State v. Jones

• Decision Date: 09 June 1983
• Docket Number: No. 49016-3,49016-3
• Citation: 99 Wn.2d 735,664 P.2d 1216
• Parties: The STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Larry JONES, Petitioner.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

Page 735

99 Wn.2d 735

664 P.2d 1216

The STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Larry JONES, Petitioner.

No. 49016-3.

Supreme Court of Washington,

En Banc.

June 9, 1983.

McKay & Gaitan, Jose Gaitan, Franco, Asia, Bensussen, Coe & Finegold, Jon R. Zulauf, Seattle, for petitioner.

Norman K. Maleng, King County Prosecutor, Deborah Phillips, Deputy Pros. Atty., Seattle, James Lobsenz, Sp. Deputy Pros. Atty., Seattle, for respondent.

UTTER, Justice.

This case presents the question of when a court may enter a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity (NGI) over a defendant's objection. We hold that, as long as the defendant is competent to stand trial, a court may rarely, if ever, take such action but that it does have a duty to assure the defendant's waiver of an NGI plea is intelligent and voluntary. Because the court in the present case did impose an NGI plea on a competent defendant and we find that error prejudicial, we reverse and remand for a new trial.

Petitioner, Larry Jones, was charged with second degree assault while armed with a firearm. At trial, he pleaded not guilty, claiming self-defense, and sought to forgo any NGI plea. At the prosecutor's request, however, and over Mr. Jones' strenuous objections, the trial court entered an NGI plea for him and appointed amicus counsel to argue the insanity defense. The jury returned a verdict finding that Mr. Jones had committed the acts charged, but was insane at the time. The jury also recommended that Mr. Jones undergo less restrictive treatment than commitment to a state mental hospital; however, the court nonetheless ordered commitment because Mr. Jones indicated he would not cooperate with less restrictive treatment.

The alleged assault took place around midnight on March 2, 1980 at the University of Washington when Leif Granrud, a plainclothes campus police officer, drove up to Mr. Jones in an unmarked car. Both Mr. Jones and Officer Granrud agree that, when Officer Granrud questioned and approached Mr. Jones, Mr. Jones drew a pistol. They struggled when Officer Granrud grabbed the gun and during the struggle two shots were fired. Help arrived before anyone was hurt.

Outside this general outline, Mr. Jones' and Officer Granrud's versions of the incident differ. Mr. Jones testified that he drew his gun only because Officer Granrud, who never identified himself as a police officer, made a motion toward a gun on his hip. Officer Granrud, while conceding that he did not identify himself, denied making any motion for his gun. Further, he testified that Mr. Jones threatened to abduct him and that, when he asked how he could be sure that the gun was loaded, Mr. Jones threatened to shoot him and cocked the gun. Mr. Jones, on the other hand, testified that he only intended to hold Officer Granrud until help arrived and only threatened to shoot him in the leg if he didn't stay in the car where Mr. Jones had placed him. Mr. Jones also testified that the gun went off accidentally.

Because Mr. Jones told a rather unusual story about fearing for his life and planning to seek political asylum in Canada, the court ordered an inquiry into his competency to stand trial. Several psychiatrists, including one retained for the defense, examined Mr. Jones and concluded he was competent to stand trial; however, all but one also indicated to the court that they believed Mr. Jones was a paranoid schizophrenic and was insane at the time of the alleged assault.

The court found Mr. Jones competent to stand trial. It then considered the State's motion that the court enter an NGI plea over Mr. Jones' objection. After hearing argument, the court granted that motion, concluding only that there was a "strong possibility" that Mr. Jones had a valid insanity defense and that there was a "substantial danger" he would be convicted if it was not asserted. The court also directed that amicus counsel be appointed to present the insanity defense. Finally, the court denied Mr. Jones' motion to bifurcate the trial into a "guilt" ¹ phase and an insanity phase, though it did rule that the State could introduce evidence of insanity only after the defense presented its case.

The trial proceeded as ordered by the court and, after Mr. Jones presented his case, the State sought to prove he was legally insane. To do this, it called two of the psychiatrists who had examined Mr. Jones to determine his competency, one a state psychiatrist and one the defense psychiatrist. Mr. Jones objected to the latter psychiatrist's testimony on the ground that it was subject to attorney-client privilege, but his objection was overruled.

The jury was instructed on both self-defense and insanity and returned the verdict described above. After being committed to Western State Hospital, Mr. Jones brought this appeal. The Court of Appeals affirmed in all respects ( see State v. Jones, 32 Wash.App. 359, 647 P.2d 1039 (1982)) and Mr. Jones petitioned for review by this court.

I

A

Refusing to enter an NGI plea can be viewed as both one-half of a guilty plea--since one is guilty only if one both does a proscribed act and is mentally responsible at the time--and as an aspect of defense strategy. The extent to which a defendant has a right to refuse to plead NGI is therefore intertwined with any right he has to plead guilty and/or control his own defense.

In Washington, both such rights exist. While there is no federal constitutional right to plead guilty ( North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 38 n. 11, 91 S.Ct. 160, 168 n. 11, 27 L.Ed.2d 162 (1970)), such a right has been established in this state by court rule. CrR 4.2(a) confers upon informed defendants the right to plead guilty unhampered by the wishes of the State. State v. Martin, 94 Wash.2d 1, 5, 614 P.2d 164 (1980).

In addition, a defendant has a constitutional right to at least broadly control his own defense. In Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975), the United States Supreme Court held that a defendant has a constitutional right to represent himself at trial: "The Sixth Amendment does not provide merely that a defense shall be made for the accused; it grants to the accused personally the right to make his defense." Faretta, at 819, 95 S.Ct. at 2533. Moreover, this right of self-representation does not arise as an aspect of the right to counsel, but is "independently found in the structure and history of the constitutional text." Faretta, at 819 n. 15, 95 S.Ct. at 2533 n. 15.

The language and reasoning of Faretta necessarily imply a right to personally control one's own defense. See Singer, The Imposition of the Insanity Defense on an Unwilling Defendant, 41 Ohio St.L.J. 637, 656 (1980); Chused, Faretta and the Personal Defense: The Role of a Represented Defendant in Trial Tactics, 65 Cal.L.Rev. 636, 651 (1977). In particular, Faretta embodies "the conviction that a defendant has the right to decide, within limits, the type of defense he wishes to mount." United States v. Laura, 607 F.2d 52, 56 (3d Cir.1979). See also North Carolina v. Alford, supra 400 U.S. at 33, 91 S.Ct. at 165 (quoting Tremblay v. Overholser, 199 F.Supp. 569, 570 (D.D.C.1961) ("[courts] should not 'force any defense on a defendant in a criminal case,' particularly when advancement of the defense might 'end in disaster ...' ")); Frendak v. United States, 408 A.2d 364, 376 (D.C.1979) (philosophy underlying Alford and Faretta is that "respect for a defendant's freedom as a person mandates that he or she be permitted to make fundamental decisions about the course of the proceedings").

The rights to plead guilty and control one's own defense are not absolute, however. A defendant exercising his right of self-representation, and thus by implication a defendant exercising his right to control his own defense, must " 'knowingly and intelligently' " relinquish the benefits he forgoes and "should be made aware of the dangers and disadvantages" of his decision. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835, 95 S.Ct. at 2541. Similarly, a court may not accept a guilty plea unless it is intelligent and voluntary. Alford, 400 U.S. at 31, 91 S.Ct. at 164; Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 1711, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969). In addition, a defendant must be competent to make these intelligent and voluntary decisions. See Sieling v. Eyman, 478 F.2d 211, 215, 221 (9th Cir.1973) (competency to plead guilty); State v. Kolocotronis, 73 Wash.2d 92, 101, 436 P.2d 774 (1968) (citing Westbrook v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 150, 86 S.Ct. 1320, 16 L.Ed.2d 429 (1966) (per curiam) (competency to represent self)).

B

Courts have taken two basic approaches to the particular question of whether a court may sua sponte impose an NGI plea on an unwilling defendant. See Note, The Right and Responsibility of a Court to Impose the Insanity Defense Over the Defendant's Objection, 65 Minn.L.Rev. 927, 928-29 (1981) (hereinafter Minn. Note). The first is that taken by the District of Columbia Circuit (hereinafter D.C. Circuit) of the United States Court of Appeals. It recognizes a broad discretion in the trial court to enter an NGI plea sua sponte whenever necessary in the pursuit of justice. See Whalem v. United States, 346 F.2d 812, 818-19 (D.C.Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 862, 86 S.Ct. 124, 15 L.Ed.2d 100 (1965). In exercising its discretion, the court is to weigh various factors, including the defendant's opposition to asserting an insanity defense, the quality of the defendant's reasoning, the viability of the defense, the court's personal observations of the defendant, and the reasonableness of the defendant's decision. United States v. Wright, 627 F.2d 1300, 1311 (D.C.Cir.1980). The rationale for the rule is that society has "[an] obligation, through the insanity defense, to withhold punishment of someone not blameworthy." Wright, at 1310; Whalem, at 818. This, the D.C. Circuit has concluded, distinguishes Alford and Faretta. See Wright, at 1309-10.

In Frendak v. United States, supra, in...