State v. Jones, 9542-1-I
| Decision Date | 28 June 1982 |
| Docket Number | No. 9542-1-I,9542-1-I |
| Citation | 32 Wn.App. 359,647 P.2d 1039 |
| Parties | STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Larry Richard JONES, Appellant. |
| Court | Washington Court of Appeals |
Jon Zulauf, McKay & Gaitan, Jose E. Gaitan, Seattle (Court-appointed), for appellant.
Norman K. Maleng, King County Pros. Atty., James Lobsenz, Deputy Pros. Atty., Seattle, for respondent.
Defendant Larry Jones appeals his sentencing to Western State Hospital following his acquittal, by reason of insanity, of second degree assault. We affirm.
Jones is a former University of Washington mathematics graduate student. In 1979, Jones left school to work on a project in San Diego relating to the Northern Tier pipeline. During his work, Jones discovered what he believed to be falsified data prepared for a cost analysis of the project. After becoming convinced that company officials desired to kill him because of his discovery, he contacted the Federal Bureau of Investigation. He subsequently returned to Seattle.
At about 8:30 on the evening of March 2, 1980, Jones left his West Seattle home with the intent of hitchhiking to the Canadian border. He carried a gun for personal protection and planned to seek landed immigrant status, which he equated with "political asylum," at the border. Jones received a ride to the University District and was let off near the freeway. From there, he walked onto the campus, hoping to obtain a ride as far as Bellingham.
After walking about the campus, Jones sat down on a university-owned Cushman scooter parked in a university parking lot and waited for a ride. He began rocking the scooter back and forth and "fooling" with the brake. A campus plainclothes police officer driving an unmarked vehicle observed Jones in the scooter and stopped.
Jones testified that the man (who he did not know was an officer) asked him "cordially" what he was doing. Jones said nothing and started to get out of the scooter and then heard the officer call out that the scooter had started to roll. Jones returned to set the brake and was sitting in the scooter when the officer ordered him to "(c)ome over here." Jones demanded to know who he was, but the officer neither then nor later identified himself. The officer got out of his car; Jones "scrambled" out of the scooter and observed that the officer had a gun. Jones then showed his gun. The officer looked at Jones' gun and began to reach for his own gun. Jones pointed his gun at the officer, who put his hands up. Jones then searched the officer and attempted to handcuff him with the officer's handcuffs. A struggle ensued and two shots were fired, but neither was injured. Additional police officers soon arrived and arrested Jones.
Although the officer's testimony is substantially in accord with Jones', it differs in certain material respects. The officer testified Jones said nothing when he asked, "(H)ow are you doin'?". Instead, Jones stepped out of the scooter and began an unrequested approach toward the officer. He came within 5 feet of the officer's car when the officer called out that the scooter had begun to roll. The officer, holding a portable radio in one hand, got out of his car while Jones was setting the brake. Jones, who had said nothing, then turned and drew his gun. The officer had not reached for his own gun. The officer did testify he had not identified himself as a police officer.
Jones was initially sent to Western State Hospital for observation and evaluation. Prior to trial, a hearing was held to determine whether Jones was competent to stand trial and whether the State's motion to impose an insanity plea should be granted. Jones and his counsel were present. Jones was questioned by his counsel and by the trial judge concerning his understanding of the proceedings. The trial judge also had before him a report, signed by three Western State doctors, advising that Jones was insane at the time of his action, but was competent to stand trial. Jones was therein diagnosed as suffering "(s)chizophrenia, chronic paranoid type." It was also reported that Jones could generally converse in a rational manner, but could not explain his conduct at the time of the incident, and that, upon arrival, Jones was "alert and oriented, but very assaultive, belligerent and uncooperative." One of the doctors testified at the hearing. The trial judge found Jones competent to stand trial. After further argument by counsel, and over defense objections, the trial judge directed that a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity be entered on Jones' behalf. The ruling was based upon the following conclusions:
There was a substantial possibility that the defendant was legally insane at the time of the alleged act.
Conclusion of law No. 1.
(There) was a substantial danger that failure of the court to enter the insanity plea on behalf of the defendant would result in the conviction of defendant notwithstanding strong evidence that he was not legally responsible for his acts due to insanity.
Conclusion of law No. 2.
Due to the strong possibility that defendant was mentally not responsible for the alleged criminal act, the court was compelled to exercise its inherent power to enter an insanity plea on defendant's behalf. State v. Smith, 88 Wash.2d 639, 643, 564 P.2d 1154 (1977).
Conclusion of law No. 3. The trial judge also appointed amicus counsel, based upon the following conclusions:
The deputy prosecuting attorney, has indicated that he will ask the jury to return a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity as the State's "first choice" verdict, but that he will request the return of a guilty verdict as a "second choice". Due to the deputy prosecutor's divided appeal to the jury, the court concludes that the defendant's constitutional rights would not be fully protected by the evidence and argument which the State intends to present.
Conclusion of law No. 4.
Defense counsel ... having properly advised the court that he intends to abide by his client's wishes and to vigorously oppose any suggestion of defendant's insanity, the court concludes that defendant's constitutional rights are not fully protected without appointment of amicus counsel.
Conclusion of law No. 5.
The jury found Jones not guilty by reason of insanity, and made the following findings upon the special verdict form authorized by RCW 10.77.040:
(3) If (you find defendant was insane at the time of the act charged), is the defendant a substantial danger to other persons unless kept under further control by the court or other persons or institutions?
(Answer: Yes)
(4) If (you find defendant was insane), does the defendant present a substantial likelihood of committing felonious acts jeopardizing public safety or security unless kept under further control by the court or other persons or institutions?
(Answer: No)
(5) If your answer to either No. 3 or No. 4 is "yes," is it in the best interests of the defendant and others that the defendant be placed in treatment that is less restrictive than detention in a state mental hospital?
(Answer: Yes)
The trial judge thereafter sentenced Jones to confinement in Western State Hospital.
Jones first contends the trial judge erred in entering a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity on his behalf and over his objection. We do not agree.
A trial judge possesses "inherent power to impose the insanity defense sua sponte over objection of defendant and his counsel." State v. Smith, 88 Wash.2d 639, 642-43, 564 P.2d 1154 (1977). This power arises from the trial judge's duty to uphold the state and federal constitutions, which preclude the conviction of an insane defendant, State v. Strasburg, 60 Wash. 106, 110 P. 1020 (1910), and to raise " 'matters which may significantly promote a just determination of the trial.' " State v. Smith, supra, 88 Wash.2d at 644, 564 P.2d 1154 quoting ABA Standards Relating to the Function of the Trial Judge § 1.1(a), at 7 (Approved Draft, 1972).
Jones argues that his case is factually distinguishable from Smith : that Smith was obviously less competent than he; that the peculiar facts in Smith and Smith's demeanor left no doubt that he was insane when the incident occurred and that an insanity defense would prevail at trial; and that there was no viable defense in Smith except insanity. We do not agree.
A trial judge can best determine a defendant's competency to stand trial because he can observe the defendant's behavior and demeanor. State v. Hanson, 20 Wash.App. 579, 581 P.2d 589 (1978). A trial judge is in the best position to decide whether a particular defendant is more competent or less competent than Smith. Indeed, both Smith and Jones were found competent to stand trial. Although both counsel stipulated to Smith's competency, they did so on the basis of expert medical opinion comparable to that presented in this case.
Moreover, a finding of competency to stand trial does not settle the question of whether a defendant was sane at the time of his alleged criminal act, for "(t)he test for a finding of not guilty by reason of insanity and the test for a finding of incompetency to stand trial are not the same." State v. Tate, 74 Wash.2d 261, 264, 444 P.2d 150 (1968). A defendant is competent to stand trial if he is able to testify, to understand the nature of the charges, to comprehend the mechanics or consequences of a trial, and to assist and confer with his attorney, State v. Maryott, 6 Wash.App. 96, 492 P.2d 239 (1971), concerning such matters as recalling facts and identifying witnesses. 21 Am.Jur.2d Criminal Law § 96 (1981).
This standard (for trial competency) is designed to indicate whether the accused knows enough about the facts of the case to relate them coherently to his or her attorney and to understand the nature of the proceedings. It is not intended to measure whether the defendant is also capable of making intelligent decisions on important matters relating to the...
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