State v. J.C.

Citation372 N.C. 203,827 S.E.2d 280
Decision Date10 May 2019
Docket NumberNo. 405PA17,405PA17
Parties STATE of North Carolina v. J.C.
CourtNorth Carolina Supreme Court

Joshua H. Stein, Attorney General, by William P. Hart, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, and Adren L. Harris, Special Deputy Attorney General, for respondent-appellant.

Yoder Law PLLC, by Jason Christopher Yoder, for petitioner-appellee.

EARLS, Justice.

The petitioner, J.C., was granted an expunction of arrest, trial, and conviction records from a prior conviction and from previously dismissed charges pursuant to N.C.G.S. §§ 15A-145.5 and 15A-146, respectively. The statute authorizing expunction of his dismissed charges was first enacted in 1979 "to provide for the expunction of arrest and trial records of youthful offenders when charges are dismissed or when there are findings of not guilty." See Act of Feb. 20, 1979, Ch. 61, 1979 N.C. Sess. Laws 34. At issue here is the proper application of the statute authorizing expunction of his conviction, N.C.G.S. § 15A-145.5. This law was enacted in 2012 "to allow for expunction of nonviolent felonies or nonviolent misdemeanors after fifteen years for persons who have had no other convictions for felonies or misdemeanors other than traffic violations under the laws of the United States, this State, or any other jurisdiction, as recommended by the Legislative Research Commission." See Act of July 2, 2012, Ch. 191, 2011 N.C. Sess. Laws 901 (Reg. Sess. 2012).1 The statute authorizes a court to order that a person "be restored, in the contemplation of the law, to the status the person occupied before such arrest or indictment or information." N.C.G.S. § 15A-145.5(c) (Supp. 2018).

Previously the State has sought appellate review of expunction orders through petitions for writ of certiorari, which the Court of Appeals has allowed on several occasions. See State v. Frazier , 206 N.C. App. 306, 697 S.E.2d 467 (2010) (reversing grant of expunction when trial court erroneously applied statute to a conviction occurring before the effective date of the statute); In re Expungement for Kearney , 174 N.C. App. 213, 620 S.E.2d 276 (2005) (reversing order granting expunction of conviction and affirming expunction of dismissed charge); In re Robinson , 172 N.C. App. 272, 615 S.E.2d 884 (2005) (reversing erroneous expunction of multiple, unrelated offenses occurring over a period of years); In re Expungement for Spencer , 140 N.C. App. 776, 538 S.E.2d 236 (2000) (reversing order granting expunction to defendant who was over the age of twenty-one at the time of the offense).

For the first time, in this case the State seeks to appeal as a matter of right the trial court's order granting J.C.’s expunction with respect to his conviction for the offense of indecent liberties with a child. The Court of Appeals dismissed the State's appeal, holding the State had no right to appeal the expunction order. The State filed a petition for discretionary review with this Court, as well as a petition for writ of certiorari. We granted the State's petition for discretionary review to determine whether the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the State's appeal from an order granting expunction under N.C.G.S. § 15A-145.5. Because we conclude that the State does not have a right of appeal in orders granting expunctions under N.C.G.S. § 15A-145.5, we affirm the Court of Appeals’ decision.

Factual and Procedural Background

On 11 June 1987, petitioner pleaded guilty in Superior Court, Onslow County to one count of indecent liberties which occurred on 24 May 1986. In exchange for J.C.’s guilty plea, the State dismissed a second indecent liberties charge, as well as an incest charge. The trial court sentenced J.C. to a three-year term, which was suspended for three years subject to supervised probation. On 11 June 2015, J.C. filed a petition in Onslow County under N.C.G.S. § 15A-145.5 seeking expunction of the offense to which he pleaded guilty. J.C. also filed a petition seeking an expunction under N.C.G.S. §§ 15A-145(a) and 15A-146 regarding the two charges against him that were dismissed.

According to section 15A-145.5, a person who has been previously convicted of a "nonviolent felony" as defined in the statute may "file a petition, in the court of the county where [he] was convicted, for expunction of [the] ... conviction from the person's criminal record if [he] has no other misdemeanor or felony convictions, other than a traffic violation." N.C.G.S. § 15A-145.5(c). The statute contains a number of conditions, including that the qualifying offense not have been:

(1) A Class A through G felony ....
(2) An offense that includes assault as an essential element of the offense.
(3) An offense requiring registration pursuant to Article 27A of Chapter 14 of the General Statutes, whether or not the person is currently required to register.
(4) Any of the following sex-related or stalking offenses: G.S. 14-27.25(b), 14-27.30(b), 14-190.7, 14-190.8, 14-190.9, 14-202, 14-208.11A, 14-208.18, 14-277.3, 14-277.3A, 14-321.1.
....
(7) An offense under G.S. 14-401.16.
....
(8) Any felony offense in which a commercial motor vehicle was used in the commission of the offense.

Id. § 15A-145.5(a)(1)-(8) (Supp. 2018). In the affidavit accompanying his petition, J.C. asserted that the felony for which he was convicted "[wa]s a Class H felony" which "did not include assault as an essential element of the offense" and "does not require registration pursuant to Article 27A of Chapter 14." Petitioner averred that his conviction also did not fall under N.C.G.S. § 15A-145.5(a)(4), (a)(7), or (a)(8).

On 8 August 2016, Judge Mary Ann Tally granted both petitions for expunction pursuant to N.C.G.S §§ 15A-145.5 and 15A-146 and ordered that the offenses be removed from J.C.’s record. On 23 August 2016, Judge Tally entered both orders for expunction, after which the State appealed the order expunging J.C.’s conviction records to the Court of Appeals. On 19 September 2017, the Court of Appeals dismissed the State's appeal. County of Onslow v. J.C. , ––– N.C. App. ––––, 805 S.E.2d 360 (2017). The court then allowed the State's petition for rehearing and on 7 November 2017, issued an opinion dismissing the State's appeal and denying the State's petition for writ of certiorari. County of Onslow v. J.C. , ––– N.C. App. ––––, 808 S.E.2d 154, 155-56 (2017). On appeal, the State challenged only the order granting defendant an expunction for his conviction pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 15A-145.5 and made no argument regarding the expunction under N.C.G.S. § 15A-146. Id. at ––––, 808 S.E.2d at 155. In its opinion the Court of Appeals unanimously concluded that the State had no statutory right to appeal the expunction order and that when the State fails to demonstrate its right to appeal, the appellate court lacks jurisdiction over the matter. Id. at ––––, 808 S.E.2d at 155. On 27 November 2017, the State petitioned this Court for discretionary review and for writ of certiorari. This Court issued a special order allowing the State's request for discretionary review on 14 August 2018.

Analysis

This case of first impression requires us to apply the plain language of the statutory framework established by the General Assembly for the expunction of certain criminal record information. Questions of statutory interpretation, like questions of law, are reviewed de novo. In re D.S. , 364 N.C. 184, 187, 694 S.E.2d 758, 760 (2010) (citation omitted). "As a general rule the prosecution cannot appeal or bring error proceedings from a judgment in favor of the defendant in a criminal case, in the absence of a statute clearly conferring that right." State v. Harrell , 279 N.C. 464, 466, 183 S.E.2d 638, 640 (1971) (quoting State v. Vaughan , 268 N.C. 105, 108, 150 S.E.2d 31, 33 (1966) ).

The statute at issue here designates a petition for an expunction as "a motion in the cause in the case wherein the petitioner was convicted."

N.C.G.S. § 15A-145.5(c)(3). Considering the statute's plain language, an expunction petition is part of the underlying criminal proceeding, making expunctions criminal matters. "The right of the State to appeal in a criminal case is statutory, and statutes authorizing an appeal by the State in criminal cases are strictly construed." State v. Elkerson , 304 N.C. 658, 669, 285 S.E.2d 784, 791 (1982) (citations omitted). This Court has recognized that "[t]he only statutory authority we find which permits an appeal by the State in a criminal case is contained in G.S. 15A-1445." Id. at 669, 285 S.E.2d at 791. In a criminal case the State may appeal only under the following circumstances:

(1) When there has been a decision or judgment dismissing criminal charges as to one or more counts.
(2) Upon the granting of a motion for a new trial on the ground of newly discovered or newly available evidence but only on questions of law.
(3) When the State alleges that the sentence imposed:
a. Results from an incorrect determination of the defendant's prior record level under G.S. 15A-1340.14 or the defendant's prior conviction level under G.S. 15A-1340.21 ;
b. Contains a type of sentence disposition that is not authorized by G.S. 15A-1340.17 or G.S. 15A-1340.23 for the defendant's class of offense and prior record or conviction level;
c. Contains a term of imprisonment that is for a during not authorized by G.S. 15A-1340.17 or G.S. 15A-1340.23 for the defendant's class of offense and prior record or conviction level; or
d. Imposes an intermediate punishment pursuant to G.S. 15A-1340.13(g) based on findings of extraordinary mitigating circumstances that are not supported by evidence or are insufficient as a matter of law to support the dispositional deviation.
(b) The State may appeal an order by the superior court granting a motion to suppress as provided in G.S. 15A-979.

N.C.G.S. § 15A-1445 (2017). Because section 15A-1445 is to be strictly construed, any deviations from or additions to the orders or rulings appealable by the State must be authorized by the...

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