State v. Jones, Docket No. 36001 (Idaho App. 3/30/2010)
| Decision Date | 30 March 2010 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. 36001. |
| Parties | STATE OF IDAHO, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. JERAD D. JONES, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Idaho Court of Appeals |
Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial District, State of Idaho, Kootenai County. Hon. John P. Luster, District Judge.
Order of the district court denying motion to suppress, affirmed.
Molly J. Huskey, State Appellate Public Defender; Justin M. Curtis, Deputy Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant.
Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; John C. McKinney, Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for respondent.
THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED OPINION AND SHALL NOT BE CITED AS AUTHORITY
Jerad D. Jones appeals from the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress. We affirm.
Pursuant to a probation agreement, probation officers Shrum and Beamer arrived at the apartment of a probationer to conduct a search. The probation officers asked Jones, who answered the door, if the probationer was there, stating that they were conducting a probation search. Jones stated that the probationer was not there and did not object to the search. Upon entering, they smelled marijuana and observed burnt "joints" in an ashtray on the living room floor. A police officer was called to assist but did not arrive for about twenty-five minutes. Shrum asked Jones to sit on the couch and he monitored him as Beamer conducted a search of the apartment. Beamer found a potato made into a pipe, a sandwich bag of marijuana, and a set of scales.
Prior to the police officer's arrival, Shrum picked up a cell phone from an ottoman within two to three feet of Jones. Knowing that the cell phone belonged to Jones, Shrum searched through the cell phone for fifteen to twenty minutes and wrote down text messages from the phone. Shrum placed the cell phone back on the ottoman prior to the police officer's arrival.
Officer Speer arrived to supervise Jones as the probation officers continued to search the apartment. Speer testified he smelled marijuana when he entered the apartment, but had no reason to detain Jones when he first arrived. Speer observed the cell phone on the ottoman but did not pick it up. Speer was shown the contraband discovered by Beamer, and Speer asked Jones if the items belonged to him. Jones admitted to possession of the items. Jones was then arrested inside the apartment, handcuffed, and placed in the patrol car. A canine unit was called to conduct a search of the apartment.
After the canine search, Speer seized a potato pipe, a sandwich bag of marijuana, and a scale. Speer did not directly pick up the cell phone. Shrum seized the cell phone after the canine unit conducted its search, which Shrum testified was one to two minutes after the arrest of Jones. Shrum gave the cell phone to Speer and showed Speer some of the relevant text messages.
Jones moved to suppress his statements admitting possession of the contraband and the evidence from the cell phone. After a hearing, the trial court denied the motion to suppress holding that Jones was not in custody at the time the statements were made and that the seizure of the cell phone was lawful as a search incident to a lawful arrest. Jones pled guilty to possession of marijuana with intent to deliver, a felony, in violation of I.C. § 37-2732(a)(1)(B) and reserved his right to appeal the denial of the motion to suppress. Jones was sentenced to a unified four-year term with two years determinate. The court suspended the sentence and placed Jones on probation for two years. Jones appeals.
Jones appeals the denial of the motion to suppress his statements to the police prior to his arrest and the evidence police obtained from searching his cell phone. The Supreme Court has stated the standard of review In reviewing a district court order granting or denying a motion to suppress evidence, the standard of review is bifurcated. State v. Watts, 142 Idaho 230, 232, 127 P.3d 133, 135 (2005). This Court will accept the trial court's findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous. State v. Diaz, 144 Idaho 300, 302, 160 P.3d 739, 741 (2007). However, this Court may freely review the trial court's application of constitutional principles in light of the facts found. Id.
State v. Purdum, 147 Idaho 206, 207, 207 P.3d 182, 183 (2009).
Although a warrantless entry or search of a residence is generally illegal and violative of the Fourth Amendment, such an entry or search may be rendered reasonable by an individual's consent. State v. Johnson, 110 Idaho 516, 522, 716 P.2d 1288, 1294 (1986); State v. Abeyta, 131 Idaho 704, 707, 963 P.2d 387, 390 (Ct. App. 1998). In such instances, the State has the burden of demonstrating consent by a preponderance of the evidence. State v. Kilby, 130 Idaho 747, 749, 947 P.2d 420, 422 (Ct. App. 1997). "[A] probationer's consent to searches constitutes a waiver of Fourth Amendment rights." State v. Purdum, 147 Idaho 206, 208, 207 P.3d 182, 184 (2009).
The determination of whether an investigative detention is reasonable requires a dual inquiry—whether the officer's action was justified at its inception and whether it was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place. State v. Roe, 140 Idaho 176, 181, 90 P.3d 926, 931 (Ct. App. 2004); State v. Parkinson, 135 Idaho 357, 361, 17 P.3d 301, 305 (Ct. App. 2000). An investigative detention is permissible if it is based upon specific articulable facts which justify suspicion that the detained person is, has been, or is about to be engaged in criminal activity. State v. Sheldon, 139 Idaho 980, 983, 88 P.3d 1220, 1223 (Ct. App. 2003). Such a detention must be temporary and last no longer than necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop. Roe, 140 Idaho at 181, 90 P.3d at 931; State v. Gutierrez, 137 Idaho 647, 651, 51 P.3d 461, 465 (Ct. App. 2002). Where a person is detained, the scope of detention must be carefully tailored to its underlying justification. Roe, 140 Idaho at 181, 90 P.3d at 931; Parkinson, 135 Idaho at 361, 17 P.3d at 305. In this regard, we must focus on the intensity of the detention, as well as its duration. Roe, 140 Idaho at 181, 90 P.3d at 931. The scope of the intrusion permitted will vary to some extent with the particular facts and circumstances of each case. Roe, 140 Idaho at 181, 90 P.3d at 931; Parkinson, 135 Idaho at 361, 17 P.3d at 305. Brief inquiries not otherwise related to the initial purpose of the stop do not necessarily violate a detainee's Fourth Amendment rights. Roe, 140 Idaho at 181, 90 P.3d at 931.
In this case, the probation and police officers entered the probationer's apartment with the probationer's consent pursuant to his probation agreement. Jones answered the door and did not object to the search. Additionally, the marijuana and other contraband that was found provided articulable facts that justified suspicion that Jones had engaged in criminal conduct, and temporarily detaining Jones during the remainder of the search was justified. In appealing the denial of the motion to suppress, Jones only argues that (1) his statements to the officer should be suppressed because he was in custody when the officer questioned him, and (2) the evidence from the cell phone should be suppressed because it was outside his immediate control when he was arrested.
Jones contends that his answers prior to his formal arrest should be suppressed because he was in custody and was not given Miranda1 warnings. The courts will suppress statements given during custodial interrogations when officers fail to administer Miranda warnings. Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 429 (1984). In State v. James, ___ Idaho ___, ___ P.3d ___ (Jan. 27, 2010), the Supreme Court recently addressed when a person is in custody stating:
The U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Miranda requires that "an individual held for interrogation must be clearly informed that he has the right to consult with a lawyer and to have the lawyer with him during interrogation." 384 U.S. at 471. Miranda warnings are required where a suspect is "in custody," a fact determined by "whether there is a `formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement' of the degree associated with a formal arrest." California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125 (1983) (per curiam) (quoting Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495 (1977) (per curiam)). To determine whether custody has attached, "a court must examine all of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation." Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 322 (1994). The test is an objective one and "the only relevant inquiry is how a reasonable man in the suspect's position would have understood his situation." Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 442 (1984).2
James, ___ Idaho at ___, ___ P.3d at ___.
"[A] court considering whether an individual is in custody `must consider all of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation.'" Id. (quoting State v. Doe, 137 Idaho 519, 523, 50 P.3d 1014, 1018 (2002)). It is the defendant's burden to show that he is in custody. Id. at ___, ___ P.3d at ___. Relevant factors include: the duration of the detention; the number of questions; the visibility of the interrogation; whether the defendant was informed the detention would be for an extended period of time; and whether physical restraint is used. Id. at ___, ___ P.3d at ___.
The James Court applied this analysis to a traffic stop on I-84 where the officer removed three occupants from the car and, after getting consent to search, found a pipe and methamphetamines in the car. Id. at ___, ___ P.3d at ___. The officer did not know who the drugs belonged to and threatened to arrest all three occupants if no one took responsibility. James then admitted to possessing the contraband. He argued that the officer's threat of arrest put him in custody. However, the Court ruled that the officer's "statement...
To continue reading
Request your trial