State v. Howard, 2007 Ohio 6331 (Ohio App. 11/27/2007)
| Decision Date | 27 November 2007 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 07CA2948. |
| Citation | 2007 Ohio 6331 |
| Parties | State of Ohio, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. David W. Howard, Jr., Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Ohio Court of Appeals |
Lori J. Rankin, Chillicothe, Ohio, for appellant.
Michael M. Ater, Ross County Prosecutor, and Matthew S. Schmidt, Assistant Ross County Prosecutor, Chillicothe, Ohio, for appellee.
DECISION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY
{¶1} David W. Howard, Jr. appeals his two felonious assault convictions after a jury trial in the Ross County Common Pleas Court. On appeal, Howard contends that the jury's finding that he did not act in self-defense, as to the male victim, was against the manifest weight of the evidence. Because substantial evidence supports the jury's verdict, we disagree. Howard next contends that the trial court ignored the doctrine of transferred intent of self-defense when it refused to give the self-defense instruction in the assault involving the female victim. Because, any error caused by the trial court's refusal to give the instruction did not prejudice Howard, we disagree. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
{¶2} In 2006, a Ross County Grand Jury indicted Howard on two counts of felonious assault. Howard entered not guilty pleas and the matter proceeded to a jury trial.
{¶3} At trial, the testimony established that the incident stemmed from Howard's drug manufacturing enterprise. Howard manufactured crystal meth for his use and the use of others. Beginning one evening and continuing into the morning of the next day, Howard and Marcus Horsley, along with others, partied by drinking alcohol and using meth and crack. It appears that various members of the party were shuttling back and forth from two nearby apartments. At one point during the party, Horsley got into an argument with Melissa Kuntz, and after a brief altercation, Horsley left the party with his girlfriend Andrea Seymour. However, Horsley and Seymour later returned to Kuntz's apartment looking for Howard and meth.
{¶4} A disagreement followed Horsley's return. Horsley wanted Howard to make more meth (or at least give him some). They went outside and Horsley knocked a jar of nearly finished drugs out of Howard's hand. Horsley claimed that he slapped the meth out of Howard's hand because he did not want him to consume it. The argument continued, and Seymour attempted to intervene and stop the argument.
{¶5} At this point, except for the blow to the jar, neither Horsley nor Howard threw any physical blows. Horsley did testify that he was going to "kick his ass." Seymour testified that the fight was just a lot cussing and yelling. According to Howard, he believed an attack was imminent and that Horsley had a scalpel. However, no one else witnessed Horsley with a scalpel at that time, though Kuntz testified that Horsley earlier threatened Howard by telling him he had a scalpel.
{¶6} The incident escalated when Howard opened a jar of "liquid fire," a drain cleaning acid used in the meth manufacturing process, and threw its contents on both Horsley and Seymour. The acid burned their flesh, ultimately requiring significant medical intervention. Howard fled and disposed of the empty bottle in a nearby parking lot.
{¶7} Officers ultimately apprehended and interviewed Howard. In the first interview, he denied throwing the bottle and claimed Horsley threw it. He also denied making meth. However, in the second interview, he admitted that he made meth. Howard originally stated that the scalpel had no purpose, but he testified that it was used in the manufacture and sale of the meth. He also claimed to have picked it up after he threw the acid on Horsley, who had just dropped it. He claimed to have hidden it in his jacket. Officers recovered his jacket but did not find the scalpel. Howard also admits that he was intoxicated at the time of the incident as a result of his use of various substances.
{¶8} At trial, Howard requested self-defense jury instructions for both of his felonious assault charges. The trial court, over Howard's objection, only gave the self-defense instruction for the felonious assault involving victim Horsley. The jury returned guilty verdicts for both counts of felonious assault. The trial court sentenced Howard accordingly.
{¶9} Howard appeals and asserts the following two assignments of error: I. "THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN VIOLATION OF MR. HOWARD'S RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW UNDER THE FIFTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND ARICLE I SECTION 16 OF THE OHIO CONSTITUTION IN UPHOLDING THE JURY'S VERDICTS WHEN THE VERDICTS WERE AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE." II. "THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN VIOLATION OF MR. HOWARD'S RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW UNDER THE FIFTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND ARICLE I SECTION 16 OF THE OHIO CONSTITUTION IN REFUSING TO GIVE A SELF-DEFENSE INSTRUCTION AS TO COUNT ONE OF THE INDICTMENT."
{¶10} In his first assignment of error, Howard contends that the verdict of felonious assault involving victim Horsley was against the manifest weight of the evidence. He does not dispute that the state proved the elements of felonious assault, but contends that he, in turn, proved that he acted in self-defense.
{¶11} An appellate court, when determining whether a criminal conviction is against the manifest weight of the evidence, "will not reverse a conviction where there is substantial evidence upon which the [trier of fact] could reasonably conclude that all the elements of an offense have been proven beyond a reasonable doubt." State v Eskridge (1988), 38 Ohio St.3d 56, paragraph two of the syllabus. See, also, State v. Smith, Pickaway App. No. 06CA7, 2007-Ohio-502, ¶41. We "must review the entire record, weigh the evidence and all reasonable inferences, consider the credibility of the witnesses, and determine whether, in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the trier of fact clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial granted." Smith at ¶ 41, citing State v. Garrow (1995), 103 Ohio App.3d 368, 370-71; Martin at 175. However, "[o]n the trial of a case, * * * the weight to be given the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses are primarily for the trier of the facts." State v. DeHass (1967), 10 Ohio St.2d 230, paragraph one of the syllabus.
{¶12} R.C. 2903.11(A)(1) provides that "[n]o person shall knowingly * * * [c]ause serious physical harm to another[.]" In Ohio, the affirmative defense of self-defense has three elements: (1) the defendant was not at fault in creating the violent situation, (2) the defendant had a bona fide belief that he was in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm and that his only means of escape was the use of force, and (3) that the defendant did not violate any duty to retreat or avoid the danger. State v. Williford (1990), 49 Ohio St.3d 247, 249, citing State v. Robbins (1979), 58 Ohio St.2d 74, paragraph two of the syllabus. The defendant must prove these three elements of self-defense by a preponderance of the evidence. Williford at 249.
{¶13} The level of force used to defend one's self must be "necessary and reasonable under the facts and circumstances of the case and in view of the danger apprehended." Martin v. Central Ohio Transit Auth. (1990), 70 Ohio App.3d 83, 93, see also City of Akron v. Dokes (1986), 31 Ohio App.3d 24, 25.
{¶14} Here, the record reveals two basic versions of the relevant events. According to the state's evidence, Horsley and Howard argued. They exchanged words. Horsley slapped a jar out of Howard's hand, which contained chemicals used to manufacture methamphetamine. Howard responded by grabbing a bottle of "liquid fire", i.e., a bottle of acidic drain cleaner, and threw the acid on Horsley and his girlfriend, Seymour. Seymour was not part of the argument. However, she intervened to try to calm Horsley. She tried to pull Horsley away and had her arm around him when Howard doused them with acid, causing severe chemical burns.
{¶15} According to the defense version, Horsley wanted drugs from Howard. Horsley had some sort of a knife (scalpel) or weapon on him when he threatened and struck Howard by knocking some drugs out of his hand. Then, in a split second, Howard doused Horsley with a chemical in self-defense. Howard immediately ran away because he was scared.
{¶16} The jury, as the trier of fact, heard these two different versions of the events. The trier of fact is free to credit the testimony of the state's witnesses and discredit the testimony of the defense witnesses, in whole or in part. The jury "is best able to view the witnesses and observe their demeanor, gestures, and voice inflections, and use these observations in weighing the credibility of proffered testimony." Seasons Coal Co. v. Cleveland (1984), 10 Ohio St.3d 77, 80. We will not intercede as long as the trier of fact has some factual and rational basis for its determination of credibility and weight.
{¶17} Here, because Howard admitted throwing the acid on Horsley, the jury only needed to determine whether Howard's actions were justified on the ground of self-defense. The record shows three plausible reasons why the jury might have reasonably rejected Howard's self-defense claim.
{¶18} First, the jury could have found that Howard was at fault in creating the violent situation. Howard claimed that Horsley had a scalpel, but no one found it. No one else saw the scalpel except Howard's sister, who failed to tell officers about it when they interviewed her. Howard claimed that after he threw the acid, the scalpel fell to the ground. He said that he picked it up and hid it in his jacket. However, the officers who recovered his jacket did not find it.
{¶19} Seymour saw the relevant events. The crux of her testimony was that Horsley postured and yelled to get drugs. She...
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...No. 23558, 2010 Ohio 4757, at ¶13; State v. Carter, Ross App. No. 10CA3169, 2010 Ohio 6316, at ¶50-51; but, see, State v. Howard, Ross App. No. 07CA2948, 2007 Ohio 6331, at ¶27 ("[T]he issue of whether an instruction is required presents a question of law for de novo review.").[*P71] R.C. 2......