State v. Hyatt, COA98-577.
Decision Date | 06 April 1999 |
Docket Number | No. COA98-577.,COA98-577. |
Citation | 513 S.E.2d 90,132 NC App. 697 |
Court | North Carolina Court of Appeals |
Parties | STATE of North Carolina v. Tony Ray HYATT, Defendant. |
Attorney General Michael F. Easley, by Special Deputy Attorney General Robert T. Hargett, for the State.
Appellate Defender Malcolm Ray Hunter, Jr., by Assistant Appellate Defender Charlesena Elliot Walker, Durham, for defendant-appellant.
On 10 January 1996, defendant Tony Ray Hyatt ("Hyatt") was indicted for possession of a firearm by a felon, driving with a revoked license, felonious driving while impaired, four counts of assault with a deadly weapon upon a government official, and six counts of being a habitual felon. Approximately five months thereafter, a public defender was appointed to represent Hyatt in Superior Court.
Following this inquiry, Hyatt signed the Waiver of Counsel form indicating, inter alia, that he had been fully informed of the charges against him, the nature of and the statutory punishment for each such charge and his right to assigned counsel. Thereafter, the trial court granted Hyatt's motion to withdraw counsel and continued the case until 9 September 1996.
However on that date, Hyatt again appeared in court without counsel and asked for another continuance. At that session, Hyatt's mother informed the trial court that she still awaited her Social Security payments which she intended on using to obtain private counsel. The trial court granted Hyatt a continuance until 7 October 1996 after explicitly warning Hyatt and his mother that "this is the last time we're going to continue this, so you have to understand that, okay?"
When Hyatt's case came to trial on 7 October 1996, Hyatt once again appeared without counsel. At that time, the following exchange occurred:
Thereafter, the trial court, without further inquiry, brought Hyatt's case to trial. Indeed, the court never asked Hyatt whether he wanted to withdraw his previous waiver of assigned counsel or wanted the assistance of standby counsel.
During the trial, Hyatt stated on numerous occasions that he didn't have a lawyer and didn't know how to proceed. For example, when asked whether he was going to provide evidence on his previously-filed motion to change venue, Hyatt responded, "I ain't got no lawyer, so I don't know how to go into that." Similarly, when Hyatt was asked whether he wanted to make an opening statement he stated, "I don't have an attorney, and I don't know what to say or how to go about it." Ultimately, Hyatt was convicted on all counts.
On appeal, Hyatt contends that the trial court committed plain error by allowing him to proceed pro se. Specifically, Hyatt's appeal contains two distinct issues: (I) Whether the trial court erred by failing to inquire into whether he needed or wanted counsel or by failing to grant him a continuance to obtain counsel, and, (II) Whether the trial court erred by allowing Hyatt to proceed pro se without ensuring that all constitutional and statutory standards were satisfied.
285 N.C. 595, 206 S.E.2d 866 (1974). Indeed, "[t]he burden of showing the change in the desire of the defendant for counsel rests upon the defendant." Id.
In the case sub judice, we are presented with the question of what actions a defendant must take to meet the aforementioned burden. We find it unnecessary to articulate any particular standard in this case because Hyatt failed to meet the threshold requirement of moving the trial court to withdraw his waiver. Admittedly, this threshold requirement has never explicitly been articulated by this Court or our Supreme Court. Nonetheless, a close reading of our prior cases demonstrates that our holding today—that a criminal defendant must move the court to withdraw his prior waiver of counsel—has been an implicit part of our jurisprudence.
disc. review denied, 292 N.C. 734, 235 S.E.2d 788 (1977).
In the case sub judice, it is undisputed that Hyatt voluntarily signed a Waiver of Counsel form. Moreover, during Hyatt's 7 October 1996 trial, Hyatt neither moved nor requested the trial court to withdraw his prior waiver. Rather, Hyatt simply stated that because he didn't have an attorney, he did not know how to question jurors or prepare an opening statement. These statements, though demonstrating Hyatt's lack of legal skills, do not equate to a motion or request to withdraw his previous waiver. Therefore, the trial court was not required to inquire into whether Hyatt wanted or needed counsel.
We note that the case sub judice is distinguishable from State v. Graham, 76 N.C.App. 470, 333 S.E.2d 547 and State v. McCrowre, 312 N.C. 478, 322 S.E.2d 775. In those cases, it was determined that the defendant was entitled to a new trial because the record showed that the defendant waived his right to appointed counsel, not to his right to all counsel. Specifically, in both cases "there is no evidence that defendant ever intended to proceed to trial without the assistance of some counsel." McCrowre, 312 N.C. at 480, 322 S.E.2d at 776-77; Graham, 76 N.C.App. at 475, 333 S.E.2d at 549. In this case, however, Hyatt explicitly informed the court that if he could not obtain private counsel he would "go with it by myself then." Thus, unlike the defendants in McCrowre and Graham who informed the trial court that they desired counsel, Hyatt led the trial court to believe that he was willing to undertake this case by himself. In sum, we hold that to obtain relief from a waiver of his right to counsel, a criminal defendant must move the court for withdrawal of the waiver. See Smith, 27 N.C.App. at 381,
219 S.E.2d at 279. In the case sub judice, Hyatt never moved the court to withdraw his waiver. Therefore, no further inquiry was required.
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