officer on the scene would lead a man of reasonable prudence to believe that the instrumentality ... or evidence of a crime will be found." See id. The same facts which give rise to probable cause may also be relevant to an analysis of exigent circumstances. See Parker v. State, 206 S.W.3d 593, 600-01 (Tex.Crim.App.2006). The State argues the investigators had knowledge of several facts supporting probable cause, including their awareness that Triana lived at the location, that Triana was a known drug dealer and/or user, and that Hoffman was his girlfriend or common-law wife. The State also notes the investigators' training and experience in these types of investigations led them to believe Hoffman's actions in suddenly stopping a conversation and entering her residence after spotting the officers, and the subsequent toilet flushing, provided both the probable cause and exigent circumstances needed to enter Hoffman's room without a warrant.
We find the State's argument unpersuasive. One of the investigators testified that at the time they visited the motel, they did not have probable cause to search Hoffman's room and were hoping to gather more information so that a search warrant could be obtained. In addition, while their suspicions centered around Triana, the investigators knew Triana was in custody at that time. Testimony revealed the investigators had no specific information regarding Hoffman possessing drugs that would have given them probable cause to enter her room and conduct a search. See Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 91, 100 S.Ct. 338, 62 L.Ed.2d 238 (1979) (); see also Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 372-73, 124 S.Ct. 795, 157 L.Ed.2d 769 (2003) (quoting Ybarra). Consequently, the investigators failed to establish the requisite probable cause necessary to justify a warrantless search of Hoffman's residence. Because probable cause was not present, we need not reach the second prong of the test requiring an exigent circumstance.
We initially note that one of the cases cited in the dissenting opinion is Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 120 S.Ct. 673, 145 L.Ed.2d 570 (2000). In Wardlow, however, the United States Supreme Court was analyzing whether reasonable suspicion justified a brief encounter between a citizen and a police officer on a public street. 528 U.S. at 123, 120 S.Ct. 673. The Court expressly recognized that "`reasonable suspicion' is a less demanding standard than probable cause." Id. In the instant case, we are addressing whether the more demanding standard of probable cause was satisfied when the investigators intruded into Hoffman's private residence.
The two cases the dissenting opinion primarily relies upon in its analysis are readily distinguishable from the instant case, and those factual distinctions are crucial to the holdings therein given that probable cause is determined from the totality of the circumstances. See Wiede v. State, 214 S.W.3d 17, 25 (Tex.Crim.App. 2007) (). First, in both Wadley and Arnold, the search or seizure in question occurred in a public place. See United States v. Wadley, 59 F.3d 510, 512 (5th Cir.1995) (); Arnold v. State, 831 S.W.2d 556, 557 (Tex.App.-Austin 1992, pet. ref'd) (nightclub). In the instant case, the investigators intruded into Hoffman's private residence, which is entitled to far greater Fourth Amendment protection than a parking lot or nightclub. As the United States Supreme Court has emphasized:
The Fourth Amendment protects the individual's privacy...
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