State v. Johnson
| Decision Date | 01 May 2014 |
| Docket Number | No. 88683–I.,88683–I. |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
| Parties | STATE of Washington, Petitioner/Cross Respondent, v. J.C. JOHNSON, Respondent/Cross Petitioner. |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
James Morrissey Whisman, King County Prosecutor's Office, Seattle, WA, for Petitioner.
Casey Grannis, Nielsen Broman & Koch, PLLC, Seattle, WA, for Respondent.
¶ 1 J.C. Johnson 1 was convicted of five crimes related to several days of ongoing domestic violence against his wife. We review two holdings by the Court of Appeals. First, the Court of Appeals overturned Johnson's unlawful imprisonment conviction because the State did not include the definition of “restrain” in the information charging him with the crime. We reverse the Court of Appeals and reinstate Johnson's conviction because charging documents need contain only the essential elements of a crime, not related definitions. Second, the Court of Appeals agreed with Johnson that it was error to give a jury instruction on the generic definition of “reckless” for the charge of assault in the second degree but held that his counsel was not ineffective for proposing it because no court had yet ruled on the issue. On this issue, we affirm the Court of Appeals but for a different reason. It is not error to instruct the jury on the generic definition of “reckless” as long as the jury is also given a “to convict” instruction that lists every element of the crime the State needs to prove in order to convict the defendant, including the charge-specific language for “reckless.”
¶ 2 A jury convicted Johnson for acts of domestic violence against his wife, J.J.2 For three days Johnson kept J.J. in their apartment under his control. Johnson would not let her get dressed while inside, and she only went out of the apartment accompanied by him. At times, Johnson used his 130–pound Rottweiler to restrain her movements. J.J. testified that he kept a knife and an ice pick near the bed to intimidate her. J.J. also testified that she did not feel free to leave, in part, because he threatened to hurt her children from a previous marriage.
¶ 3 During those three days, Johnson severely injured J.J. He choked her on multiple occasions. J.J. testified that he also hit her with rocks and allowed his Rottweiler to bite her. J.J. also testified that he grabbed her and slammed her down so that she hit her neck. Johnson admitted at trial that he “shoved her hard” and she fell and hit her head. Report of Proceedings (Dec. 14, 2010) at 33–34.
¶ 4 J.J. finally escaped after Johnson threatened to kill her by suffocating her with duct tape. J.J. ran from the house in her underwear when he turned his back on her and found help from a neighbor. J.J. received treatment for her injuries, which included dog bites, bruises, and severe swelling—especially around her face and throat.
¶ 5 The State charged Johnson with five crimes, including unlawful imprisonment and second degree assault for intentionally assaulting another and thereby recklessly inflicting substantial bodily harm. The jury convicted Johnson on all counts and Johnson appealed. The Court of Appeals held that the information for the unlawful imprisonment charge was insufficient because it left out the definition of “restrain.” State v. Johnson, 172 Wash.App. 112, 136–40, 297 P.3d 710 (2012). The court also held that the jury instruction defining “reckless” for the assault charge improperly lowered the State's burden of proof, but defense counsel was not deficient for proposing it. Id. at 133, 297 P.3d 710. We granted review of those two issues only. State v. Johnson, 178 Wash.2d 1001, 308 P.3d 642 (2013).
¶ 6 1. Was the information for the unlawful imprisonment charge sufficient even though it did not include the definition of “restrain?”
¶ 7 2. Did defense counsel provide ineffective assistance by proposing a definition of “reckless” in the jury instructions that did not include charge-specific language when the “to convict” instruction included the specific language?
¶ 8 Johnson challenges the sufficiency of the information on constitutional grounds. “We review allegations of constitutional violations de novo.” State v. Siers, 174 Wash.2d 269, 273–74, 274 P.3d 358 (2012). He also challenges the jury instructions in his case. “We review jury instructions de novo.” State v. Levy, 156 Wash.2d 709, 721, 132 P.3d 1076 (2006).
¶ 9 In criminal cases, the accused has the constitutional right to know the charges against them. U.S. CONST. amend. VI; WASH. CONST. art. I, § 22. The State formally gives notice of the charges in the information, also known as the charging document. SeeCrR 2.1(a)(1) ().
¶ 10 The information is constitutionally sufficient “only if all essential elements of a crime, statutory and nonstatutory, are included in the document.” State v. Vangerpen, 125 Wash.2d 782, 787, 888 P.2d 1177 (1995). “ ‘An essential element is one whose specification is necessary to establish the very illegality of the behavior charged.’ ” State v. Zillyette, 178 Wash.2d 153, 158, 307 P.3d 712 (2013) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v. Ward, 148 Wash.2d 803, 811, 64 P.3d 640 (2003)). This essential elements rule exists “to apprise the accused of the charges against him or her and to allow the defendant to prepare a defense.” Vangerpen, 125 Wash.2d at 787, 888 P.2d 1177. If the State fails to allege every essential element, then the information is insufficient and the charge must be dismissed without prejudice. State v. Nonog, 169 Wash.2d 220, 226 n. 3, 237 P.3d 250 (2010).
¶ 11 Johnson was charged with unlawful imprisonment under former RCW 9A.40.040 (1975). That statute reads, “A person is guilty of unlawful imprisonment if he knowingly restrains another person.” Former RCW 9A.40.040. The information at issue in this case reads as follows:
And I, Daniel T. Satterberg, Prosecuting Attorney aforesaid further do accuse J.C. JOHNSON of the crime of Unlawful Imprisonment—Domestic Violence, based on a series of acts connected together with another crime charged herein, committed as follows:
That the defendant J.C. JOHNSON in King County, Washington, during a period of time intervening between May 4, 2009 through May 6, 2009, did knowingly restrain [J.J.], a human being;
Contrary to RCW 9A.40.040, and against the peace and dignity of the State of Washington.
Clerk's Papers (CP) at 18. Johnson argues that the information is deficient because it does not include the statutory definition of “restrain.” “Restrain” is defined as “to restrict a person's movements without consent and without legal authority in a manner which interferes substantially with his liberty.” Former RCW 9A.40.010(1) (1975).
¶ 12 Johnson relies on State v. Warfield, 103 Wash.App. 152, 157, 5 P.3d 1280 (2000), where the Court of Appeals held that the term “knowingly” in the unlawful imprisonment statute modifies every aspect of the term “restrain.” Thus, the court held that the State must prove that the defendant knew that the restraint was (1) without consent and (2) without legal authority, in a manner that interfered substantially with the victim's liberty. Id. Johnson argues that this definition is an essential element of the crime that must appear in the information because the State must prove that he knew that he lacked legal authority to restrain the victim. We disagree.
¶ 13 The State need not include definitions of elements in the information. It was enough that the State alleged all of the essential elements found in the unlawful imprisonment statute, former RCW 9A.40.040. We have never held that the information must also include definitions of essential elements. In fact, we have rejected similar arguments before.
¶ 14 In State v. Allen, 176 Wash.2d 611, 626–27, 294 P.3d 679 (2013), the defendant was charged with felony harassment under RCW 9A.46.020, which makes it a crime to “knowingly threaten[ ] ... [t]o cause bodily injury.” RCW 9A.46.020(1)(a)(i). The State did not include in the information the constitutional limitation that only true threats may be charged, and the defendant argued that this omission was error. Allen, 176 Wash.2d at 626–27, 294 P.3d 679. We disagreed. Importantly, we noted, “We have never held the true threat requirement to be an essential element of a harassment statute.” Id. at 628, 294 P.3d 679. Rather, “ ‘the constitutional concept of “true threat” merely defines and limits the scope of the essential threat element in the felony telephone harassment statute and is not itself an essential element of the crime.’ ” Id. at 630, 294 P.3d 679 (quoting State v. Tellez, 141 Wash.App. 479, 484, 170 P.3d 75 (2007)). Thus, we found no error in the information that did not include the “true threat” concept. Id.
¶ 15 The reasoning in Allen applies to this case. Like the “true threat” concept, the definition of “restrain” defines and limits the scope of the essential elements. That does not make the definition itself an essential element that must be included in the information. In this case, the information included all of the essential elements, and therefore we hold that it was constitutionally sufficient.3
¶ 16 Johnson argues that the definition of “restrain” expands rather than limits the scope of the mens rea element because the State must prove that the defendant knew that the restraint was without legal authority. That argument relies entirely on the Court of Appeals' holding in Warfield. We take this opportunity to examine that case further.
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