State v. Jackson

• Decision Date: 25 November 2020
• Docket Number: No. SC20-257,SC20-257
• Citation: 306 So.3d 936
• Parties: STATE of Florida, Petitioner, v. Michael James JACKSON, Respondent.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

306 So.3d 936

STATE of Florida, Petitioner,

v.Michael James JACKSON, Respondent.

No. SC20-257

Supreme Court of Florida.

November 25, 2020

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Stephen D. Ake, Senior Assistant Attorney General, William David Chappell and Michael Kennett, Assistant Attorneys General, Tallahassee, Florida, for Petitioner

Marie-Louise Samuels Parmer and Maria DeLiberato of Parmer DeLiberato, P.A., Tampa, Florida, for Respondent

PER CURIAM.

Petitioner, the State of Florida, has invoked this Court's authority to issue all writs necessary to the complete exercise of its jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(7), Fla. Const. Citing this Court's ultimate jurisdiction under article V, section 3(b)(1) of the Florida Constitution, the State petitions this Court for an extraordinary writ that would direct the circuit court to dismiss a resentencing proceeding and reinstate two previously vacated death sentences for Respondent, Michael James Jackson. Alternatively, the State petitions this Court for a writ of prohibition, see art. V, § 3(b)(7), Fla. Const., that would bar the circuit court from conducting the resentencing.

The issue undergirding the State's petition is whether a death sentence that was vacated by the postconviction court can be "reinstated" if the State never appealed the final order granting relief, the resentencing has not yet taken place, and this Court has since receded from the decisional law on which the sentence was vacated. See Hurst v. State , 202 So. 3d 40 (Fla. 2016), receded from in part by State v. Poole , 297 So. 3d 487 (Fla. 2020). Because the State's arguments that we should answer that question in the affirmative are flawed, we deny the State's all writs petition and alternative petition for writ of prohibition.

I. BACKGROUND

Hurst and Poole

In Hurst , this Court on remand from Hurst v. Florida , 577 U.S. 92, 136 S.Ct. 616, 193 L.Ed.2d 504 (2016), held

that before the trial judge may consider imposing a sentence of death, the jury in a capital case must unanimously and expressly find all the aggravating factors that were proven beyond a reasonable doubt, unanimously find that the aggravating factors are sufficient to impose death, unanimously find that the aggravating factors outweigh the mitigating circumstances, and unanimously recommend a sentence of death.

Hurst , 202 So. 3d at 57. After determining that the defendant's sentencing proceeding involved constitutional error that "was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt," this Court in Hurst "remand[ed] for a new penalty phase." Id. at 45. Subsequent to Hurst , this Court in Mosley v. State , 209 So. 3d 1248, 1283 (Fla. 2016), held "that Hurst should be applied retroactively to" defendants whose sentences became final after Ring v. Arizona , 536 U.S. 584, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002).

In Poole , the postconviction court, based on Hurst , set aside the defendant's death sentence. Poole , 297 So. 3d at 491. The State timely appealed the postconviction court's order, arguing that Poole, who was convicted not just of first-degree murder but also of attempted first-degree murder, armed burglary, sexual battery, and armed robbery, "suffered no constitutional deprivation in his sentencing proceeding," and requesting that this Court "reexamine and partially recede from Hurst ." Id. Recognizing that Hurst had misinterpreted Hurst v. Florida , this Court in Poole "recede[d] from Hurst v. State except to the extent that it held that a jury must unanimously find the existence of a statutory aggravating circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. And in reversing the portion of the order that set aside the death sentence, we explained that the jury's unanimous finding that Poole committed other violent felonies during the course of the first-degree murder "satisfied the requirement that a jury unanimously find a statutory aggravating circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at 508.¹

This Case

Jackson was convicted by a jury of the robberies, kidnappings, and murders of James and Carol Sumner. Jackson v. State , 18 So. 3d 1016, 1020 (Fla. 2009). "[T]he jury recommended death sentences for the murders of both victims by votes of eight to four." Id. at 1024. "The trial court found eight aggravating circumstances," including that "Jackson had been previously convicted of another capital felony because the murders occurred contemporaneously" and that the murders "were committed while Jackson was engaged in the felony of kidnapping." Id. The trial court "imposed a sentence of death for each of the murders." Id. On direct appeal, we affirmed Jackson's convictions and sentences. Id. at 1036. In 2013, we affirmed the denial of Jackson's initial postconviction motion filed under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851, and we denied Jackson's habeas petition. Jackson v. State , 127 So. 3d 447, 477 (Fla. 2013).

On February 27, 2017, Jackson filed a successive postconviction motion seeking Hurst relief. The postconviction court granted Jackson a new penalty phase, and the State did not appeal the order granting relief. Jackson's new penalty phase was scheduled to begin on February 24, 2020.

On February 4, 2020, the State sought to apply the holding in Poole to Jackson's case by filing a motion below requesting that the circuit court dismiss the resentencing proceeding "and maintain [Jackson's] sentence[s] of death," given, among other things, Jackson's contemporaneous convictions for other qualifying felonies. The circuit court denied the State's motion, reasoning that it "lack[ed] jurisdiction to reconsider" the final order that vacated Jackson's death sentences. The circuit court in relevant part explained:

The time in which to appeal the June 9, 2017 Order has passed and, as such, it is a final order that this Court cannot rescind or dismiss. See Taylor v. State , 140 So. 3d 526, 529 (Fla. 2014) ; Simmons v. State , 274 So. 3d 468, 470 (Fla. 1st DCA 2019) ("Because the order granting resentencing became final when neither party moved for rehearing or appealed the order, the trial court had no authority to enter a second order rescinding the original order.").

On February 20, 2020, the State filed with this Court the Emergency All Writs Petition and Petition for Writ of Prohibition as well as a motion to stay the resentencing proceedings. We granted the motion to stay and requested that Jackson respond to the State's petition. Jackson timely filed a response. Oral argument was held on June 2, 2020.

II. ALL WRITS PETITION

In its all writs petition, the State asks this Court to direct the circuit court to reinstate Jackson's death sentences. In the alternative, the State asks this Court to direct the circuit court to consider the State's motion below and to disregard Simmons , a decision on which the circuit court in part relied and from which the First District has since receded en banc in Rogers v. State , 296 So. 3d 500 (Fla. 1st DCA 2020). Both requests are grounded in the notion that the circuit court has the inherent authority to reconsider the final order that vacated Jackson's sentences. But the State fails to establish that any such authority exists. Therefore, even assuming the all writs provision could be used to grant the type of relief requested, we deny the State's petition.

In the end, the State provides no relevant authority to support its assertion that a final order that disposes of a rule 3.851 motion by granting a new penalty phase is in substance a nonfinal, interlocutory order. Although a "trial court retains inherent authority to reconsider and, if deemed appropriate, alter or retract any of its nonfinal rulings prior to entry of the final judgment or order terminating an action," Silvestrone v. Edell , 721 So. 2d 1173, 1175 (Fla. 1998), here the State erroneously assumes that a postconviction proceeding is a step in the criminal prosecution and that a resentencing proceeding is a continuation of a postconviction proceeding. Our caselaw says otherwise.

We begin our analysis by briefly addressing our jurisdiction to entertain the all writs petition. We then examine the relevant rules of procedure and decisions from this Court, including Taylor and State v. Owen , 696 So. 2d 715 (Fla. 1997) ( Owen II ). We next explain why neither Simmons nor Rogers is relevant. Lastly, we address McCoy v. State , No. SC20-427 (Fla. notice of appeal filed Mar. 23, 2020), a pending case in which the circuit court under similar circumstances reinstated the defendant's death sentence in the wake of Poole , and we explain why the circuit court there erred.

Jurisdiction

This Court "[m]ay issue ... all writs necessary to the complete exercise of its jurisdiction." Art. V, § 3(b)(7), Fla. Const. "[T]he all writs provision does not constitute a separate source of original or appellate jurisdiction" but instead "operates as an aid to the Court in exercising its ‘ultimate jurisdiction,’ conferred elsewhere in the constitution." Williams v. State , 913 So. 2d 541, 543 (Fla. 2005). The use of the all writs provision "is restricted to preserving jurisdiction that has already been invoked or protecting jurisdiction that likely will be invoked in the future." Roberts v. Brown , 43 So. 3d 673, 677 (Fla. 2010).

The State cites as the independent basis for jurisdiction article V, section 3(b)(1), under which we have exclusive jurisdiction to "hear appeals from final judgments of trial courts imposing the death penalty." Jackson counters that "this Court's ultimate jurisdiction over death penalty cases is not in jeopardy."

We conclude that an independent jurisdictional basis exists. Indeed, we are preserving our jurisdiction under article V, section 3(b)(1) to decide an issue—one that is "unique to capital cases or to the death sentence itself," State v. Preston , 376 So. 2d 3, 4 (Fla. 1979) —that is already before this Court on direct appeal and that has resulted in at least one vacated death sentence being reinstated by a circuit court in the absence of a resentencing...