State v. Pratt

• Decision Date: 28 January 2021
• Docket Number: No. 98066-7,98066-7
• Citation: 196 Wash.2d 849,479 P.3d 680
• Parties: STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Cory PRATT, Petitioner.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

196 Wash.2d 849

479 P.3d 680

STATE of Washington, Respondent,

v.Cory PRATT, Petitioner.

No. 98066-7

Supreme Court of Washington.

Argued October 20, 2020

Filed: January 28, 2021

Steven Whitman Thayer, Steven W. Thayer, 112 W. 11th St. Ste. 200, Vancouver, WA, 98660-3344, Mark W. Muenster, Attorney at Law, 1010 Esther St., Vancouver, WA, 98660-3028, for Petitioner.

Rachael Rogers, Colin Patrick Hayes, Clark County Prosecuting Attorney's Office, P.O. Box 5000, Vancouver, WA, 98666-5000, for Respondent.

Yu, J. ¶ 1 This case concerns the eligibility criteria of the special sex offender sentencing alternative (SSOSA), which requires offenders to have "an established relationship with, or connection to, the victim such that the sole connection with the victim was not the commission of the crime." RCW 9.94A.670(2)(e). We are asked to determine whether an offender is eligible for SSOSA where he and the victim shared a family member in common, but did not have a direct relationship. We conclude that Cory Pratt was not "connected" to his victim as required by RCW 9.94A.670(2)(e) and is therefore ineligible for a SSOSA sentence. We affirm the Court of Appeals and remand the case to the trial court for resentencing.

BACKGROUND

¶ 2 In July 2016, Pratt and his daughter attended his cousin's birthday party. Several young girls spent the night after the party, including M.B., the 10-year-old daughter of Pratt's aunt's stepsister. Pratt slept in a backyard tent with the girls. The next day, M.B. told her grandmother and parents that Pratt had touched her in the tent. M.B. testified that Pratt touched her arm, her lower back, and rubbed her crotch. 2 Verbatim Report of Proceedings (VRP) (Oct. 2, 2017) at 152-56. M.B.’s mother contacted police. In October 2016, Pratt was charged with one count of child molestation in the first degree. After a two-day bench trial, Pratt was found guilty of the charge.

¶ 3 Pratt requested a SSOSA sentence pursuant to RCW 9.94A.670. The State objected, arguing that Pratt was ineligible because he did not have an "established relationship" with M.B. as required by the statute:

Here, [Pratt] had only met this victim a few hours before the actual crime took place ... maybe just over 12 hours after he had met her.

So there clearly is not an established relationship.

3 VRP (Jan. 5, 2018) at 349. Pratt countered that he was eligible for SSOSA because his connection with M.B. was "easily established" through "familial ties." Id. at 353. Pratt elaborated:

[T]his is not a situation where he just showed up at a bus stop to grab the kid or abducted the kid, and that's the sole connection.

I would argue that the sleepover itself is sufficient to satisfy the statute in that he was there as, you know, a helping adult at this party with his own daughter there, so there's additional connection to this child other than the crime.

Id. at 354.

¶ 4 The court agreed with Pratt:

[I]t's very close, tenuous, but there is some connection. They may not have really met, but there is a connection. They knew—he knew of the child. He knew of the parents. There is some time there spent. This was not brought together where he sought out the victim for the purposes of committing the act.

Id. at 360.¹ The court sentenced Pratt according to SSOSA, reducing his sentence from 57 months of confinement to 12 months.

¶ 5 The State appealed Pratt's sentence. In a published split opinion, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court, concluding that Pratt was ineligible for SSOSA. State v. Pratt , 11 Wash. App. 2d 450, 454 P.3d 875 (2019). Pratt filed a petition for review, which we granted. 195 Wash.2d 1023, 464 P.3d 231 (2020).

ANALYSIS

¶ 6 Once a defendant has been convicted of a sex offense, the trial court has the discretion to impose a SSOSA sentence. State v. Osman , 157 Wash.2d 474, 482, 139 P.3d 334 (2006). However, in order to be eligible for SSOSA, an offender must meet the statutory criteria.

John Doe G v. Dep't of Corr ., 190 Wash.2d 185, 192, 410 P.3d 1156 (2018) ; RCW 9.94A.670(2). As SSOSA eligibility is a question of statutory interpretation, our review is de novo. State v. Petterson , 190 Wash.2d 92, 98, 409 P.3d 187 (2018).

¶ 7 Pratt's eligibility for SSOSA turns on whether he meets the requirement set forth in RCW 9.94A.670(2)(e) :

The offender had an established relationship with, or connection to, the victim such that the sole connection with the victim was not the commission of the crime.

¶ 8 At trial, Pratt testified that he had little interaction with M.B., at most handing her a marshmallow skewer and asking her name. But Pratt contends that because there was a familial connection between Pratt's family and M.B.’s family, his crime was not the "sole connection" to M.B. The State maintains that Pratt is ineligible for SSOSA because the legislature did not intend SSOSA to apply to offenders like Pratt, who did not have any recognized relationship with their victim prior to the molestation.

¶ 9 We agree with the State and affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.

¶ 10 Our primary duty in statutory interpretation is to ascertain and carry out the legislature's intent. State v. Bigsby , 189 Wash.2d 210, 216, 399 P.3d 540 (2017). We first examine a statute's plain meaning by construing the words of the statute itself and giving effect to that plain meaning. State v. Hirschfelder , 170 Wash.2d 536, 543, 242 P.3d 876 (2010). To determine the plain meaning, we review the text and " ‘the context of the statute in which that provision is found, related provisions, and the statutory scheme as a whole.’ " State v. Ervin , 169 Wash.2d 815, 820, 239 P.3d 354 (2010) (quoting State v. Jacobs , 154 Wash.2d 596, 600, 115 P.3d 281 (2005) ). "If after this inquiry the statute is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation, it is ambiguous." State v. Jones , 172 Wash.2d 236, 242, 257 P.3d 616 (2011). We may then turn to statutory construction, relevant case law, and legislative history to discern legislative intent. Id .

¶ 11 It is unclear from the plain meaning of RCW 9.94A.670(2)(e) what degree of association is required between an offender and his or her victim. The first clause of the statute, "[t]he offender had an established relationship with, or connection to, the victim," suggests a familiarity between offender and victim that existed prior to the sexual offense. But the second clause of the statute, "such that the sole connection with the victim was not the commission of the crime," taken literally, seems to widen the scope of possible associations to any two people with some contact prior to the sexual offense.

¶ 12 These competing clauses resulted in a split decision in the Court of Appeals. The majority emphasized the first clause, holding that the word "established" modified both "relationship" and "connection," and that Pratt's minimal contacts with M.B. during the party—giving M.B. a marshmallow skewer and asking her name—were not sufficient to qualify as an established relationship or connection. Pratt , 11 Wash. App. 2d at 459-460, 454 P.3d 875. The dissent, however, focused on the broader language in the second clause, interpreting the "sole connection" to mean any connection outside of the assault:

Therefore, the real question is not whether the connection between the offender and the victim rose to a certain level. The question is whether the sole connection between the offender and the victim was the commission of the crime.

Pratt, 11 Wash. App. 2d at 465, 454 P.3d 875 (Maxa, C.J., dissenting).

¶ 13 RCW 9.94A.670(2)(e) ’s first and second clauses do appear to be at odds. But " ‘[s]tatutes must be interpreted and construed so that all the language used is given effect, with no portion rendered meaningless or superfluous.’ " State v. Roggenkamp , 153 Wash.2d 614, 624, 106 P.3d 196 (2005) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v. J.P ., 149 Wash.2d 444, 450, 69 P.3d 318 (2003) ). "Established relationship" would be superfluous if any "connection" between offender and victim made an offender eligible for SSOSA, so long as the crime was not the "sole connection" between the two. Similarly, we cannot assume the second clause carries no meaning. As we must assume that the legislature intended both clauses of RCW 9.94A.670(2)(e) to carry legal weight, the statute is ambiguous.

¶ 14 Washington courts have not yet defined the requisite connection between an offender and victim that triggers SSOSA eligibility.² Some cases touch on the issue tangentially, but none directly address it. For instance, in State v. Landsiedel , the Court of Appeals concluded that "victim" in RCW 9.94A.670(2)(e) refers to the direct victim of the sexual crime, not a third party impacted by the offender's crimes. 165 Wash. App. 886, 892, 269 P.3d 347 (2012). In State v. Willhoite , the Court of Appeals held that an offender convicted of possession of child pornography was ineligible for SSOSA because

under the plain language of the statute ... the defendant must have had an established relationship with the victim. Here, it is undisputed that Willhoite did not have a relationship with any of the victims. He was therefore ineligible for a SSOSA.

165 Wash. App. 911, 915, 268 P.3d 994 (2012). Notably, the Court of Appeals summarized RCW 9.94A.670(2)(e) entirely by the "established relationship " language. But as Willhoite had never met his victims, it was unnecessary for that court to interpret any nuance in RCW 9.94A.670(2)(e). As courts have not yet resolved the ambiguity of RCW 9.94A.670(2)(e), we next review legislative history.

¶ 15 The state legislature enacted SSOSA in 1984 to permit trial courts to suspend the sentences for first time offenders in exchange for treatment and supervision. SUBSTITUTE H.B. 1247, 48th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 1984). The legislature developed the sentencing alternative with recommendations from the Sentencing Guidelines Commission, which in turn relied on input from treatment professionals and victim advocates....